Japanese Taiwan

Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy

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Ethnic Diversity, Two-Layered Colonization, and Complex Modern Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan

Chih Huei Huang

Preface

Following the end of Japanese rule in 1945, Taiwan entered what should have been a postcolonial period of its history. In theory, after liberating themselves from the political control of their colonial overlords, citizens of a newly independent colony proceed to revive their freedom of independent discourse: intellectuals re-examine colonial texts, reinterpret history from the viewpoint of the colonized, heal the scars of colonization, and so on. The former European colonies that gained independence shortly after World War II went through—more or less—this process of “decolonization” (Moore-Gilbert 1997; Loomba 1998).

Over the past seventy years, however, Taiwan has followed a markedly different historical path. Although Taiwan began “de-Japanization” after Japan’s defeat, it was not the colonized Taiwanese who led the movement. Those colonized Taiwanese did not start producing significant amounts of independent discourse until after the lifting of martial law in the late 1980s (as will be seen below), the same time that Taiwanese postcolonial research began to appear. But this wave of research, based mainly on literary sources, did not discuss what had occurred after Japanese colonization; rather, it sought to break free from the Republic of China (ROC) and the repressive national identity the Chinese had imposed (Chen 2003; Lu 2003).

At the end of the colonial period, Taiwan’s population numbered less than 6 million. When the Pacific War ended, over 300,000 ethnic Japanese left the island that had been their home for nearly five decades. Soon after, 1.1 million Chinese soldiers and civilians poured into Taiwan from the mainland as a result of the Chinese Civil War. These Chinese soldiers and civilians, who before the outbreak of civil war had just finished fighting the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), had a “postwar” relationship with

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Japan and are thus unsuitable subjects for a discussion of “postcolonialism” in Taiwan. Local Taiwanese, however, who had just broken free from colonial rule as a result of Japan’s defeat, were still constructing a “postcolonial” relationship with Japan. These two “Japans” coexisted within Taiwanese society for half a century. What attitudes toward Japan did the interactions of these views produce? This sociocultural phenomenon has received very little attention from academics, and postcolonial theories developed to explain former Western colonies do not explain it either.

In recent years, Taiwan has been described as a “Japanophilic” nation, yet one where contradictions and paradoxes abound. Japanese citizens of the prewar generation who visit Taiwan seem to find long-lost friends in their Taiwanese counterparts; a few words are all it takes for them to understand one another. Younger Japanese who come harboring a sense of postcolonial guilt are surprised at the warm reception they meet with from the Taiwanese and further perplexed to hear their praise for the actions of the colonial government.

Still more perplexed, in fact, are the first generations of the Taiwanese educated by the ROC. Their history textbooks taught them how the congenitally cruel Japanese slaughtered innocent Chinese and oppressed the people of Taiwan, but their parents (or grandparents) love Japanese culture and converse in Japanese with friends. They might recall sleeping on tatami mats in Japanese-style rooms as toddlers, but then they also recall hearing their parents talk about Japanese brutality toward the Chinese in the war.

Beginning in the 1990s, Japanese-style product advertisements, tatami rooms, and department stores began popping up all over Taiwan even as discussion of Japan-related issues in the media still provoked explosive emotional extremism. Controversy has persisted into the twenty-first century: Kobayashi Yoshinori’s hot-selling manga Taiwan-ron (On Taiwan) provoked a war of words in Taiwan with its comments that the Japanese government never lied to Taiwanese “comfort women”; surprisingly, many Taiwanese agreed with this view (Huang 2001; Li 2002). Similarly, when well-intentioned Japanese gathered donations in 2006 to refurbish a Takasago Volunteer Units memorial in Taiwan, the ROC government forcibly removed it and filed a lawsuit because it opposed the idea of memorializing soldiers who fought for Japan (Huang 2009: A12). Events like these give rise to public controversy because they reveal the contradictions and conflicts that result from Taiwanese ethnic groups’ very different attitudes toward Japan. How have these postwar and postcolonial relationships coexisted in the same society for the last seventy years?

The difficulty of research on Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan

Just two years after the end of World War II, an English-based system of foreign language instruction was instituted at Taiwanese universities; Japanese programs, by contrast, did not come into being until 1963. The private Chinese Culture University (Zhongguo wenhua daxue, founded in 1962 as Far East University [Yuandong daxue]) led the way by setting up a Japanese division under its Department of Oriental Languages and Literature in 1963. Thereafter, the policy was to allow one Japanese
studies program to be established at a private university once every three years: this was first introduced in Tamkang University in 1966, then in Fu Jen Catholic University in 1969 and Soochow University in 1972. Unable to create full Japanese departments, these schools had to resort to Japanese studies divisions set up under broader “Oriental languages and literature” departments. Then Japan severed diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1972, and the growth of Japanese studies came to an abrupt halt. Of the forty universities in Taiwan, only four private schools offered Japanese programs. Not until 1989 did a national public university (National Chengchi University) establish a Japanese-language division under its Oriental languages and literature department; by then, English departments had been around for forty-two years.

Once a public university had broken the taboo, Japanese programs proliferated rapidly: beginning in 1989, public and private universities established fourteen Japanese departments or divisions, and vocational and technical schools added fifty more. Once the restrictions of the Nationalists’ martial law were gone, there was a rush to meet the demand (Cai 2003).

By 1945 overall primary school enrollment had reached 70 percent, a complete system of secondary and technical education was in place, and considerable numbers of Taiwanese had earned degrees from universities in Japan. By these standards, Taiwan probably had more potential as a center for Japanese studies than any other country outside of Japan. However, only a year after assuming control over Taiwan, the ROC government banned the publication, circulation, and use of Japanese newspapers, magazines, and books. Local intellectuals protested, but their objections went unheeded. After the February 28th Incident broke out in 1947, and the resulting KMT targeted killing of Japanese-educated Taiwanese intellectuals, there were no more debates on preserving the use of Japanese. The books on Japan published in Taiwan before martial law was lifted in 1987 were written by waishengren (“provincial-outsider,” i.e. “mainlander”) authors who took as their starting point the historical experience of the Chinese War of Resistance. Some, speaking as victors in the war, censured Japan, while others recalled the hardships of the war and the tremendous animosity between China and Japan; all, however, perpetuated wartime attitudes toward Japan. Narratives like this dominated the Taiwanese book market for forty years, a phenomenon I have previously referred to as one of substitution—taking local Taiwanese ruminations on Japanese rule and replacing them with the discourse of an external group. No such phenomenon of substitution occurred in other former Japanese colonies.

Under KMT party-state rule between 1945 and 1987, historical research that did not meet the government’s ideological needs—such as studies of the Chinese Civil War, the early PRC, or Japanese-era Taiwan—was roundly suppressed. The few writings on Taiwanese history that did emerge were penned by Chinese-born historians (Guo 1954), not the colonized Taiwanese who had experienced fifty years of Japanese rule. The fields of historical research and education tilted strongly toward Chinese history for at least forty years after the war. The first master’s thesis on Taiwanese history did not appear until 1966; the first Ph.D. dissertation was submitted in 1982. Only 10 percent of history theses pertained to Taiwanese history, and the minority of those that dealt with the Japanese period concerned themselves chiefly with resistance
movements (Peng 2002; Liu 2003: 67–78). The first academic society devoted to Taiwanese history, the Taiwanese Historical Association, was not established until 1995. Looking at the publication of autobiographies in Taiwan, one finds a similar imbalance: waishengren autobiographies outnumbered those of Taiwanese by a ratio of 20:1 between 1945 and 1964 and 10:1 between 1945 and 1974, even though locals comprised at least 80 percent of the population (Wang 1996: 161–5).

Stung by their country’s defeat in World War II, Japanese historians categorically repudiated Japan’s colonial conduct and tended to place Taiwan at the margin of a Greater Chinese historical framework; as a result, little research on Taiwanese history has been undertaken in Japan (Kabayama 2003: 17–24). Also, due to the nature of the colonial relationship, many sources were scattered between Japan and Taiwan, making research difficult. Only after the loosening of speech restrictions in the 1980s were Taiwanese historical source materials organized and made available. Japanese research produced more results after the late 1980s, but by that time, sources had been lost and many members of the colonial generations had died.

Double-layered postcolonial structure and nonlinear ethnic relationships

A study of Taiwan’s complicated postcolonial ethnic structure also requires a short historical treatment. As described in the earlier chapters in this volume, the hybrid culture and tense rivalries between the Taiwanese Hoklo, Hakka, and Austronesian Aborigines was complicated even further after the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895. A new group of migrants came from all over Japan to the newest territory of their empire. Their own customs and dialects differed, but the naichijin (Japanese nationals living in Taiwan) became a new ethnic category. In 1905, they numbered merely 50,000; by 1945 their ranks had swelled to more than 300,000, or 6 percent of the population, more than the Austronesians (3 percent) but less than the Hoklo (75 percent) and the Hakka (13 percent) (Nanpō 1944; Taiwan zongdu 1992). By the end of the colonial era, many second- and third-generation naichijin considered Taiwan as their home (Yan 2008: 173–217), but (as Dawley describes in Chapter 6) they were repatriated to Japan by mid-1947.

At the same moment an influx began of 1.1 million Chinese Nationalist soldiers and officials—refugees from many different mainland provinces who spoke very different Chinese languages and dialects and observed very different customs. But because they did have more in common with each other historically than with the Taiwanese, they became a new single ethnic group, the waishengren “provincial-outsiders.” These native citizens of the Republic of China had been taught for decades about their nation as a Republic of Five Races (Han Chinese, Manchurian, Mongolian, Chinese Muslim, and Tibetan) that combined to form a single national “Chinese people” (Zhonghua minzu). In postwar Taiwan, the ROC sought to instill this ideology of nationalism through the national education system. The Austronesians, whose different origins were most obvious, were a particular target: they were required to adopt Chinese-style names and accept the myth that they too were the descendants of Chinese civilization.
The myth of a single national race did not weaken until the end of martial law. One of the first challenges to it was the “Return Our Land” campaign launched in 1988 (one year after the end of martial law) by the Association for the Advancement of Aboriginal Rights, established four years earlier. Also in 1988, Hakka began to seek the restoration of their basic social and cultural rights. A year later, constitutional scholar Koh Se-kai proposed a new draft constitution centered around “cultural pluralism” to replace the five-race Zhonghua minzu with a system consisting of Taiwan’s four major cultural groups: Hoklo, Hakka, Aborigines, and mainlanders (Ko 1991).

In the constitutional reforms that began in 1991, the Aborigines’ official name was changed from shanbao (“mountain comrades”) to Yuanzhumin (“Indigenous People”). The change was momentous, for it signaled the ROC government’s acceptance of the Austronesians’ status as the original inhabitants of Taiwan. Once it was acknowledged that the waishengren were the last ethnic group to come to Taiwan, the Zhonghua minzu ideology lost its legitimacy. As each community campaigned to revitalize its language and culture, the notion of four major ethnic groups gradually became established in the central government and became widely accepted in Taiwanese society. With the rise in ethnic consciousness came an increase in academic research: the years since 1991 have seen the establishment of three colleges and thirteen departments of Hakka studies as well as fourteen Aboriginal Studies departments and research centers (Wang 2008: 20–9).

These shifts in Taiwanese ethnic identification and the corresponding re-evaluation of Taiwanese history are not all that different from historical experiences of decolonization in other parts of the world. The difference is, the target of decolonization was the distorted view of history and ethnicity imposed by another people after the first colonial overlords had already departed; considered from this perspective, the uniqueness of Taiwan’s postcolonial experience is immediately apparent.

After martial law was lifted in 1987, oral accounts by former colonial subjects began to emerge, oral and written narratives of the once-taboo February 28th Incident began to be published, and personal histories written in Japanese began to appear. Emerging after four decades of suppression, these once colonized voices swept over the publishing world, their narratives mostly focusing on personal life experiences and comparing life under the Japanese with life under the KMT. Although the authors belonged to different professions, social classes, and genders, their accounts exhibit a high degree of similarity due to the historical experiences they shared. They were not men and women of letters, nor were they scholars or researchers, but Japan was intertwined in their seemingly ordinary life experiences. If one wants to analyze Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan, these accounts are a good place to start.

In terms of genre, most of these personal experiences were written in Japanese as biographies, memoirs, poems, journal entries, or collections of testimony. Most were self-published at the author’s own expense; only a few were formally published by publishing companies. Some were published in Japan, others in Taiwan; even today they continue to emerge. One such genre was the body of short poems written by former Taiwanese colonial subjects. Impossible to publish in Taiwan, these poems circulated among poetry aficionados in Taiwan for many years before finally
being published in Japan beginning in 1994 (where they were dubbed the "Taiwan Martyrshu"), attracting widespread attention in Japanese poetry circles. After martial law ended, Taiwanese senryu poets formed a poetry society in 1990 to satirize current events and look back on past experiences with their haiku-like three-line ironic poems. Many educated by the Japanese through high school and beyond could now join poetry societies to study, giving voice to their inner emotions with their succinct verses. Naturally, Japan was an important theme of their poems, which represent attitudes toward Japan held by ordinary Taiwanese (Huang 2003a: 115–46).

If one relies only on personal (or ethnic group) memories and perceptions, there is the problem of the imprecision and fluidity of memory; these must be read in combination with the research on Japan, Taiwanese history, and ethnic relations discussed above to truly understand the causes and effects of events. As if by some tacit agreement, these four types of knowledge all accumulated at an amazing rate after the end of martial law. This sudden liberation was significant not only for the former colonial subjects but also for the many rank-and-file waishengren who also suffered during the White Terror, for now their records of events like the Protect Diaoyutai movement (bao Diao yundong) could be published and discussed openly. As though to prove that the shackles of the second colonialization had finally been shattered, every action of the former colonial overlords was spread out in the sunlight to be scrutinized. Colonialism's influence extended not only to the colonized Taiwanese but also to the Japanese naichijin who came to Taiwan in the first half of the twentieth century and the waishengren who arrived after they left. The relationship between these two groups combined with their separate relationships with local Taiwanese groups to form an even more complex spectrum of attitudes toward Japan (Huang 1989; Huang 2006a: 51–75, 2006b). Multiple layers of historical experience have mixed with multilateral ethnic interactions to form a nonlinear, asymmetrical, continually evolving relationship structure.

Changes before and after February 28th: Transformation, comparison, resistance

Reading through the memoirs and other autobiographical writings of former colonial subjects over the last twenty years, one notices an obvious common characteristic: in order to resist the discrimination and oppression imposed by an alien people (the Japanese), intellectuals originally held out hope for the Republic of China on the mainland, but all that changed dramatically after the February 28th Incident. It was not only the victims and their families who were transformed but intellectuals and ordinary people as well, especially the Hoklo.

Although this transformation is discussed mainly in literature, there is no lack of more concrete historical evidence. For instance, in the diaries of Yang Jizhen (1911–1990), written in Japanese for four decades beginning in 1944, one can get a look at it. Born in a small town in central Taiwan, Yang developed a deep dissatisfaction with Japanese discrimination during his time at school. Later, as a student at Japan's Waseda University, he and other Taiwanese students often contemplated how to change the status of the colonized Taiwanese population. After he graduated with
outstanding grades, he took a job as a technician in Manchukuo, hoping to be nearer to the ancestral home of his heart. To his dismay, after the war, “When I returned to Taiwan in May 1946, the Taiwan I saw was completely different from the one I used to live in. There was no difference between Chen Yi’s absolute power and the colonial power formerly held by the Japanese—in fact, [Chen’s] power was even more barbaric, ignorant, unenlightened and unfair. The people of Taiwan live in secret discontent.” He then added, “Only now do I begin to reflect critically on the dream of my ancestral homeland I had pursued so desperately” (Huang and Xu 2007: 693).

The inward confessions of these lines reveal the deep disappointment that comes when high expectations go unfulfilled. There was now something to compare Japanese colonial rule to. This mind set of comparison was mentioned by Ong Lok-tek (1924–1985) in 1960:

Most of the 10 million Taiwanese of today have lived through two different eras, which they compare when considering anything. It's just like how when we move to a new place, we compare the new house to the old; it's human nature. However, if the result of the comparison is that the Japanese era was better, that's a really serious problem.... Actually, the Taiwanese themselves never dreamed that things would get so bad that they would be forced to compare them with how they used to be. (Ong 1970: 103–4)

After February 28th, a few Taiwanese fled overseas to escape arrest and execution at the hands of the new government. Ong and Shi Ming are two examples; the latter was originally discontented with Japanese colonial rule and hoped to travel to the “ancestral country” to seek strength to resist Japan. Later, having suffered the disillusionment of his expectations being turned to despair, he thought that KMT rule was a more arbitrary and exploitative form of foreign rule than Japan’s had been, so he campaigned for Taiwanese independence from his new home in Japan, not returning to Taiwan until the 1990s (Shi 1994). Another path was followed by Taiwanese Communists like Xie Xuehong, who fled to the Chinese mainland after the failure of February 28th, hoping to use China’s strength to liberate Taiwan from KMT rule. However, these were choices that could be made by a very few individuals. The great majority of Taiwanese intellectuals who, like Yang Jizhen, stayed in Taiwan tried contesting local elections in the 1950s and cooperating with the faction of waishengren opposed to Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship, but their efforts failed. The following decade saw waishengren liberals like Lei Zhen and Yin Haiguang suppressed by the powerful party-state machine. Yang finally chose to relocate to the United States, where he fought for the establishment of an independent new nation, even considering cooperating with the CCP to escape unreasonable ROC rule.

What methods of resistance were available for the much larger number of Taiwanese unable to emigrate or throw themselves into politics? The KMT’s high-handed campaign of “de-Japanization” disparaged Japanese education as “slave education” (mihuā jiaoyu), robbed intellectuals of their main language of communication, and stigmatized the high level of educational and cultural capital the Taiwanese had worked so hard to achieve. After February 28th, Japanese songs,
movies, and other media remained banned, and even native Taiwanese songs and 
movies were suppressed. As a result, Japanese disappeared from the public sphere 
(except in Aboriginal areas), but it survived in private in families, clubs, friends, and 
journals, eventually re-emerging into the open with the tidal wave of poetry, journals, 
novels, and other writings that gushed forth following the end of martial law.

From these texts one can observe a unique form of resistance: the same people who 
had been unwilling to learn Japanese as colonial subjects studied the language with 
enthusiasm once it had been forbidden by the KMT, an attitude expressed in spirited 
*senryū* such as Gao Shousou’s “Never have I studied Japanese so hard as—after the 
war” and Li Zhuoyu’s “Reject Mandarin until the end of my days; let this be my vow.” 
Speaking only Japanese and one’s native dialect, like Hoklo, became a way to proclaim 
one’s distinct identity (Huang 2003a: 129–31).

On a spiritual plane, many Taiwanese found the “Japanese spirit” (*Yamato-
damashii*) which had been instilled in them during the colonial period—particularly 
during mobilization for the war—more persuasive than Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles 
of the People so widely promoted by the KMT. That spirit helped them overcome life’s 
adversities and embodied the spiritual values these people hoped to pass on to their 
embodies hard work, integrity, keeping one’s word, and other virtues” in contrast with 
its opposite, the “Chinese style” (Cai 2001: 240, 243). One can see the importance of 
*Yamato-damashii* to the so-called “Nihongo generation” of Taiwanese who insisted on 
using Japanese in their daily lives. But were they really Japanese, or were they willing 
to become Japanese? This is a deeply misunderstood question in the postwar ethnic 
relations of Taiwan.

“I was a Japanese until I turned 22,” said former ROC president Lee Teng-hui, 
for example (Shiba 1994); “Taiwan is my ancestral land; Japan is my motherland” 
(Ke 2005), said another; “I’m a sushi-eating, enka-singing Japanese—or so I seem, 
anyway,” added a third. The new hybrid culture that grew up during the colonial 
period belonged neither entirely to Japan nor to old Taiwan; one could say it was 
both, a phenomenon of dual identity that can be seen everywhere in the world where 
colonialism once flourished. However, because this dual identity was suppressed 
under a new regime, it went through a process of transformation, comparison, and 
resistance, developing into a peculiar expression of self-identity.

In addition, because Japanese was the best linguistic tool the Taiwanese had to 
express themselves, it was easily misunderstood or maliciously distorted, on one 
hand by the *waishengren* (as seen in two poems by Wang Jinyi: “All I did was show 
a little Japanese-style politeness, yet I was called ‘Japanese devil’” and “As soon as 
he heard me humming a Japanese tune, he called me a ‘natural-born slave’”), on the 
other by the Japanese themselves (some referred contemptuously to their reciting of 
Japanese poetry as “living off Japanese feces”), and even by their own children who, 
having been educated after the war, lacked understanding of history and the Japanese 
language (Wang Jinyi, quoted in Huang 2003a: 126, 133, 141). Reading their words for 
myself, I have come to believe that after undergoing a process of transformation and 
comparison, these Taiwanese came to a remarkably subtle and balanced interpretation 
of the Japan of the past, as evidenced by this *senryū* of Li Zhuoyu’s: “Let us destroy
all past attachments and hatreds/And start over again." Faced with the reality of Japan’s departure, they overcame the grievances and sorrows of colonization and used sarcasm to criticize the postwar Japanese government, as seen in Li’s senryū, “The country on earth most satisfying to abuse/Is Japan” and “To be betrayed and, before that, abandoned: the history of Taiwan” (Imagawa 2006). Some even published books in Japan castigating postwar Japanese policy, “instructing” a younger generation of Japanese from their high position as “elders” (senpai). Perspectives like this, refracted through the prisms of a dual colonial history and complex ethnic relations, require a new methodology to be fully understood.

The allure of Chinese nationalism: Original homeland, “half-mountain people,” and the left wing

China’s early-twentieth-century anti-Manchu and anti-Japanese nationalism had little to do with Taiwan. Some Taiwanese intellectuals, however, did see Chinese nationalism as a force they could rely on to resist imperial Japanese colonization and assimilation. The attraction was especially strong for the Hakka, who had always been more mindful of their yuanxiang ("original homeland"). After the end of World War II, the Hakka were pulled in one direction by their idea of their yuanxiang in China, and in the other direction by the Japanese colonial assimilation they had experienced together with the Hoklo, which led them to identify themselves as Taiwanese (bênhôngêng). Postwar historical research generally interprets the conflict with the newly arrived mainlanders as a form of shengji maodun ("friction between people of different provincial origins"), but this point of view completely ignores the differences between the Hoklo and the Hakka.

That the Hakka survived for hundreds of years in Taiwan without being assimilated by the Hoklo, who greatly outnumbered them, attests to the cultural resilience of the former. Recent scholarship on Hakka social and political history has shown that proportionally fewer Hakka were victims of the February 28th Incident because their population was concentrated in agricultural areas, whereas the cities where most of the killing took place were populated mainly by the Hoklo; in fact, some waishêngêng fleeing from angry Taiwanese took refuge in Hakka villages. However, during the White Terror and “village cleanup” that followed, rural Hakka left-wing sympathizers were killed in greater proportion than the Hoklo (Xiao and Huang 2001: 398–9).

From a cultural perspective—language, ancestor worship, education for imperial examinations, and so on—the Hakka placed greater emphasis on the idea of China in their imagination of nationality. For example, although Dai Guohui (1931–2001) also fiercely criticized the Chiangs’ rule during martial law, he took exception to Taiwanese independence advocates like Ong lok-tek and Shi Ming:

The fathers of the Taiwan independence movement ... the notion of a Taiwanese race that they advocate—that the Taiwanese have developed into a people separate from the Chinese, and the self-determination they demand on that basis, is a fiction that has collapsed of its own accord... [I hope] the “quasi-border” of the
Taiwan Strait may open soon and the people of both sides may become the sort of "Chinese people" anticipated by Nixon. All Chinese—whether on the left or on the right, on the mainland or on an island—are compatriots. (Dai 1989: 179, 228)

In the same book, Dai mentions the February 28th Incident, which he experienced, and expresses sympathy for his waishengren "compatriots" persecuted by the Hoklo, who in his view had been aggressors no different from the Japanese (1989: 107–8).

Hakka author Wu Zhuoliu's autobiographical works also demonstrate his own unique attachments to China and interpretation of February 28th. Born in 1900, Wu was thoroughly Japanese-educated, but influenced by his grandfather's stories of Chinese culture, he worked to resist Japanese assimilation and spent time in Nanjing during World War II. February 28th marked the beginning of his disappointment with his ancestral home, however. With a reporter's keen powers of observation, he criticized the role played in the incident by so-called "half-mountain people" (banshanren): Taiwanese (both Hoklo and Hakka) who, dissatisfied with Japanese colonial rule, had gone to China (metonymized as the "mountain," Tangshan) to seek assistance. After the war, many returned to Taiwan with the KMT and became part of the ruling class. Wu explicitly rebuked them for assisting the government to hunt down local intellectuals during their 1947 assault. (Knowing the danger of making such thoughts public, however, he requested that his words not be published until ten years after his death [Matsuda 2006; Ren 2008].) While some Taiwanese (Hoklo and Hakka alike) kept their faith in "China" despite the turmoil of the February 28th Incident, many others felt betrayed by their new compatriots and were alienated from any sustainable Chinese nationalism. These two psychological courses differed immensely; their ideas of nation-building were irreconcilably different, and the differences are reflected in their attitudes toward Japan.

The Hakka, in particular, had to find a way to survive as a minority caught between two more powerful groups, the Hoklo and the waishengren. In terms of cultural consciousness, their ideas of yuanxiang and zuguo ("motherland") were closer to the mainlanders'. At the same time, they also feared Hoklo chauvinism in the Taiwanese independence movement. Their memories of the early colonial period stressed their armed anti-Japanese resistance, while the Hoklo, by contrast, tended to stress Japan's later efforts to modernize Taiwan and their experiences fighting alongside the Japanese in the war, and often in their memoirs they viewed Japan as their motherland (Cai 2001; Ke 2005). However, as one Hakka researcher put it,

At present there are two versions of Taiwanese history: one that portrays Chinese culture as the root of Taiwanese culture, and one that ostensibly focuses on Taiwanese culture but is actually narrated from a Hoklo point of view. Neither version acknowledges that Taiwanese culture also includes the Pingpuu (plains Aborigines, largely assimilated or driven into the mountains by Chinese settlers), Aborigines and Hakka. (Xiao and Huang 2001: 632)

The Hakka are often ignored by being lumped under the vague heading of "Taiwanese," even though their experiences, loyalties, and ideals have differed.
greatly from those of the Hoklo majority which has been able to more successfully define the "Taiwanese" experience.

Tribal village meets nation-state: Aborigines, Japan, and the Republic of China

Taiwan's ethnic groups have never been equally represented: some are enormously outnumbered by others. In terms of population size, the Austronesian Aborigines are the smallest group. However, with nearly twenty tribes, the Aborigines are extremely diverse, and the area of their traditional lands comprises over half of Taiwan. While some tribes number in the hundreds, others number in the tens of thousands, and their languages, cultures, living spaces, and social organizations also differ greatly. This complex combination of factors complicates outsiders' efforts to understand Aboriginal history and identity.

As described in earlier chapters of this volume, the first efforts to comprehensively study these diverse, complex Aboriginal peoples of tremendous vitality who had no written language came from the Japanese government, whose quest to alter their way of life and incorporate them into a modern nation-state began in the late nineteenth century. Before interacting with Taiwan's Aborigines, Japan had expanded its national control over the Ainu of Hokkaido and the indigenous Ryukyuan peoples after centuries of contact with southwestern and northeastern natives. By contrast, a significant number of Aborigines of Taiwan were incorporated into the empire over a very short time, a colossal project completed at a huge price.

The Aborigines encountered the Japanese under very different circumstances than the Hoklo and Hakka had. How to claim sovereignty over them under international law was a question that vexed Japan. The Japanese eventually adopted a deliberately ambiguous approach, treating the Aborigines as a rebellious group that had never accepted Qing imperial authority; since Japan had inherited Taiwan from the Qing, the new government had a duty to "put down" rebellions whenever they occurred. The Japanese knew, however, that this was not a valid legal interpretation, so they proceeded gradually, prioritizing appeasement over force—at least in many cases where access to valuable natural resources were not being obstructed. Whenever an Aboriginal group agreed to accept Japanese rule, a kijunshiki "allegiance ceremony" would be arranged to announce the new addition to the empire.

The kijunshiki were designed for the participation of individual villages or districts. The Aborigines saw the ceremonies as "reconciliations"; some tribes gave up their weapons after being defeated in battle, while others used peaceful negotiations to obtain favorable terms. The Japanese official Records of Aborigine Administration (Riban shiko, 1895–1926) mention over seventy such ceremonies, most in the north. Camphor trees could be found in abundance throughout the Atayal tribe's mountainous territory in central and northern Taiwan, and the Japanese, anxious to harvest valuable camphor, met fierce resistance when they pushed to establish a line of outposts called the aiyusen that effectively shrank the Aborigines' territory. During this period (1896–1920), some 151 battles or skirmishes were fought between the Japanese and Aboriginal groups, most in Atayal territory. In many other areas,
however, tribal leaders negotiated for peace, and no record of kijunshiki exists. After the largest offensive, the Taroko Battle, ended in 1914, Japan declared victory in its five-year campaign against the Aborigines. However, it had come at great cost. Japan settled on the name of banchi (“savage land”) for Aboriginal territory and used police officers to rule it in a manner distinct from the way the plains were governed.

During the Japanese era, police officers and their families were essentially the only Japanese to travel deep into Aborigine territory. Beginning in 1910 or so, Japanese farmers and fishermen began immigrating to the Karenkō (Hualien)—Taitō (Taidong) coast, settling in an arc of nearly twenty villages, of which Yoshino (with a population of 1,500) was the largest. Other Japanese who bought land on the east coast lived more or less in isolation. Thus the Aborigines of the east had a greater variety of interactions with the Japanese; some even acquired agricultural or fishing skills from them. Most Aborigines, however, called the mountains home, and the police officers there were surrounded by Indigenous villagers with few or no Japanese to keep them company.

By the 1930s there were 5,000 policemen in Aborigine territory, about as many as there were on the plains. Of course, the population of the plains was much greater, so the ratio of police to locals was far higher in Aboriginal areas. Leo Ching has written that “the role of the police in the aboriginal territory was to instill awe and dread of imperial authority” (2001: 136). In fact, half of the police officers in the Aboriginal areas were keishu, a low rank that existed only in those areas; they functioned as assistants to the other officers. Japanese nationals accounted for only a minority of keishu in the 1930s; the rest were split evenly between Taiwanese islanders and Aborigines; later still, village seinendan or youth groups assisted the police (Ishimaru 2008). Besides their military and law enforcement responsibilities, the police were involved in everything from judicial administration, education, and social guidance to public health and economic development, and they even helped mediate disputes over hunting grounds; meanwhile, their wives taught things like etiquette and sewing. This work was also uniquely dangerous; from 1904 to 1929 more than 2,600 police officers or their family members were killed by resisting tribes, compared to 1,400 civilians. Even the Aborigine Administration (riban) authorities admitted that “serving in such dangerous areas where fighting might break out at any time is a duty not found in other parts of the empire” (Yagashiro 2008: 519, 808–10).

In the mid-1920s, headhunting incidents gradually ceased as the Atayal tribes of the Central Mountains, particularly the Eight She (Aboriginal villages) of Hokusei (Beishi), submitted to Japanese authority. The colonial government then turned to economic development, road building, and education (Dali 2001), as riban officials began to describe these special subjects as “unsullied,” “lovable,” and “childlike” instead of “dim-witted, violent and cruel” (Yamaji 2004: 100). The electric fence along the aiyusen in the northern and central mountains was removed; it had been installed as a deterrent to resisting tribes, but a third of those killed by accidental contact with it were police officers.10 It was because tensions had finally subsided that the Washe Incident, a violent rebellion by Seediq tribesmen in 1930, came as such a shock to riban authorities. In the aftermath of the incident, Governor-General Ishizuka Eizō, his administrative chief, the head of Taichū Prefecture (where the incident occurred),
and the police chief all assumed responsibility and resigned, provoking a thorough re-evaluation of riban policy.

In the new riban policy announced by new governor-general Ota Masahiro, special emphasis was placed on appointing “sober, level-headed” officers to Aboriginal areas, where they would remain in their given areas and win the trust of the Aboriginals by means of a “human-centered” approach. The officers were also expected to learn the local tribe's language, understand its unique psychology, and take its culture and customs seriously, and avoid the use of violence. These were all major changes. The new riban policies were printed and distributed as a handbook, which the police officers dubbed the “riban constitution.” Based on the officers’ subsequent treatment of the Aboriginals, scholars agree that the new policy was faithfully carried out (Kondō 1993: 6–11). The memoirs of Dali Kakei, a descendant of the chiefs of the Eight She of Beishi, attest to the image of hardworking, enlightened police officers (Dali 2001: 130–57). The new “gentle” policy lasted until 1939.

Following its declaration of war against China, Japan launched its “national spirit general mobilization movement” in 1937 and passed the National General Mobilization Law the following year. In keeping with the new policy, Japan once again began appointing military governor-generals to Taiwan and announced the beginning of the kōmin'ka (imperialization) movement. Riban officials did not come up with a policy response until a plenary meeting in March 1939, by which point large numbers of police officers in Aboriginal areas were being recalled to Japan for military service. At the meeting, it was decided to develop the Aboriginals into “benevolent self-ruling citizens” and introduce them to a new way of living. This included many modern notions such as using mosquito nets, toilets, and bathrooms, introducing more Japanese-style clothing, cultivating “national spirit,” and training to become subjects of the emperor—in other words, accelerated Japanization to meet the needs of the wartime system.

Having grown up under the softened policy of the 1920s and the “gentle” policy of the 1930s, a new generation of Aboriginals came of age as Japan was mobilizing for battle. These young Aboriginal men surprised their Japanese officials with their thirst for battle and eagerness to prove their loyalty to the nation, and the exploits of the native “Takasago Volunteers” (Takasago giyūtai) became legendary. In a mere fifty years, the colonists had won the heartfelt loyalty of a significant number of the ethnic minorities they ruled. On the battlefields of the south Pacific, Aboriginal soldiers saved the lives of many Japanese, and this experience of being brothers-in-arms left a mark on that generation’s attitudes toward Japan that endured long after war’s end.

A generation that included Japanese-literate Aboriginals had recently appeared; beginning in the 1930s, many started submitting articles in publications like Riban no tomo (“Aboriginal Administrators’ Companion,” 1932–1943). From these submissions, one can see how fervently many Aboriginals strove to be outstanding Japanese citizens and to cleanse themselves of the “savage” stigma. After the war, a few Aboriginal elites left memoirs, letters, and diaries which, together with oral interviews, court testimony, and reportage, comprise a treasure trove of written information on, among other things, their attitudes toward Japan. There were no differences apparent
between elite men of different tribes, but there is a lack of material from the nonelite as well as women, which might explain the overwhelming impression that a whole generation of Aborigines indeed became loyal subjects.\footnote{Note here.}

From these texts and fieldwork, I have observed that due to their innate respect for fighting spirit and strict distinctions among social classes, the Aborigines, compared to the plains people, felt it easier to adapt psychologically to wartime mobilization. Many Hoklo and Hakka youth of the same generation also exhibited devotion to “Japanese spirit” (Zheng 1998), but others went through a psychological transformation, as embodied in this Japanese poem by Hoklo Huang Delong: “I recall I hated Japan when I was a Japanese soldier/But now I write this poem as a Japanophile/What a marvelous thing!” (Huang 2003a: 131). The Aborigines’ psychological transformation, by contrast, came before the war; for example, Walis Piho, a descendant of the Musha rebels, recalled, “At that time, I had forgotten the Musha Incident, forgotten my father; all I thought about was how to show loyalty to the country” (Hayashi 1998). The greatest difference was that the Aborigines had no notion of a yuaxiang or zuguo in China—Taiwan was the only home they had ever had, and Japan was their first country; they did not hesitate because they had no other choice.

When the Aborigines who had fought as Japanese soldiers returned to Taiwan and saw the Chinese troops on the island, the shock of the realization that their “country” had changed hands was much greater for them than for their counterparts on the plains. Did Japan have the right under international law to do what it did by signing the Treaty of San Francisco—give up the people and land over which it had assumed sovereignty via kijunshiki—without telling them? From many Aborigines’ perspectives, the new rulers were handed complete authority over Taiwan’s native peoples without having to pay the smallest part of the price of blood and treasure the Japanese had sacrificed to win it.

Under the Japanese, the leading members of the Tsou and Atayal tribes had already grasped the idea of self-rule, and like the plainsmen they were jailed or executed for demanding it in the February 28th Incident. Thus they concealed their self-identification as educated Japanese citizens and the affection they had developed for the Japanese from fighting together in the war until they were able to voice these sentiments to Japanese people (or Japanese speakers) who visited their mountains in the late 1980s. Also, because the new “national language” of Chinese took time to permeate mountain villages, using it to conduct village affairs was infeasible; Japanese remained the lingua franca for some areas until the 1990s, and a new Creole or mixed language developed (Tsuchida 2008: 159–72). Despite never having received a Japanese education, many of the next generation of Aborigines learned Japanese from hearing it spoken at home and in public meetings; however, this did not occur among the Hoklo or the Hakka.

With the arrival of the waishengren, ethnic relations among the Aborigines changed. The Chinese chauvinism endemic among many waishengren did not take into account the cultural differences of the Aborigines, and indeed forced them to adopt Chinese names. Also, the government gave Aboriginal land to newly arrived ROC soldiers to farm. In 1955, waishengren comprised 1.1 percent of the
population in Aboriginal mountain areas; this increased to 4.9 percent ten years later (Li 1970: 80–1). Due to the large number of former soldiers among the waishengren, the male–female ratio among them in 1956 was 4:1; hence, intermarriage with all of Taiwan’s ethnic groups was inevitable. During the early 1950s, the government had forbidden low-ranking soldiers to marry; after the ban was lifted, many of these soldiers married young Aborigine women.

In the postwar curriculum put together by the waishengren, events like the Musha (Wushe) Incident were used to portray the Aborigines as models of resistance against the Japanese; no mention was made of their friendly relations with the Japanese after that. Mona Ludaw, the instigator of Musha, was honored with a place in the national Martyr’s Shrine, while the Aborigines who had lost their lives on the battlefields for Japan were forgotten (Huang 2006b).

The recoil of Chinese nationalism: New and old hatreds, threats foreign and domestic, and the entanglement of three “postwars”

Compared with Hoklo, Hakka, and Aboriginal perspectives of Japan, the views of the waishengren were shaped by completely different experiences.

According to historians’ estimates, during eight years of war between China and Japan, the ROC army suffered in excess of 3 million casualties, including 1 million dead, not to mention the incalculable economic losses. Prices soared, and hyperinflation nearly destroyed the nation’s finances (Li 1995: 22–5). Yet Chiang Kai-shek refused to seek reparations from Japan, to the great amazement and relief of the Japanese. Recent research indicates that although Chiang advocated leniency toward Japan, he never intended to refuse reparations; his hand was forced, however, by his fear that once the mainland had been lost, the United States and Japan would recognize communist China (Z. Huang 2009). Thus, in the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1952, the ROC expressed “magnanimity and friendship toward the people of Japan,” vowing to “repay enmity with virtue” (yi de bao yuan) in its postwar relations with Japan (Nagano and Kondó 1999: 160). This conspicuously generous position was in spite of the fact that the government, having just lost the mainland and fled to Taiwan, desperately needed financial and material assistance. Refusing reparations clearly was not in the immediate interests of the government or the people. After China’s first victory in a century of humiliations, the psychological foundation for “magnanimity and friendship” did not exist; the people’s accumulated suffering was too great. Chiang’s choice to “repay enmity with virtue” (and, conveniently, to advertise its charity toward Japan to the world) is important in calculating how the postwar was experienced in Taiwan. In return, Japan showed its support by sending officers to train Nationalist forces to fight their Civil War against the Communists, supporting the right of Chiang Kai-shek and his regime to rule Taiwan, and allowing the KMT to take possession of all its assets on the island.

With or without a foundation, this so-called “gratitude diplomacy” (ongi gaiko) endured for two decades before changing dramatically in the 1970s. First, when the United States elected to give control of the Ryukyus back to Japan, it planned to transfer the Diao-yutai Islands, abundant in fish and oil deposits, as well. This offended
the patriotic sentiments of students from Taiwan and Hong Kong studying in the United States, who joined together to organize large-scale street protests to “protect Diaoyutai.” The movement was fueled by high-octane Chinese nationalism: ranks of students from all over China and Taiwan shouted slogans like, “Down with Japanese militarism! Stand up, people of China! The Chinese people do not surrender!” (Lin 2001: 5, 519). The overseas students’ patriotic enthusiasm spread across the Pacific to the ROC, unleashing a tide of student movements the likes of which the martial law-era ROC had never seen, as well as a debate on Chinese nationalism.

Next, in September 1972, Japan established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and cut formal diplomatic ties with the ROC, marking an end to twenty years of “gratitude diplomacy.” The break happened to occur right after the Protect Diaoyutai movement (1970–1972) and the United Nations’ expulsion of the ROC (October 1971). Not only did the beleaguered KMT government have harsh words for Japan’s “rank ingratitude” but the people also demonstrated in protest. Students and professors issued a proclamation that was published in the *United Daily News* of September 30:

This treacherous, despicable treatment of the Chinese people is infuriating; if this is not unendurable, nothing is. We cannot hold back our accumulated animosity any longer. The tears of the eight-year War of Resistance have not yet dried, and already Japan sees profit and forgets justice, just like before. It is not only a galling humiliation to our country, but a provocation toward the sons and daughters of China as well.

They called on the people to take revenge by refusing to deal with Japanese businesses, watch Japanese films, listen to Japanese music, or eat Japanese food. Although these actions failed to present a real threat to Japanese interests, the sense of “galling humiliation” and “rank ingratitude” burned deeply into the hearts of the Protect Diaoyutai generation.

The intellectuals of the Protect Diaoyutai movement were the first generation in Taiwan to be born and educated under the ROC. Although the *waishengren* enjoyed relatively greater access to educational resources, they were not a majority. However, as one participant in the overseas movement put it,

Antipathy for Japan was the main impetus for the Protect Diaoyutai movement ... Those who participated were mainly Taiwan mainlanders and Hong Kong students; very few were local Taiwanese. In my own experience I found that although the Taiwanese students had all kinds of reasons for not taking part, the main one was a lack of hatred for Japan. If they did participate in the movement, they did so either because they opposed the KMT or because they were attracted to socialism. (Shui 2001: 716)

The Protect Diaoyutai movement in Taiwan was led mainly by *waishengren*. There were a few local Taiwanese who defended Chinese nationalism as fervently as the *waishengren*: “Nationalism is sincere love for one’s comrades, a sense of belonging
to one body. We want to unify China; what weapon could be more powerful than that?" However, the locals were much less involved in political activity; one Chinese student from Korea observed that "the local classmates were still deeply caught up in the tragedy of the February 28th Incident and the White Terror: 'Stay out of politics' was the guiding principle their parents drilled into them at every opportunity" (Xu 2001: 732).

From the above it is apparent that despite the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement and Zhonghua minzu-oriented education, attitudes toward Japan still differed by ethnic group. The passionately nationalist waishengren youth linked the Protect Diaoyutai movement with the May Fourth movement of the early republic, and they saw it as their duty to assume the mantle of "5000 years of history and culture, 130 years of national calamity and more than 20 years of exile" (Mao 2001: 519); this differed substantially from the historical experience of the local ethnic groups under the Japanese.

In fact, the Chinese nationalism the KMT government worked so hard to establish was a double-edged sword that, if used carelessly, could cut the hand that wielded it. In Taiwan, nationalism served to bring together and eliminate dissent among separate ethnic groups with differing views of Japan. Identifying with the Chinese who had triumphed in the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan was much more attractive to young people than identifying with the Taiwanese who had been in bondage for fifty years. Filled with naïve youthful enthusiasm, they were willing to devote themselves to the noble mission to liberate the suffering comrades on the mainland. Moreover, nationalism healed the rifts among the waishengren caused by the White Terror and the suppression of opposition parties.

Overseas, however, rampant anti-Japanese nationalist sentiment greatly damaged the ROC's reputation. Students saw the ROC government as weak and indecisive; to them, unifying China was the only way to grow strong enough to resist Japan. Thus some even resolved to accept the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China and, in the fervent hope that the Cultural Revolution would bring hope for China, rushed to visit the mainland. Once it realized the surge of nationalism had gotten dangerously out of control, the ROC government started clamping down on the students and teachers most active in the Protect Diaoyutai movement (Wang 1996: 364).

From the discussions above we see that the ROC government had to walk a tightrope between avoiding domestic criticism toward Japan and responding to the threat posed by the movement to unify China. Having lost the trump card of "gratitude diplomacy," the ROC responded to subsequent events in Japan—the history textbooks controversy, the prime minister's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and so on—the same way the PRC did, only without the authority or strength to speak for all of China.

As for the millions who had followed the KMT government to Taiwan, every international blow to the legitimacy of the ROC version of Chinese nationalism increased their sense of crisis. One second-generation mainlander, drawing on the experiences of his family, put it this way:

The formation of the waishengren identity was tied closely to early modern Chinese history. In terms of ideology, waishengren were limited to the KMT
view of history whether they agreed with it or not; in terms of destiny, because of the continuation of the civil war and the pressure of Taiwanese separatism, the *waishengren* became a kind of nebulous collective. Their common experience—of ushering in a new era, resisting foreign intrusion, enduring crushing defeat, migrating on a massive scale (a kind of KMT or *waishengren* version of the Long March), and then surviving threats domestic and foreign—has molded a strong and deep sense of identity and history that probably exceeds that of most other ethnic groups in China and Taiwan alike. (Yang 2008: 97–8)

Thus, the discouragement and frustration with which the *waishengren* perceived Japan were deeper and more complex than just having been “victims of aggression” during the war.

On the other hand, the three native Taiwanese ethnic groups now living in the ROC had taken part in the Pacific War as Japanese subjects. Yet the governments of both Japan and the ROC for decades avoided the duty to seriously handle the war’s legacy, including the issues of pay owed to soldiers and compensation for the families of the fallen, not to mention comforting the souls of the deceased. Instead, the task of negotiating with Japan for compensation and closure fell on private citizens. Recent incidents such as the Taiwanese Solidarity Union chairman Shu Chin-chiang’s 2005 visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the 2006 forced removal of the Takasago Volunteers memorial in the Atayal town of Wulai are part of the postwar legacy that needs to be addressed. It is clear that Taiwanese society is still entangled in three “postwars,” unable to resolve them and move on to the next stage of history.

Complex relationships resulting from the interweaving of ethnicity and history

In Taiwan, attitudes toward Japan have not developed in a regular, proportional, linear way, as they have in the United States, China, and Korea. When multiple ethnic groups live through multiple historical eras, these various elements influence each other in convoluted ways to produce a multilayered, nonlinear path of development, very much like a complex system. The notion of “complex systems” has developed over the last twenty years or so in the fields of information technology and natural science as a way of understanding nonlinear, diverse, and interconnected natural and human phenomena. This model can be applied to the present subject as well. Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan exhibit characteristics of a complex system: the frictious combination of similar yet distinct ethnic groups, interactions between different generations, and the multiple layers of issues have intertwined and accumulated to the extent that it is hard to untangle them all. The interactions within the system display fragility, unpredictability, contradictions, and chaotic tendencies. Using the notion of complex systems to analyze Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan helps us sort out the various layers and horizontal links.
As discussed above, attitudes toward Japan are a product of accumulated historical experience, but Taiwan's ethnic groups were separated into different areas on the island and had different relationships with one another in different historical periods, so their historical experiences differ. In this complex system, ethnicity is the most important factor in determining attitudes toward Japan. This includes four ethnic communities in modern Taiwan: the Aborigines, Hoklo, Hakka, and waishengren. Ethnicity is the primary determinant of historical experience, language, area of residence, livelihood, religious life, and cultural tradition. The system is open and unstable, for each ethnicity can be further divided into subgroups. The relationships among these ethnic groups over a century of turbulent history can be divided into at least two distinct types: (a) the colonizer and colonized, and (b) adversaries and allies. Type (a) includes two "postcolonial" relationships resulting from two different colonial periods, and (b) can be divided into six types of "postwar" relationships resulting from six wars.

(a) Relations between the colonizer and colonized: Between 1895 and 1945, the colonizers were the Japanese and the colonized were the Hoklo, Hakka, and Aborigines. Then, between 1945 and 1987, the colonizers were now the waishengren, and the colonized were the Hoklo, Hakka, and Aborigines. There were various types of relations between the colonizer and colonized: the most often discussed is that of resistance by the colonized. In a multiethnic society like Taiwan, resistance was often not simply one side versus another, but a triangular tug-of-war. Under the Japanese, the colonized could invoke the strength of the Republic of China to resist their colonial overlords. Under KMT-imposed martial law, however, the colonized used the spiritual strength they had acquired under the Japanese to resist the ROC's colonial rule.

Also, "postcolonial" relations should have developed immediately following the end of Japanese rule, but before that could happen in Taiwan, a second colonial era under the ROC had begun. Thus, when the government was no longer controlled by the waishengren, those who had lived under the Japanese as well entered into a doubly postcolonial era.

(b) Relations between antagonists or allies: Over the past 100 years or so, Taiwan's four major ethnic groups have participated in six large-scale conflicts and wars, namely: (1) Japan's initial conquest of Taiwan and the attending armed resistance (1895–1915), (2) the Japanese campaigns against the Aborigines (1896–1920), (3) the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), (4) the Pacific War (1941–1945), (5) the February 28th Incident and its aftermath (1947), and (6) the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949). The first four took place during the Japanese era, and the last two during the early years of KMT rule. Different wars were fought between different enemies, which meant that today's enemy might very well be tomorrow's ally. For example, the Japanese and the three Taiwanese ethnic groups were enemies in the early colonial era but fought on the same side in the Pacific War. Likewise, the native Taiwanese groups under ROC rule were pulled into war against the Communists, with whom they had hitherto had no quarrel. The fact that armed conflict took place in the framework of colonialism further complicated ethnic relations.

For the past 100 years, Taiwanese history has been closely tied to two countries, China and Japan. And during that period China and Japan have each gone through
multiple stages of rapid historical change. The Qing Dynasty, the ROC, and the PRC are three totally different polities; the same holds true for the Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa imperial polities and postwar Japan. Japan’s rule of Taiwan also went through three very different stages. Because Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan developed in the context of these multiple rapid historical changes, they exhibit the diversities we see today.

To distinguish the different attitudes toward Japan found in Taiwanese society, the first factor to look at should be ethnicity. Since different groups did not share the same past, that makes the historical experiences of Taiwan’s ethnic groups display nonlinear patterns of antagonism and cooperation. This is further complicated by the fact that there are over ten tribes of Aborigines, the waishengren came from all over China, the Japanese came from all over Japan, and Taiwan’s Hoklo and Hakka originated from different homelands and clans. Ethnicity, even though enlarged by many subgroups, can still be refracted into the postwar relationship as to view Japan from the angle of a foe and the quite ambivalent postcolonial relationship.

The second most important factor is generation. Each generation’s attitudes toward Japan were shaped by its education in school, at home, and through the mass media. Intermarriage between different ethnic groups gave rise to conflicting views of Japan within families, especially in the second and third generations, which have been affected greatly by the appeal of Japanese popular culture.

The third factor is governed by socioeconomic background: commercial interests, political factions, and the like also affected attitudes toward Japan, creating an open, interacting complex system. And this all in turn has been affected by the re-emergence of China as a superpower; the PRC’s insatiable demand on capital and human resources has drastically changed the political and socioeconomic balance in the Asian Pacific—and this sensation inevitably has affected Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan.

After the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, Taiwan’s society should have entered the historical phase of decolonization. However, the reality was different. Native Taiwanese (ethnic Hoklo, Hakka, and Taiwan Indigenous Peoples), that is, the previously colonized inhabitants, began to seriously take stock of the historical legacy of Japanese colonial rule, but this reflective evaluation appeared in a significant way only after 1987. This pivotal moment marked the end of the KMT’s forty-year period of martial law; only then could various “postwar” and “postcolonial” attitudes toward Japan be displayed equally among Taiwan’s ethnic groups.

As seen above, these two incompatible categories can be subdivided into multiple intertwining subcategories that make them difficult to figure out. So, is Taiwan “Japanophile” or “Japanophobic”? Are its people resisters or collaborators? Due to the complex nonlinear relationships among the island’s ethnic groups, attempting to understand them with the inductive methods of traditional behavioral science is not a trivial exercise. This chapter has endeavored to shed light on Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan with an analysis of the two most important factors that have shaped them: history and ethnicity, as the accumulated influence interwoven by these factors produced so-called complex systemic entanglements. It is my hope that this analysis
will help readers gain a different angle than simple stereotypes of “Japanophilic” or “Japanophobic” belief, and a better understanding of Taiwan’s uniquely abundant, multilayered social and cultural dynamics.

Notes

1. See, for example, Okada (2009) and Okada (1997).
2. Of the twelve books I have collected, only one fails to fit this pattern; see Huang (2006b: 156–8).
3. Ruan (1992) was the first book to break the taboo; after its publication, many other collections of interviews appeared, providing valuable historical testimony.
4. I previously have used these colonial texts that began to emerge in the 1990s in conjunction with anthropology-style fieldwork (Huang 2001: 222–50, 2003b: 296–314).
5. The “White Terror” refers to the period of martial law and anticommunist laws in Taiwan (1949–1992), during which thousands of people, including waisengren, were imprisoned or killed for their political views and opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s totalitarianism on the pretext of being Communist agents. The Protect Diaooyutai movement refers to a series of protests in 1970–1974 by students in Taiwan, Overseas Chinese, and Hong Kong people against Japanese claims of sovereignty over an archipelago known in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands.
6. The third type of text discussed in Huang (2006b) particularly reflects Lee Teng-hui’s influences from Japanese culture.
7. More literally “savage administration” or “savage policy.”
8. For example, there is no record of incidents or battles with the Tsou and Puyuma. The number 151 comes from my own calculations. For a table of Japanese battles with the Aborigines, see Yagashiro (2008: 796–805).
9. A total of 888 people had migrated to the eleven Japanese sugar cane villages in the Taidong area by the 1920s; a decade later, only 171 remained (Yamaguchi 2007: 217–53).
10. Between 1916 and 1926, there were twenty-seven people who died as a result of accidental contact with the electric fence; ten were Japanese policemen (Riban shikō 1918–1938, editions 1–5).
11. “If anyone tries to purposely distort the facts by saying the Japanese made no positive contributions to the Eight Tribes of Beishi,” wrote Dali Kakei, “his words will be utterly unconvincing.”
12. Yanagimoto (2000) is a work of literary reportage, presenting cases of war crimes against women.
13. See the debate between Huang Daolin and Mu Gu (Sun Qingyu) in Wang (1996: 388).