Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition

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1 Introduction

Firms frequently segment customers according to price sensitivity in order to price discriminate and increase profits. In some settings, consumer heterogeneity can be directly observed and a firm can base its pricing upon contractible consumer characteristics; in other settings, heterogeneity is not directly observable, but can be indirectly elicited by offering menus of products and prices and allowing consumers to self-select. In both cases, the firm seeks to price its wares as a function of each consumer’s underlying demand elasticity, extracting more surplus and increasing sales to elastic customers in the process.

When the firm is a monopolist with market power, the underlying theory of price discrimination is now well understood, as explained, for example, by Varian (1989) in an earlier volume in this series. On the other extreme, when markets are perfectly competitive and firms have neither short-run nor long-run market power, the law of one price applies and price discrimination cannot exist. Economic reality, of course, largely lies somewhere in between the textbook extremes, and most economists agree that price discrimination arises in oligopoly settings. This chapter explores price discrimination in these imperfectly competitive markets, surveying the theoretical literature.

Price discrimination exists when prices vary across customer segments that cannot be entirely explained by variations in marginal cost. Stigler’s (1987) definition makes this precise: a firm price discriminates when the ratio of prices is different from the ratio of

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1 Besides Varian (1989), this survey benefited greatly from several other excellent surveys of price discrimination, including Philips (1983), Tirole (1988, ch. 3) and Wilson (1993).

2 It is straightforward to construct models of price discrimination in competitive markets without entry barriers in which firms lack long-run market power (and earn zero long-run economic profits), providing that there is some source of short-run market power that allows prices to remain above marginal cost, such as a fixed cost of production. For example, a simple free-entry Cournot model as discussed in section 3.2 with fixed costs of production will exhibit zero long-run profits, prices above marginal cost, and equilibrium price discrimination. The fact that price discrimination can arise in markets with zero long-run economic profits suggests that the presence of price discrimination is a misleading proxy for long-run market power. This possibility is the subject of a recent symposium published in the Antitrust Law Journal (2003, Vol. 70, No. 3); see the papers by Baker (2003), Baumol and Swanson (2003), Hurdle and McFarland (2003), Klein and Wiley (2003a, 2003b), and Ward (2003) for the full debate.

marginal costs for two goods offered by a firm.\textsuperscript{4} Such a definition, of course, requires that one is careful in calculating marginal costs to include all relevant shadow costs. This is particularly true where costly capacity and aggregate demand uncertainty play critical roles, as discussed in section 8. Similarly, where discrimination occurs over the provision of quality, as reviewed in section 6, operationalizing this definition requires using the marginal prices of qualities and the associated marginal costs.

Even with this moderately narrow definition of price discrimination, there remains a considerable variety of theoretical models that address issues of price discrimination and imperfect competition. We further limit attention in this survey to the straightforward setting of symmetric firms competing in a retail market; even here, there are numerous theories to explore. These include third-degree price discrimination (section 3), purchase-history price discrimination (section 4), intrapersonal price discrimination (section 5), second-degree price discrimination and nonlinear pricing (section 6), product bundling (section 7), and demand uncertainty and price rigidities (section 8). Unfortunately, we must prune a few additional areas of inquiry, leaving some models of imperfect competition and price discrimination unexamined. Among the more notable omissions in this chapter are price discrimination in vertical structures,\textsuperscript{5} imperfect information and costly search,\textsuperscript{6} the commitment effect of

\textsuperscript{4}Clerides (2001a) contrasts Stigler's ratio definition with a price-levels definition (which focuses on the difference between price and marginal cost), and discusses the relevance of this distinction to a host of empirical studies.

\textsuperscript{5}For example, in a vertical market where a single manufacturer can price discriminate across downstream retailers, there are a host of issues regarding resale-price maintenance, vertical foreclosure, etc. As a simple example, a rule requiring that the wholesaler offer a single price to all retailers may help the upstream firm to commit to not flood the retail market, thereby raising profits and retail prices. While these issues of vertical markets are significant, we leave them largely unexplored in the present paper. Some of these issues are considered elsewhere in this volume; see, for example, Rey and Tirole (2003).

\textsuperscript{6}The role of imperfect information and costly search in imperfectly competitive environments has previously received attention in the first volume of this series (Varian (1989, ch. 10, section 3.4) and Stiglitz (1989, ch. 13)). To summarize, when customers differ according to their information about market prices (or their costs of acquiring information), a monopolist may be able to segment the market by offering a distribution of prices, as in the model by Salop (1977), where each price observation requires a costly search by the consumer. A related set of competitive models has been explored by numerous authors including Varian (1980, 1981), Salop and Stiglitz (1977, 1982), Rosenthal (1980) and Stahl (1989). Unlike Salop (1977), in these papers each firm offers a single price in equilibrium. In some variations, firms choose from a continuous equilibrium distribution of prices; in others, there are only two prices in equilibrium, one for the informed and one for the uninformed. In most of these papers, average prices increase with the proportion of uninformed consumers and, more subtly, as the number of firms increases, the average price level can increase toward the monopoly level. These points are made in Stahl (1989). Nonetheless, in these papers price discrimination does not occur at the firm level, but across firms. That is, each firm offers a single price in equilibrium, while the market distribution of prices effectively segments the consumer population into informed and uninformed buyers. Katz's (1984) model is an exception to these papers by introducing the ability of firms to set multiple prices to sort between informed and uninformed consumers; this contribution is reviewed in section 3.5. At present, competitive analogs of Salop's (1977) monopoly price discrimination
price discrimination policies,\textsuperscript{7} collusion and intertemporal price discrimination\textsuperscript{8}, and the strategic effect of product lines in imperfectly competitive settings.\textsuperscript{9}

It is well known that price discrimination is only feasible under certain conditions: (i) firm(s) have short-run market power, (ii) consumers can be segmented either directly or indirectly, and (iii) arbitrage across differently priced goods is infeasible. Given that these conditions are satisfied, an individual firm will typically have an incentive to price discriminate. The form of price discrimination will depend importantly on the nature of market power, the form of consumer heterogeneity, and the availability of various segmenting mechanisms.

When a firm is a monopolist, it is simple to catalog the various forms of price discrimination according to the form of consumer segmentation. To this end, suppose that a consumer’s preferences for a monopolist’s product are given by

\[ U = v(q, \theta) - y, \]

where \( q \) is the amount (quantity or quality) consumed of the monopolist’s product, \( y \) is numeraire, and consumer heterogeneity is captured in \( \theta = (\theta_o, \theta_u) \). The vector \( \theta \) has two components. The first component, \( \theta_o \), is observable and prices may be conditioned upon its value; the second component, \( \theta_u \), is unobservable and is known only to the consumer. We say that the monopolist is practicing \textit{direct} price discrimination to the extent that its prices depend upon observable heterogeneity. Generally, this implies that the price of purchasing \( q \) units of output will be a function that depends upon \( \theta_o \): \( P(q, \theta_o) \). When the firm further chooses to offer linear price schedules, \( P(q, \theta_o) = p(\theta_o)q \), we say the firm is practicing \textit{third-degree} price discrimination over the characteristic \( \theta_o \). If there is no unobservable heterogeneity and consumers have rectangular demand curves, then all consumer surplus

\textsuperscript{7}While the chapter gives a flavor of a few of the influential papers on this topic, the treatment is left largely incomplete.

\textsuperscript{8}For instance, Gul (1987) shows that when durable-goods oligopolists can make frequent offers, unlike the monopolist, they can improve their ability to commit to high prices and obtain close to full-commitment monopoly profits.

\textsuperscript{9}A considerable amount of study has also focused on how product lines should be chosen to soften second-stage price competition. While the present survey considers the effect of product line choice in segmenting the marketplace (e.g., second-degree price discrimination), it is silent about the strategic effects of locking into a particular product line (i.e., a specific set of locations in a preference space). A now large set of research has been devoted to this topic, including papers by Brander and Eaton (1984), Klemperer (1992) and Gilbert and Matutes (1993), to list a few.
is extracted and third-degree price discrimination is \textit{perfect} price discrimination. More generally, if there is additional heterogeneity over \( \theta_u \) or downward-sloping individual demand curves, third-degree price discrimination will leave some consumer surplus.

When the firm does not condition its price schedule on observable consumer characteristics, every consumer is offered the same price schedule, \( P(q) \). We say the firm \textit{indirectly} price discriminates if the marginal price varies across consumer types at their chosen consumption levels; i.e., \( P'(q(\theta)) \) is not constant in \( \theta \), where \( q(\theta) = \arg \max_q \ v(q, \theta) - P(q) \). A firm can typically extract greater consumer surplus by varying the marginal price and screening consumers according to their revealed consumptions. This use of nonlinear pricing as a sorting mechanism is typically referred to as \textit{second-degree} price discrimination.\(^{10}\) More generally, in a richer setting with heterogeneity over observable and unobservable characteristics, we expect that the monopolist will practice some combination of direct and indirect price discrimination—offering \( P(q, \theta_o) \), but using the price schedule to sort over unobservable characteristics.

While one can categorize price discrimination strategies as either direct or indirect, it is also useful to catalog strategies according to whether they discriminate across consumers (\textit{interpersonal} price discrimination) or across units for the same consumer (\textit{intrapersonal} price discrimination). Intrapersonal price discrimination is a variation of price/marginal-cost ratios across the portfolio of goods purchased by a \textit{given consumer} (i.e., cross-consumer heterogeneity is held constant). For example, suppose that there is no interconsumer heterogeneity so that \( \theta \) is fixed. There will generally remain some intraconsumer heterogeneity over the marginal value of each unit of consumption so that a firm cannot extract all consumer surplus using a linear price. Here, a firm can capture the consumer surplus associated with intraconsumer heterogeneity, either by offering a nonlinear price schedule equal to the individual consumer’s compensated demand curve or by offering a simpler two-part tariff.

\(^{10}\)Pigou (1920) introduced the terminology of first-, second- and third-degree price discrimination. There is some confusion, however, regarding Pigou’s original definition of second-degree price discrimination and that of many recent writers (e.g., see Tirole (1988)) who include self-selection via nonlinear pricing as a form of second-degree discrimination. Pigou (1920) did not consider second-degree price discrimination as a selection mechanism, but rather thought of it as an approximation of first-degree using a step function below the consumer’s demand curve and, as such, regarded both first and second-degrees of price discrimination as “scarcely ever practicable” and “of academic interest only.” Dupuit (1847) gives a much clearer acknowledgment of the importance of self-selection constraints in segmenting markets, although without a taxonomy of price discrimination. We follow the modern use of second-degree price discrimination to include indirect segmentation via nonlinear pricing.
We will address these issues more in section 5.\textsuperscript{11} Elsewhere in this chapter, we will focus on interpersonal price discrimination, with the implicit recognition that intra-personal price discrimination often occurs simultaneously.

The methodology of monopoly price discrimination is both useful and misleading in illuminating the effects of discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms. It is useful because the monopoly methods can frequently be used to calculate each firm’s best response to its competitors’ policies. Just as one can solve for the best-response function in a Cournot quantity game by deriving a residual demand curve and proceeding as if the firm was a monopolist on this residual market, we can also solve for best responses in more complex price discrimination games by deriving residual market demand curves. Unfortunately, our intuitions from the monopoly models can be misleading, because we are ultimately interested in the equilibrium of the firms’ best-response functions rather than a single optimal pricing strategy. For example, while it is certainly the case that, ceteris paribus, a single uniform-pricing firm will weakly benefit by introducing price discrimination, if every firm were to switch from uniform pricing to price discrimination, profits may fall for the entire industry. Whether profits fall depends upon whether the additional surplus extraction allowed by price discrimination (the standard effect in the monopoly setting) exceeds the additional competitive externality if discrimination increases the intensity of price competition. This comparison, in turn, depends upon the details of the markets, as will be explained. The pages that follow consist largely of evaluations of these interactions between price discrimination and imperfect competition.

When evaluating the impact of price discrimination in imperfectly competitive environments, two related comparisons are relevant. First, starting from a setting of imperfect competition and uniform pricing, what are the welfare changes from allowing firms to price discriminate? Second, starting from a setting of monopoly and price discrimination, what are the welfare effects of increasing competition? Because the theoretical predictions of the models often depend upon the nature of competition, consumer preferences and consumer heterogeneity, we shall pursue these questions by examining a collection of specialized models that illuminate the broad themes of this literature and illustrate how the implications of competitive price discrimination compare to uniform pricing and monopoly.

In sections 2-7, we explore variations on these themes, by varying the forms of com-

\textsuperscript{11}See Armstrong and Vickers (2001) for a more detailed discussion of intrapersonal price discrimination and its relevance.
petition, preference heterogeneity, and segmenting devices. Initially in section 2, we begin with the benchmark of first-degree, perfect price discrimination. In section 3, we turn to the classic setting of third-degree price discrimination, applied to the case of imperfectly competitive firms. In section 4, we examine an important class of models that extends third-degree price discrimination to dynamic settings, where price offers may be conditioned on a consumer’s purchase history from rivals—a form of price discrimination that can only exist under competition. In section 5, we study intrapersonal price discrimination. Section 6 brings together several diverse theoretical approaches to modeling imperfectly competitive second-degree price discrimination, comparing and contrasting the results to those under monopoly. Product bundling (as a form of price discrimination) in imperfectly competitive markets is reviewed in section 7. Models of demand uncertainty and price rigidities are introduced in section 8.

2 First-degree price discrimination

First-degree (or perfect) price discrimination—which arises when the seller can capture all consumer surplus by pricing each unit at precisely the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay—serves as an important benchmark and starting point for exploring more subtle forms of pricing. When the seller controls a monopoly, the monopolist obtains the entire social surplus, and so profit maximization is synonymous with maximizing social welfare. How does the economic intuition of this simple model translate to oligopoly?

The oligopoly game of perfect price discrimination is quite simple to analyze, even in its most general form. Following Spulber (1979), suppose that there are \( n \) firms, each selling a (possibly differentiated) product, but that each firm has the ability to price discriminate in the first degree and extract all of the consumer surplus under its residual demand curve. Specifically, suppose the residual demand curve for firm \( i \) is given by \( p_i = D_i(q_i, q_{-i}) \), when its rivals perfectly price discriminate and choose the vector \( q_{-i} = (q_1, \ldots, q_{i-1}, q_{i+1}, \ldots, q_n) \). In addition, let \( C_i(q_i) \) be firm \( i \)'s cost of producing \( q_i \) units of output; the cost function is increasing and convex. The ability to then perfectly price discriminate when selling \( q_i \) units of output implies that firm \( i \)'s profit function is

\[
\pi_i(q_i, q_{-i}) = \int_0^{q_i} D_i(y, q_{-i})dy - C_i(q_i).
\]
A Nash equilibrium is a vector of outputs, \((q^*_1, \ldots, q^*_n)\), such that each firm’s output, \(q^*_i\), is a best-response to the output vector of its rivals, \(q^*_{-i}\): formally, for all \(i\) and \(q_i\), \(\pi_i(q^*_i, q^*_{-i}) \geq \pi_i(q_i, q^*_{-i})\). As Spulber (1979) noted, the assumption of perfect price discrimination—in tandem with the assumption that residual demand curves are downward sloping—implies that each firm \(i\)’s profit function is strictly concave in its own output for any output vector of its rivals. Hence, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in quantities follows immediately. The equilibrium allocations are entirely determined by marginal-cost pricing based on each firm’s residual demand curve: \(D_i(q^*_i, q^*_{-i}) = C'_i(q_i)\).\(^{12}\)

In this oligopoly game of perfect price discrimination, the marginal consumer purchases at marginal cost, so, under mild technical assumptions, social surplus is maximized. In this setting, unlike the imperfect price discrimination settings which follow, the welfare effect of price discrimination is immediate, just as in monopoly perfect price discrimination. A few differences exist, however. First, while consumers obtain none of the surplus under the residual demand curves, it does not follow that consumers obtain no surplus at all; rather, for each firm \(i\), they obtain no surplus from the addition of the \(i\)th firm’s product to the current availability of \(n-1\) other goods. If the goods are close substitutes and marginal costs are constant, the residual demand curves are highly elastic and consumers may nonetheless obtain considerable non-residual surplus from the presence of competition. The net effect of price discrimination on total consumer surplus requires an explicit treatment of consumer demand.

Second, it may be the case that each firm’s residual demand curve is more elastic when its rivals can perfectly price discriminate than when they are forced to price uniformly. Thus, while each firm prefers the ability to perfectly price discriminate itself, the total industry profit may fall when price discrimination is allowed, depending on the form of competition and consumer preferences. We will see a clear example of this in the Hotelling-demand model of Thisse and Vives (1988) which examines discriminatory pricing based on observable location. In this simple setting, third-degree price discrimination is perfect, but firms are worse off and would prefer to commit collectively to uniform-pricing strategies.

Third, if \(n\) is endogenous, if entry with fixed costs occurs until long-run profits are driven

\(^{12}\)This general existence result contrasts with the more restrictive assumptions required for pure-strategy Nash equilibria in when firms’ strategies are limited to choosing a fixed unit price for each good. Spulber (1979) also demonstrates that if an additional stability restriction on the derivatives of the residual demand curves is satisfied, this equilibrium is unique.
to zero, and if consumer surplus is entirely captured by price discrimination, then price discrimination lowers social welfare compared to uniform pricing. This conclusion follows immediately from the fact that consumer surplus is zero and entry dissipates profits, leading to zero social surplus from the presence of the market. Uniform pricing typically leaves some consumer surplus (and hence positive social welfare). Again, whether consumer surplus is entirely captured by price discrimination requires a more explicit analysis of demand.

Rather than further explore the stylized setting of first-degree price discrimination, we instead turn to explicit analyses undertaken for each of the imperfect price discrimination strategies studied in the ensuing sections.

3 Third-degree price discrimination

The classic theory of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to several distinct markets is straightforward: the optimal price-discriminating prices are found by applying the familiar inverse-elasticity rule to each market separately. If instead of monopoly, however, oligopolists compete in each market, then each firm applies the inverse-elasticity rule using its own residual demand curve—an equilibrium construction. Here, the cross-price elasticities of demand play a central role in determining equilibrium prices and outputs. These cross-price elasticities, in turn, depend critically upon consumer preferences and the form of consumer heterogeneity.

3.1 Welfare analysis

With third-degree price discrimination, there are three potential sources of social inefficiency. First, aggregate output over all market segments may be too low if prices exceed marginal cost. To this end, we seek to understand the conditions for which price discrimination leads to an increase or decrease in aggregate output relative to uniform pricing. Second, for a given level of aggregate consumption, price discrimination will typically generate interconsumer misallocations relative to uniform pricing; hence, aggregate output will not be efficiently distributed to the highest-value ends. And third, there may be inter-firm inefficiencies as a given consumer may be served by an inefficient firm, perhaps purchasing from a more distant or higher-cost firm to obtain a price discount.

In the following, much is made of the relationship between aggregate output and welfare. If the same aggregate output is generated under uniform pricing as under price discrimi-
ination, then price discrimination must necessarily lower social welfare because output is allocated with multiple prices; with a uniform price, interconsumer misallocations are not possible. Therefore, holding production inefficiencies fixed, an increase in aggregate output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase welfare under monopoly. Varian (1985) made this point in the context of monopoly, but the economic logic applies more generally to imperfect competition, providing that the firms are equally efficient at production and the number of firms is fixed. Because we can easily make statements only about aggregate output for many models of third-degree price discrimination, this result will prove useful, giving us some limited power to draw welfare conclusions.

There are two common approaches to modeling imperfect competition: quantity competition with homogeneous goods and price competition with product differentiation. The simple quantity-competition model of oligopoly price discrimination is presented in section 3.2. We then turn to price-setting models of competition. Within price-setting games, we further distinguish two sets of models based upon consumer demands. In the first setting (section 3.3), all firms agree in their ranking of high-demand (or “strong”) markets and low-demand (or “weak”) markets. Here, whether the strong markets are more competitive than the weak markets is critical for many economic conclusions. In the second setting (section 3.4), firms are asymmetric in their ranking of strong and weak markets; e.g., firm a’s strong market is firm b’s weak market and conversely. With asymmetry, equilibrium prices can move in patterns that are not possible under symmetric rankings and different economic insights present themselves. Following the treatment of price-setting games, we take up the topics of third-degree price discrimination with endogenous entry (section 3.5) and private restrictions on price discrimination (section 3.6).

3.2 Cournot models of third-degree price discrimination

Perhaps the simplest model of imperfect competition and price discrimination is the immediate extension of Cournot’s quantity-setting, homogeneous-good game to firms competing

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13Varian (1985) generalizes Schmalensee’s (1981) necessary condition for welfare improvements by considering more general demand and cost settings, and also by establishing a lower (sufficient condition) bound on welfare changes. Schwartz (1990) extends Varian’s boundary results to cases in which marginal costs are decreasing. Additional effects arising from heterogeneous firms alter the application of these welfare results to oligopoly, as noted by Galera (2003). It is possible, for example, that price discrimination may lead to more efficient production across firms with differing costs, offsetting the welfare loss from consumer misallocations, thus leading to a net welfare gain without an increase in aggregate output. In this paper, we largely examine models of symmetric firms.
in distinct market segments. Suppose that there are \( m \) markets, \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), and \( n \) firms, \( j = 1, \ldots, n \), each of which produces at a constant marginal cost per unit. The timing of the output game is standard: each firm \( j \) simultaneously chooses its output levels for each of the \( i \) markets: \( \{q^j_1, \ldots, q^j_m\} \). Let the demand curve for each market \( i \) be given by \( p_i = D_i(Q_i) \), where \( Q_i = \sum_j q^j_i \), and suppose that in equilibrium all markets are active. Setting aside issues of equilibrium existence, it follows that the symmetric equilibrium outputs, \( \{q^*_1, \ldots, q^*_m\} \), satisfy, for every market \( i \),

\[
MC = D_i(nq^*_i) + D'_i(nq^*_i)q^*_i = p^*_i \left( 1 - \frac{1}{n\varepsilon^m_i} \right),
\]

where \( \varepsilon^m_i \) is the market elasticity for segment \( i \).

Several observations regarding the effects of competition follow immediately from this framework. First, it follows that marginal revenues are also equal across market segments, just as in monopoly. Second, under mild assumptions, as the number of firms increases, the markup over marginal cost decreases in each market segment. From this comparative static, it follows that each firm’s profit also decreases and consumer surplus increases as \( n \) increases. Third, if each market segment has a constant elasticity of demand, relative prices across segments are constant in \( n \) and, therefore, an increase in firms necessarily decreases absolute price dispersion. Finally, in the spirit of monopolistic competition, one can introduce a fixed cost of production and allow entry to drive long-run profits to zero, thereby making the size of the market endogenous. In such a setting, both long-term market power and economic profit are zero, but fixed costs of entry generate short-run market power, short-run economic rents, and prices above marginal cost.

Aside from the effects of competition, one can also inquire about the welfare effects of price discrimination relative to uniform pricing. To this end, it is first helpful to review the setting of monopoly in Robinson (1933). In that work, Robinson concludes that whether aggregate output increases when a monopolist price discriminates depends upon the relative curvature of the segmented demand curves. Particularly in the case of two segments, if the “adjusted concavity” (an idea we will make precise below) of the more elastic market is greater than the adjusted concavity of the less elastic market at a uniform price, then output

\[ ^{14} \text{More precisely, Robinson defines the } \text{adjusted concavity} \text{ of a segment demand curve to capture the precise notion of curvature necessary for the result. Schmalensee (1981) provides a deeper treatment which builds upon Robinson’s work.} \]
increases with price discrimination; when the reverse is true, aggregate output decreases. When a market segment has linear demand, the adjusted concavity is zero. It follows that when demand curves are linear—providing all markets are served—price discrimination has no effect on aggregate output.\textsuperscript{15} In sum, to make a determination about the price discrimination effects on aggregate output under monopoly, one needs only to compare the adjusted concavities of each market segment.

For Cournot oligopoly, a similar analysis applies and the adjusted concavities are key to determining the effect of price discrimination on aggregate output. When demand curves are linear, these concavities are zero, and—providing all market segments are served—price discrimination has no effect on total sales. To see this clearly, let $Q_i = \alpha_i - \beta_i p_i$ be the demand function for segment $i$ (or alternatively, $p_i = D_i(Q_i) = \alpha_i / \beta_i - Q_i / \beta_i$), and therefore $Q = \alpha - \beta p$ is the aggregate output across all segments at a uniform price of $p$, where $\alpha \equiv \sum_i \alpha_i$ and $\beta \equiv \sum_i \beta_i$. With constant marginal cost of production, $c$, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium under uniform pricing is simply $Q^u = (\alpha - \beta c) \left( \frac{n}{n+1} \right)$. Under price discrimination, the equilibrium total output in each segment is similarly given by $Q_{pd}^i = (\alpha_i - \beta_i c) \left( \frac{n}{n+1} \right)$. Summing across segments, aggregate output under price discrimination is equal to that under uniform pricing: $Q_{pd} = \sum_i Q_{pd}^i = Q^u$. Given that firms are equally efficient at production and aggregate output is unchanged, price discrimination reduces welfare because it generates interconsumer misallocations. More generally, when demand curves are nonlinear or some markets would not be served under uniform pricing, price discrimination may increase welfare. The ultimate conclusion is an empirical matter.

### 3.3 A tale of two elasticities: best-response symmetry in price games

In her study of third-degree price discrimination under monopoly, Robinson (1933) characterizes a monopolist’s two markets as “strong” and “weak.” By definition, a price discriminating monopolist always sets the higher price in the strong market, and the lower price in the weak market. It is useful to extend this ranking to imperfectly competitive markets. Suppose that there are two markets, $i = 1, 2$. We say that market $i$ is “weak” (and the other is “strong”) for firm $j$ if, for any uniform price(s) set by the other firm(s), the optimal price in market $i$ is always lower than the optimal price in the other segment. Formally,\textsuperscript{15}This finding was first noted by Pigou (1920), and so Robinson’s analysis can be seen as a generalization to nonlinear demand.
if $BR_i^j(p)$ is the best-response function of firm $j$ in market $i$, given that its rival sets the price $p$, then market 1 is weak (and 2 is strong) if and only if $BR_i^1(p) < BR_i^2(p)$ for all $p$.

We say that the market environment satisfies best-response symmetry (following Corts (1998)) if the weak and strong markets of each firm coincide; alternatively, if the weak and strong markets of each firm differ, then the environment exhibits best-response asymmetry.

As we will see, when firms commonly agree on their rankings of markets from strong to weak (i.e., best-response symmetry), there exists a useful result from Holmes (1989) which predicts when aggregate output will rise or fall with the introduction of price discrimination, and therefore provides some indication about its ultimate welfare effects. This result is not available when best responses are asymmetric, which creates a crucial distinction in what follows. In this section, we assume that there exists best-response symmetry; in the following section, we study best-response asymmetry.

Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) extend the analysis of third-degree price discrimination to settings of imperfect competition with product differentiation, under scoring the significance of cross-price elasticities in predicting changes in profits and surplus. Specifically, Holmes (1989) builds upon the monopoly model of Robinson (1933) and demonstrates that under symmetric duopoly, it is crucial to know the ratio of market to cross-price elasticities, aside from the adjusted concavities of demand. The curvatures of the demand curves are insufficient, by themselves, to predict changes in aggregate output when markets are imperfectly competitive.

To understand the relevance of the ratio of market elasticity to cross-price elasticity, consider two market segments, $i = 1, 2$, and duopolists, $j = a, b$, each offering products in both segments and producing with constant marginal cost of $c$ per unit. We take market 2 to be the strong market and market 1 to be weak. Demand for firm $j$’s output in market $i$ depends upon the prices offered by each firm in market $i$: $q_i^j(p_i^a, p_i^b)$. These demand functions are assumed to be symmetric across firms (i.e., symmetric to permuting indices $a$ and $b$), so we can write $q_i(p) \equiv q_i^a(p, p) \equiv q_i^b(p, p)$. The market elasticity of demand in market $i$ (as a function of symmetric price $p = p_i^a = p_i^b$) is therefore

$$\varepsilon_i^m(p) = -\frac{p}{q_i(p)}q_i'(p),$$

---

16It is possible that such an ordering fails to exist if the inequality statement fails to hold for all prices. We abstract from this more complicated setting and assume every market is so ordered.
and \( j \)'s own-price firm elasticity of demand in market \( i \) is

\[
\varepsilon_{i,j}^f(p^a, p^b) = -\frac{p^i}{q_i^i(p^a, p^b)} \frac{\partial q_i^j(p^a, p^b)}{\partial p^j},
\]

which at symmetric prices, \( p = p_i^a = p_i^b \), is more simply

\[
\varepsilon_i^f(p) = -\frac{p}{q_i(p)} q_i'(p) + \frac{p}{q_i(p)} \frac{\partial q_i^a(p, p)}{\partial p_i^b} = \varepsilon_i^m(p) + \varepsilon_i^c(p),
\]

where \( \varepsilon_i^c(p) > 0 \) is the cross-price elasticity of demand at symmetric prices, \( p \). Thus, the firm elasticity in a duopoly market is composed of two components: the market (or industry) elasticity and the cross-price elasticity. The former is related to the ability of a monopolist (or collusive duopoly) to extract consumer surplus; it measures the sensitivity of the consumer to taking the outside option of not consuming either good. The latter is related to the ability of a rival to steal business; it measures the consumer’s sensitivity to purchasing the rival’s product. While a monopolist will choose prices across markets such that

\[
\frac{p_i - c}{p_i} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^m(p_i)},
\]

non-cooperative duopolists (in a symmetric price equilibrium) will set prices across markets such that

\[
\frac{p_i - c}{p_i} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_i^m(p_i) + \varepsilon_i^c(p_i)}.
\]

Several results follow from this comparison and the presence of the cross-price elasticity.

- **Price effects.** From the above formulation of the inverse-elasticity rules, competition clearly lowers prices in both markets compared to monopoly, *ceteris paribus*, and therefore we expect competition to increase welfare in this simple third-degree price discrimination setting. It is also immediate that the effect of competition on price dispersion across markets is ambiguous and depends upon the cross-price elasticities. If the goods are close substitutes and market competition is fierce, prices will be close to marginal cost and competition will reduce price differentials across the markets. Alternatively, if consumers in the weak market find the goods to be close substitutes (their next best alternative is consuming from a rival firm) while consumers in the strong market exhibit powerful brand loyalties (their next best alternative is the outside good), then the firms choose highly competitive prices in the weak market and close-to-monopoly prices in the strong market. These choices lead to
greater price differentials across markets. Unfortunately, no testable implications for price dispersion arise from the theory without additional information regarding the cross-price elasticities in each market.

- **Output (and welfare) effects.** A recurring policy question in the price discrimination literature is whether to allow third-degree price discrimination or to enforce uniform pricing. A key ingredient to understanding this question in the context of imperfectly competitive markets is the impact of price discrimination on output.

Consider the marginal profit to firm $j$ from a change in price in market $i$ (starting from a point of price symmetry):

$$D\pi_i(p) \equiv q^a_i(p) + (p - c) \frac{\partial q^a_i(p, p)}{\partial p^a_i}.$$  

We further assume that these marginal profit functions decrease in price for each market segment. The third-degree discriminatory prices are determined by the system of equations,

$$D\pi_i(p^*_i) = 0, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

while the uniform-price equilibrium is determined by

$$D\pi_1(p^*_u) + D\pi_2(p^*_u) = 0.$$  

Given our assumption of decreasing marginal profit functions, it is necessarily the case that $p^*_u \in (p^*_1, p^*_2).$ This in turn implies that the output in market 2 decreases under price discrimination while the output in market 1 increases. The impact of price discrimination on aggregate output, therefore, is not immediately clear.

To determine the effect on aggregate output, suppose that due to arbitrage difficulties, a discriminating firm cannot drive a wedge greater than $r$ between the two prices; hence, $p_2 = p_1 + r.$ It follows that, for a given $r,$ each firm will choose $p_1$ to satisfy $D\pi_1(p_1) + D\pi_2(p_1 + r) = 0,$ the solution of which we denote parametrically as $p^*_1(r).$ By construction, $p^*_2(r) \equiv p^*_1(r) + r.$ Hence, the aggregate-output effect of fixing a price differential of $r$ can be characterized by

$$Q(r) = q_1(p^*_1(r)) + q_2(p^*_1(r) + r).$$

Because $r = 0$ corresponds to uniform pricing, it follows that if $Q(r)$ is increasing in $r,$ then

---

17Borenstein (1985) and Borenstein and Rose (1994) develop related theories indicating how competition may increase price dispersion. Borenstein and Rose (1994) find empirical evidence of various measures of increased price dispersion as a function of increased competition in airline ticket pricing.

18We assume that portions of each market are served under both forms of pricing.

19In the context of monopoly, the direction of price changes in third-degree price discrimination follows this pattern if the monopolist’s profit function is strictly concave in price within each segment. When this is not the case (e.g., profit is bimodal in price), the direction of price changes is ambiguous, as shown by Nahata, et al. (1990).
aggregate output increases from price discrimination; alternatively, if $Q(r)$ is decreasing in $r$, aggregate output (and welfare) necessarily decreases. After some simplification, the condition that $Q'(r) > 0$ is equivalent to the condition

$$
\left[ \frac{(p_2 - c)}{2q_2(p_2)} \frac{d}{dp_2} \left( \frac{\partial q_2^2(p_2, p_2)}{\partial p_2^2} \right) - \frac{(p_1 - c)}{2q_1(p_1)} \frac{d}{dp_1} \left( \frac{\partial q_1^1(p_1, p_1)}{\partial p_1^2} \right) \right] + \left[ \frac{\epsilon_{c2}^2(p_2)}{\epsilon_{m2}^2(p_2)} - \frac{\epsilon_{c1}^1(p_1)}{\epsilon_{m1}^1(p_1)} \right] > 0.
$$

The first bracketed expression is a straightforward variation of Robinson’s adjusted-concavity condition found in the case of monopoly. When demands are linear, the expression is zero. The second expression (the elasticity-ratio difference) is novel and due entirely to competition. If the strong market (market 2) is more sensitive to competition (i.e., $\epsilon_{c2}^2/\epsilon_{m2}^2$ is larger in the strong market than the weak market), then price discrimination causes the output reduction in the strong market to be less than the output increase in the weak market; aggregate output rises accordingly. If this reduction in the strong market is sufficiently small relative to the weak market, then welfare will also rise.

The point most worth stressing is that the effect of competition depends upon the size of the cross-price elasticity relative to the industry elasticity. When demands are linear (and adjusted concavities are zero), the elasticity-ratio test gives a sufficient condition for increased output:

$$
\frac{\epsilon_{m2}^2(p_1)}{\epsilon_{c2}^2(p_2)} > \frac{\epsilon_{c1}^1(p_1)}{\epsilon_{m1}^1(p_1)}.
$$

In words, price discrimination leads to an increase in output if the discrepancy in elasticities across the two markets is greater with respect to the outside option than with respect to the rival’s good. Among other things, this condition implies that at the discriminating monopoly prices (where the left-hand ratio is 1), the strong market is “more competitive” than the weak market in the sense of cross-price elasticities.

- **Profit effects.** The profit effects of price discrimination are more difficult to predict. While any individual firm’s profit rises when allowed to price discriminate, the entire industry profit may rise or fall when all firms add price discrimination to their strategic arsenals. Two papers have made significant findings in this direction. Holmes (1989) analyzes the case of linear demand functions and finds that when the elasticity ratio condition above is satisfied, profit (as well as output) increases. When the elasticity ratio is violated, however, the effect on profits is ambiguous although welfare necessarily falls. What is particularly
interesting is that price discrimination decreases profits when the weak market has a higher cross-price elasticity but a lower market elasticity compared to the strong market. Because the market elasticity is lower in the weak market, a given increase in price would be more profitable (and more socially efficient) in the weak market than in the strong market. When profits fall due to price discrimination (which Holmes (1989) notes is never by more than a few percentage points), it is because the weak market’s significantly higher cross-price elasticity outweighs its lower market elasticity, and therefore price discrimination reduces the weak-market price. From a profit perspective (and a social welfare perspective), this lower price is in the wrong market and thus profits decline relative to uniform pricing.

Related to this finding, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) consider a non-linear model of third-degree price discrimination in which each segment is a Hotelling linear market with uniformly distributed consumers, each of whom has identical downward-sloping demand. The market segments differ only by the consumers’ transportation costs. They demonstrate that when competition is sufficiently intense (specifically, each segment’s transportation cost goes to zero while maintaining a constant cost ratio), industry profits increase under price discrimination and consumer surplus falls. This outcome suggests that Holmes’s (1989) linear examples of slightly decreased profits from price discrimination may not be robust to nonlinear settings with intense competition. This finding, together with the other results of Holmes (1989), leads to a consensus that price discrimination increases profits in settings of best-response symmetry. In addition, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) find that when the segment with the lower market elasticity also has a sufficiently higher cross-price elasticity (i.e., low transportation costs), welfare falls under price discrimination. Interestingly, the economics underlying this result are similar to Holmes’s (1989) linear model of decreased profits—price discrimination causes the prices to fall and rise in the wrong markets.

**Inter-firm misallocations.** The model examined in Holmes (1989) is symmetric across firms—no firm has a cost or product advantage over the other. This simplification obscures possibly significant, inter-firm misallocations that would arise in a model in which one firm has a comparative advantage in delivering utility to consumers. The change from uniform pricing to price discrimination may either mitigate or amplify these distortions. As an immediate illustration of this ambiguity, consider a duopoly setting in which both firms are local monopolists in the strong market and the strong-market demands are rectangular (although possibly different across firms). In the weak market, suppose that the firms are Hotelling (1929) duopolists in a market which is covered in equilibrium. Given these
assumptions, the only social inefficiency is that some consumers in the weak market purchase from the “wrong” firm; this situation arises when the price differential across firms in the weak market is not equal to the difference in marginal costs. Under price discrimination, our assumption of rectangular demand curves implies that the strong-market, inter-firm price differential depends entirely on the consumer’s valuations for each product. In the weak market, however, it is easy to see that the resulting price differential between the firms is smaller than the difference in marginal costs; the price discrimination equilibrium results in the high-cost firm serving too much of the market. Compare this outcome to the uniform-price setting: If the strong market is sufficiently important relative to the weak market, then the uniform-price differential will be close to the price-discriminating, inter-firm differential in the strong market. If the strong-market differential is close to the difference in marginal costs, then uniform pricing mitigates inefficiencies; if the differential in the strong market is smaller than the price-discriminating differential in the weak market, then uniform pricing amplifies the social distortions. In short, there are no robust conclusions regarding the effect of price discrimination on misallocated production.

3.4 When one firm’s strength is a rival’s weakness: best-response asymmetry in price games

The assumption that firms rank strong and weak markets symmetrically is restrictive, as it rules out most models with spatial demand systems in which price discrimination occurs over observable location; e.g., a weak (far away) market for firm a is a strong (close) market for firm b. The assumption of best-response symmetry in the previous analysis allowed us to conclude that the uniform price always lies between the strong market price and the weak market under discrimination. Without such symmetry, this conclusion does not exist. Indeed, it is possible that all prices rise or fall under price discrimination, depending on the underlying market demand curves.

- A simple model to illustrate recurring themes. We begin with a simple example of differentiated duopoly drawn from Thisse and Vives (1988) to illustrate some of the consequences of price discrimination when firms have dissimilar strengths and weaknesses across market segments. Consider a standard Hotelling (1929) model of duopoly in which two firms are located on the endpoints of a linear market. Each consumer has an observable
location parameter, \( \theta \in (0, 1) \), which is drawn from a uniform distribution across the market; each consumer demands at most one unit of output. A consumer at location \( \theta \) who consumes from the left firm at price \( p_l \) obtains utility \( z - \tau \theta - p_l \), while the same consumer purchasing from the right firm at price \( p_r \) obtains \( z - \tau (1 - \theta) - p_r \). In this sense, \( z \) represents the base value of the product, while \( \tau \) is a measure of product differentiation and the intensity of competition. Each firm produces output at constant marginal (and average) cost equal to \( c \).

In the analysis that immediately follows, we assume that \( z \) is sufficiently large so that the duopoly equilibrium exhibits competition (rather than local monopoly or kinked demand) and that the multi-plant monopolist covers the market. Critically, this guarantees that the industry demand elasticity is zero while the cross-price elasticity between products depends on \( 1/\tau \), which can be quite large. Among other things, this relationship between the industry and cross-price elasticities induces intense competition in the duopoly setting.

As a benchmark, consider the case of uniform pricing. In the duopoly setting, it is well known that the Nash equilibrium price is \( p = c + \tau \) and that each firm earns \( \pi = \frac{1}{2} \tau \) in profits. Intuitively, a higher transportation cost translates into higher product differentiation, prices, and profits; indeed, \( \tau \) is the unique source of profit in the Hotelling framework. Now, suppose that firms are able to price discriminate directly on the consumer’s location, \( \theta \), as in Thisse and Vives (1988). It follows in equilibrium that the more distant firm offers a price to the consumer of \( p = c + \tau (1 - 2\theta) \) for all \( \theta \leq \frac{1}{2} \), and \( p = c \) for \( \theta > \frac{1}{2} \); analogously, the right firm offers \( p = c + \tau (2\theta - 1) \) for \( \theta \geq \frac{1}{2} \) and \( p = c \) for \( \theta < \frac{1}{2} \). It immediately follows that price discrimination leads to a fall in equilibrium prices for every market segment: \( p^d(\theta) = \max\{p_l(\theta), p_r(\theta)\} < c + \tau \) for all \( \theta \in (0, 1) \). Consequently, price discrimination also lowers profits which are now \( \pi^d = \int_0^{1/2} \tau (1 - 2s)ds = \frac{1}{4} \tau \), only half of the profits that would arise under uniform pricing.

Compare these duopoly outcomes to those which emerge when the two products are sold by a multi-plant monopolist. When the monopolist is restricted to offering the output of each plant at a uniform mill price, the firm will set its price so as to leave the consumer

\[ p^m(\theta) = \max\{p_l(\theta), p_r(\theta)\} < c + \tau \] for all \( \theta \in (0, 1) \). Consequently, price discrimination also lowers profits which are now \( \pi^m = \int_0^{1/2} \tau (1 - 2s)ds = \frac{1}{4} \tau \), only half of the profits that would arise under uniform pricing.

\[ \pi^d = \frac{1}{4} \tau \] for all \( \theta \in (0, 1) \).

\[ \pi^m = \frac{1}{4} \tau \] for all \( \theta \in (0, 1) \).

Lederer and Hurter (1986) show that such marginal-cost pricing by the closest unsuccessful competitor is a common feature in pricing equilibria of location models.

Technically, if the distribution of consumers included \( \theta = 0 \) and \( \theta = 1 \), we would have to modify this statement to say that prices remain unchanged for consumers located exactly at the mill.
at $\theta = \frac{1}{2}$ with no surplus (providing $z$ is sufficiently large); hence, $p = z - \frac{1}{2}\tau$ and per-plant profits under uniform pricing are $\pi = \frac{1}{2} (z - c - \frac{1}{2}\tau)$. If the multi-plant monopolist is able to price discriminate over consumer location, however, it can do much better. The firm would offer a price to extract all consumer surplus, $p^m(\theta) = z - \tau \min\{\theta, 1 - \theta\}$, and per-plant profits would increase to $\pi^m = \frac{1}{2} (z - c - \frac{1}{4}\tau)$. Unlike imperfect competition, monopoly allows price discrimination to lead to increased prices and profits.

Several noteworthy comparisons can be made. First, consider the effect of price discrimination on profits and price levels. Profits for a monopolist increase with the ability to price discriminate by $\tau/4$, while industry profits for competing duopolists decrease by $\tau/2$ when firms use discriminatory prices. Under duopoly, introducing price discrimination creates aggressive competition at every location and uniformly lowers every price: prices decrease from $p = c + \tau$ to $p^d(\theta) = c + \tau - 2\tau \min\{\theta, 1 - \theta\}$. Here, the business-stealing effect of price discrimination dominates the rent-extraction effect, so that duopolists are worse off with the ability to price discriminate. This result contrasts with that under best-response symmetry (section 3.3) where price discrimination typically increases industry profits. Because welfare is constant in this simple setting, these profit conclusions imply that consumers are better off with price discrimination under competition and better off with uniform pricing under monopoly.\(^{22}\)

Second, note that price discrimination generates a range of prices. Because perfect competition implies that all firms choose marginal cost pricing (even when allowed to price discriminate), a reasonable conjecture may be that an increase in competition reduces price dispersion relative to monopoly. In the present model, however, the reverse is true—competition increases dispersion. The range of prices with price discriminating duopolists is $p^d(\theta) \in [c, c + \tau]$, twice as large as the range for the multiplant monopolist, $p^m(\theta) \in [z - \frac{1}{2}\tau, z]$. Intuitively, when price discrimination is allowed, duopoly prices are more sensitive to transportation costs because the consumer’s distance to the competitor’s plant is critical. A multiplant monopolist, however, is only concerned with the consumer choosing

\(^{22}\)When drawing welfare conclusions, one must be especially careful given this model’s limitations. Because the market is covered in equilibrium and inelastic consumers purchase from the closest plant, it follows that all regimes (price discrimination or uniform pricing, monopoly or duopoly) generate the same total social surplus. Hence, a richer model will be required to generate plausible welfare conclusions; we will consider such models later. That said, this simple model is useful for generating immediate intuitions about the effects of competition and price discrimination on profit, consumer surplus, price levels and price dispersion. Most importantly, the model illustrates the significance of relaxing best-response symmetry over strong and weak markets.
the outside option of purchasing nothing, so the relevant distance for a consumer is that to
the nearest plant—a shorter distance. More generally, the prices under duopoly are driven
by cross-price elasticities and the monopoly prices are driven by own-price demand elastic-
ities, which suggests that whether dispersion increases from competition depends upon the
specifics of consumer preferences.\footnote{For example, if the base value also depends continuously upon location, \( z(\theta) \), with \( z'(\theta) \), then a multi-plant monopolist who sells to the entire market will offer a range of prices larger than would the duopolists. Whether competition increases or decreases price dispersion is unclear without more knowledge about market and cross-price elasticities. This ambiguity is no different from the setting of best-response symmetry; see section 3.3.}

Third, if we generalize the model slightly so that firm \( a \) has higher unit costs than firm \( b \), \( c_a > c_b \), we can consider the impact of price discrimination on inter-firm misallocations. With uniform pricing, each firm chooses \( j = \frac{2}{3} c_j + \frac{1}{3} c_{-j} + \tau \) and the price differential is \( (c_a - c_b)/3 \). Because this price differential is smaller than the difference in firm costs, too many consumers purchase from firm \( a \). Under uniform pricing by a multi-plant monopolist, the differential is larger, \( (c_a - c_b)/2 \), but some misallocation remains. When price discrimination by location is allowed, however, inter-firm allocative efficiency is restored for both duopoly and multi-plant monopoly settings. In the case of duopoly, efficiency arises because the marginal consumer, who is located at a point of indifference between the two endpoints, is always offered marginal cost pricing from both firms. In a monopoly, the monopolist extracts all consumer surplus using price discrimination and so eliminates any inter-plant misallocations. Although this setting is simplified, the intuition for why price discrimination decreases inter-firm misallocations can be generalized to any discrete-choice model in which the marginal consumer in equilibrium is offered marginal-cost prices under discrimination.

Fourth, consider the possibility of commitment. Given that profits are lower with price
discrimination in the presence of competing firms, it is natural to wonder whether firms
may find it individually optimal to commit publicly to uniform pricing in the hopes that
this commitment will engender softer pricing responses from rivals. This question was first
addressed in Thissse and Vives (1988), who add an initial commitment stage to the pricing
game. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously decides whether to commit to uniform
prices (or not); in the second stage, both firms observe any first stage commitments, and
then each sets its price(s) accordingly.\footnote{When one firm commits to uniform pricing and the other does not, Thissse and Vives (1988) assume that the uniform-pricing firm moves first in the second-stage pricing game.} One might conjecture that committing to uniform pricing may be a successful strategy if the second-stage pricing game exhibits strategic
complementarities. It is straightforward to show in the present example, however, that the gain which a uniform-price firm would achieve by inducing a soft response from a rival is smaller than the loss the firm would suffer from the inability to price discriminate in the second stage. Formally, when one firm commits to uniform pricing and the other does not, the equilibrium uniform price is \( p = c + \frac{1}{2} \tau \) and the optimal price-discriminatory response is \( p(\theta) = c + \tau \left( \frac{3}{2} - 2\theta \right) \); these prices result in a market share of \( \frac{1}{4} \) and a profit of \( \pi = \frac{1}{8} \tau \) for the uniform pricing duopolist, and yield a market share of \( \frac{3}{4} \) and a profit of \( \pi = \frac{9}{16} \tau \) for the discriminator. Combined with the previous results on profits, it follows that choosing price discrimination in the first stage dominates uniform pricing: A Prisoners’ Dilemma emerges. This result, however, is not robust across other demand settings, as we will see below in 3.6.

- **General price effects from discrimination and competition.** In the simple Hotelling model, prices decrease across all market segments when price discrimination is introduced. Because firms differ in their ranking of strong and weak markets in this example, one might wonder how closely this result depends upon best-response asymmetry. The answer, as Corts (1998) has shown, is that best-response asymmetry is a necessary condition for all-out competition or all-out price increases.\(^{25}\)

Recall that if firms have identical rankings over the strength and weakness of market segments (and if profit functions are concave and symmetric across firms), it follows that the uniform price lies between the weak and strong segment prices. When firms do not rank markets symmetrically in this sense, it is no longer necessary that the uniform price lies between the price discriminating prices. Indeed, Corts (1998) demonstrates that for any segment profit functions consistent with best-response asymmetry, either all-out competition or all-out price increases may emerge from price discrimination, depending on the relative importance of the market segments.\(^{26}\)

Suppose there are two markets, \( i = 1, 2 \) and two firms, \( j = a, b \), and that market 1 is firm \( a \)'s strong market but firm \( b \)'s weak market. Mathematically, this implies that the best-response functions satisfy the following inequalities: \( BR^a_1(p) > BR^a_2(p) \) and \( BR^b_1(p) < BR^b_2(p) \). Graphically, the price-discrimination equilibrium for each market is indicated by the intersections of the relevant best-response functions; these equilibria are labeled \( E_1 \) and \( E_2 \).

\(^{25}\)Nevo and Wolfram (2002) and Besanko, et al. (2002) empirically assess the possibility of all-out competition in breakfast cereals and ketchup, respectively.

\(^{26}\)Chen (1997) also studies a model of price discrimination leading to price reductions for all consumers.
Depending on the relative importance of market 1 and market 2, firm $j$’s uniform-price best-response function can be anywhere between its strong and weak best-response functions. With this insight, Corts (1998) shows that for any pair of prices bounded by the four best-response functions, there exists a set of relative market weights (possibly different for each firm) that support these prices as an equilibrium. It follows that if the uniform-price equilibrium is a pair of prices in the shaded region of the upper-right of the interior, then price discrimination leads to all-out competition and prices fall in both segments. For example, if firm $a$ finds market 1 to be sufficiently more important relative to market 2 and firm $b$ has reverse views, then the uniform-price best-response functions intersect in the upper-right, shaded region and all-out competition emerges. This is the intuition behind the simple Hotelling game above. There, each firm cares substantially more about its closer markets than its distant markets. On the other hand, if the uniform-price equilibrium is a pair of prices in the shaded region in the lower left, then price discrimination causes all segment prices to increase.

When the underlying demand functions induce either all-out competition or all-out price
gouging, the theoretical predictions are crisp. With all-out competition, price discrimination lowers all segment prices, raises all segment outputs, raises consumer utility and lowers firm profits. With all-out price increases, price discrimination has the opposite effects: all segment prices increase, all segment outputs decline, welfare and consumer surplus both decrease. When the underlying preferences do not generate all-out competition or price gouging (i.e., the uniform prices are not part of the shaded interior) the impact of price discrimination is more difficult to assess. A more general treatment for settings of best-response asymmetry in which prices do not uniformly rise or fall would be useful to this end—perhaps focusing on market and cross-price elasticities in the manner of Holmes (1989).

3.5 Price discrimination and entry

The preceding analysis has largely taken the number of firms as exogenous. Given the possibility of entry with fixed costs, a new class of distortions arises: price discrimination may induce too much or too little entry relative to uniform pricing.

- **Monopolistic competition.** If entry is unfettered and numerous potential entrants exist, entry occurs to the point where long-run profits are driven to zero. Under such models of monopolistic competition, social surplus is equated to consumer surplus. The question arises, with free entry does a change from uniform pricing to discrimination lead to higher or lower aggregate consumer surplus?

To answer this question, two effects must be resolved. First, by fixing the number of firms, does a change from uniform pricing to price discrimination lead to higher industry profits? We have already observed that price discrimination can either raise or lower industry profits, depending on the underlying system of demand. If price discrimination raises industry profits, then greater entry occurs; if price discrimination lowers profits, then fewer firms will operate in the market. Second, given that a move to price discrimination changes the size of the industry, will consumer surplus increase or decrease? Under uniform pricing, it is well known that the social and private values of entry may differ due to the effects of business stealing and product diversity; see, for example, Spence (1976) and Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Generally, when comparing price discrimination to uniform pricing, no clear welfare result about the social efficiency of free entry exists, although a few theoretical contributions are suggestive of the relative importance of various effects.

Katz (1984), in a model of monopolistic competition with price discrimination, was one
of the first to study how production inefficiencies from excessive entry may arise. He found that price discrimination’s impact on social welfare is ambiguous and depends upon his model’s demand parameters. Rather than developing Katz’s (1984) model, this ambiguity can be illustrated with a few simple examples.

In our first example, price discrimination is shown to be beneficial through the extension of Hotelling’s (1929) linear market to a circular setting, as in Salop (1979). Suppose that inelastic unit-demand consumers are uniformly distributed around a circular market. As entry occurs, assume firms automatically relocate equidistant from one another. When the market is covered, all potential consumers purchase a good from the nearest firm, so the optimal number of firms is that which minimizes the sum of transportation costs and the fixed costs of entry, $K$. The sum of costs is $nK + \tau/4n$ and the socially efficient level of entry is $n_{eff} = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{\tau}{K}}$. Under uniform pricing, each firm chooses an equilibrium price of $p = c + \tau/n$, leading to per-firm profits of $\pi^u = \tau/n^2 - K$. Free entry implies that entry occurs until $\pi^u = 0$, so $n^u = \sqrt{\tau/K} > n_{eff}$. Twice the efficient level of entry thus occurs with uniform pricing; the marginal social cost of additional entry, $K$, exceeds the benefit of lower transportation costs that competition generates. In contrast, under price discrimination, rivals offer $\hat{p}(\theta) = c$ to consumers located more distant than $1/2n$; consumers purchase from the closest firm at a price of $p(\theta) = c + \tau(\frac{1}{n} - 2\theta)$. Equilibrium profits are lower under price discrimination for a given $n$, $\pi^{pd} = \frac{\tau}{2n^2} - K$, so entry occurs up to the point where $n^{pd} = \sqrt{\frac{\tau}{2K}}$. It follows that $n^u > n^{pd} > n_{eff}$, so price discrimination increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing by reducing the value of entry. This conclusion, of course, is limited to the model at hand.

As a counter-example, suppose that consumer preferences are entirely observable so that a third-degree price-discriminating monopolist would capture more of the consumer surplus than a uniform-pricing monopolist. To model imperfect competition, assume along the lines of Diamond (1971) that goods are homogeneous, but consumers must bear a small search cost for each visit to a store to obtain a price quote. There is then an equilibrium in which all firms offer the monopoly price schedule and consumers purchase from the first store they visit, providing that the resulting consumer surplus exceeds the cost of search. All firms follow identical pricing strategies, so there is no value to search, and each sells to an equal fraction of consumers. Because of ex ante competition, firms enter this market until long-

\footnote{In particular, the proportion of informed to uninformed consumers is key.}
run profits are dissipated. Because more consumer surplus remains under uniform pricing than under price discrimination, welfare is higher under uniform pricing while too much entry occurs under price discrimination.

Unfortunately, as these two examples suggest, we are left without any clear guidance regarding the effects of price discrimination on entry and the associated changes in social welfare under monopolistic competition.

- **Entry deterrence** Allowing price discrimination by symmetric firms can increase the profitability of serving a market, and thereby generate more entry as shown in Katz (1984). On the other hand, one might imagine that firms are situated asymmetrically, as in Armstrong and Vickers (1993), where an incumbent firm serves two market segments, and potential entry can occur only in one of the segments. Here, price discrimination has no strategic value to the entrant given its limited access to a single market, but it does allow the incumbent to price lower in the newly entered market, while still maintaining monopoly profits from its captive segment. Hence, the incumbent’s best-response discriminating prices following entry will generally result in a lower price in the attacked market than if uniform pricing across segments were required.

For sufficiently high capital costs, entry is blockaded whether or not the incumbent can price discriminate. For sufficiently low costs of entry, entry occurs regardless of whether the incumbent can price discriminate. For intermediate values, however, the availability of price discrimination leads to blockaded entry, while uniform price restrictions accommodate the entrant. Under uniform pricing, in Armstrong and Vickers’s (1993) model, the prices in both markets are lower with entry than they would be with price discrimination and deterrence. Entrant profits and consumer surplus are also higher, while incumbent profits fall. This result is robust, providing that the monopoly price in the captive market exceeds the optimal discriminatory price in the competitive market. Armstrong and Vickers (1993) further demonstrate that the net welfare effects of uniform price restrictions are generally ambiguous, as the efficiencies from reduced prices must be offset against the inefficiencies from additional entry costs.

The model in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) illustrates the possibility that uniform pricing reduces all prices relative to price discrimination, due entirely to entry effects. A restriction to uniform prices promotes entry, which in turn generates price reductions in both markets. A similar theme emerges in section 7 but for different economic reasons when we consider entry deterrence from bundling goods.
3.6 Restrictions between firms to limit price discrimination

Using the example drawn from Thisse and Vives (1988), we previously noted that when firms commit publicly to a pricing strategy (uniform or discriminating), it is possible that price discrimination becomes a dominant strategy and firms become trapped in a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma—all firms would like to commit collectively to uniform pricing but, individually, each prefers to price discriminate. Of course, we have also seen settings in which price discrimination raises industry profits, as in Holmes (1989). At present, we do not have a general theory predicting when unilateral commitments to uniform pricing will be optimal. Such a theory would be directly useful for analyzing the conditions under which uniform pricing emerges without collective action. It would also be indirectly useful when studying strategic commitments in the face of entry. An incumbent monopolist may find, for example, that a commitment to uniform price is optimal if entry will occur regardless, but commitment to large price discounts (perhaps larger than the statically optimal price-discriminating prices) will deter entry into the weak market.

We have more precise conclusions regarding collective restrictions, however, as well as a few useful insights regarding the control of price discrimination in vertical structures. We discuss each in turn.

- **Collective agreements to restrict price discrimination.** It is difficult to obtain general results regarding the unilateral, multilateral and social incentives for price discrimination. Fortunately, there are some clear cut cases: (i) best-response asymmetry with all-out competition, and (ii) best-response symmetry with linear demands. When all-out competition is present, price discrimination lowers prices and profits. Hence, a collective agreement by firms to restrict price discrimination has the effect of raising prices for all consumers, lowering aggregate output, and lowering consumer surplus and total welfare.

  In the second setting of best-response symmetry with linear demands, Holmes (1989) demonstrates that if the elasticity-ratio condition is satisfied, then price discrimination in-

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28 A numerical linear-demand example in Holmes (1989) demonstrates both that price discrimination can lower industry profits and that a unilateral commitment to uniform pricing can be a dominant strategy. The numerical example assumes the strong and weak segment demand curves for firm $a$ are $q_s = (1 - 2p^a + p^b)$ and $q_w = (1 - \frac{41}{10}p^a + 4p^b)$, respectively. The market demand curves for firm $b$ are symmetric to firm $a$’s. Costs are zero, $c = 0$. Holmes (1989) does not solve for the commitment stage game; he provides the example only to illustrate that profits decrease from price discrimination. Solving for the stage game, firm profits from collective price discrimination are 0.4546; profits from collective uniform pricing are 0.4707; profits from uniform pricing when a rival price discriminates are 0.4573 and profits from price discrimination when a rival chooses uniform prices are 0.4705. Uniform pricing is a dominant strategy.
creases industry profits. Hence, with linear demands, firms have only a collective incentive to prohibit price discrimination if the elasticity-ratio condition fails. Given that demands are linear, violation of the elasticity-ratio condition implies that price discrimination lowers aggregate output and hence welfare. In this simple setting, it follows that welfare increases by allowing firms to agree collectively to limit price discrimination. There is still the possibility that the elasticity-ratio condition fails and welfare decreases, but industry profits still increase with price discrimination. Here, restrictions on welfare-reducing price discrimination must come from outside the industry. Winter (1997) considers a variation of Holmes’s (1989) analysis in the context of collective agreements to limit (but not prohibit) price discrimination by restricting the difference between the high and low prices. His conclusion for linear demands is similar: when firms have a collective desire to restrict price discrimination, it is socially efficient for them to be allowed to do so. As an illustration, suppose an extreme case in which each half of the strong market is captive to one of the firms (therefore, $\varepsilon_2 = 0$), while the weak market has a positive cross-price elasticity of demand. In such a case, the elasticity-ratio test clearly fails. At the equilibrium prices, a slight restriction on price discrimination causes the weak-market price to rise slightly and the strong-market price to fall by a similar margin. Because the weak market price is below the collusive profit-maximizing price, this price increase helps the duopolists. Because the strong market’s price is at the optimal monopoly price under discrimination (due to captive customers), a slight decrease causes only a second-order reduction in profits to the duopoly. Hence, a slight restriction on price discrimination is jointly optimal for duopolists.

In this case, where the elasticity-ratio condition is violated (and demands are linear), Holmes (1989) shows that $Q'(r) < 0$. As a consequence, a restriction on the price differential (a lowering of $r$) raises aggregate output. Since aggregate output increases and the price differential decreases, welfare necessarily increases. It follows that industry agreements to limit price discrimination arise only if price discrimination reduces welfare, providing that adjusted demand concavities are small. The results are less clear when demands are not linear and the adjusted concavity condition plays an important role.

In short, when profits are lower under price discrimination, firms in the industry would prefer to collude and commit to uniform pricing. Such collusion would decrease welfare if all-out competition would otherwise occur, and increase welfare when demand is linear and price discrimination would have reduced aggregate output. In more general settings, unfortunately, the results are ambiguous.
Vertical restraints and downstream price discrimination. Although this survey largely ignores the impact of price discrimination on competing vertical structures, it is worth mentioning a sample of work in this area. We have already mentioned one strategic effect of price discrimination via secret price discounts by wholesalers to downstream firms: price discrimination may induce the upstream firm to flood the downstream market. A legal requirement that the wholesaler offer a single price to all retailers may instead help the upstream firm to commit to not over supply the retail market, thereby raising profits and retail prices. See, for example, Rey and Tirole (2003), elsewhere in this volume.

In other settings of wholesale price discrimination, if downstream market segments have different elasticities of demand but third-degree price discrimination is illegal or otherwise impractical because of arbitrage, vertical integration can be used as a substitute for price discrimination. Tirole (1988) gives a simple model of such a vertical price squeeze. A monopoly wholesaler, selling to a strong market at price \( p_2 \) and to a weak market at price \( p_1 < p_2 \), may suffer from arbitrage as the firms in the weak downstream market resell output to the strong segment. By vertically integrating into one of the weak-segment downstream firms, the wholesaler can now supply all output at the strong-segment price of \( p_2 \) while producing in the weak segment and using an internal transfer price no greater than \( p_1 \). Other firms in the weak market will be squeezed by the vertically integrated rival due to higher wholesale prices. The wholesaler effectively reduces competition in the weak segment to prevent arbitrage and implement a uniform wholesale price.

Consider instead the case where it is the downstream retail firms that are the source of price discrimination. How do the various tools of resale price maintenance (RPM) by the upstream manufacturer impact profits and welfare when retailers engage in third-degree price discrimination? As the previous discussions suggested, a manufacturer who sells to imperfectly competitive, price-discriminating retailers would prefer to constrain retailers from discounting their prices to consumers who are highly cross-elastic, as this is just a business-stealing externality. On the other hand, the manufacturer would like to encourage price discrimination across the full range of cross-price inelastic consumers as this action raises profits to the industry. Hence, the combination of competition and price discrimination generates a unique conflict in the vertical chain.

A simple duopoly example from Chen (1999) illustrates this conflict. Suppose that type-1 consumers are captive and buy only from the local retailer (if at all), while type-2 consumers comparison-shop for the lowest price. Both types have unit demands drawn
from a uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$. Here, price discrimination arises simply because a consumer’s outside option may depend upon his type (and the competing offer of a rival). Market 1 (comprised of type-1 consumers) has a measure of $\alpha$; market 2 has a measure of $(1 - \alpha)$. Marginal costs are 0. Here, the optimal price to maximize the sum of retailers’ and manufacturer’s profits is $p_1 = p_2 = \frac{1}{2}$. Total profit is $\frac{1}{4}$. When $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, this collective maximum cannot be achieved with two-part tariffs by themselves. A two-part tariff of the form $T(q) = F + wq$ will generate equilibrium prices by the retailers of $p_1 = \frac{1+w}{2}$ and $p_2 = w$; the conditionally optimal fixed fee will extract retailer profits, $F = \frac{1}{4} \alpha (1 - w)^2$. The corresponding wholesale price is

$$w^* = \frac{2(1 - \alpha)}{4 - 3\alpha},$$

which implies retail prices will exceed the profit-maximizing prices of $\frac{1}{2}$. In effect, a classic double marginalization arises on each market segment. With the addition of either price ceilings or price floors, the two-part tariff again becomes sufficient to maximize the vertical chain’s profit. For example, either $w = \frac{1}{2}$ and $F = 0$ with a price ceiling of $\frac{1}{2}$, or $w = 0$ and $F = \frac{1}{4}$ and a price floor of $\frac{1}{2}$, will achieve the desired retail prices. Moreover, RPM here has the desirable effect of lowering prices, raising output and making prices less dispersed across markets. With more general demand settings (specifically, type-1 consumers’ valuations distributed differently than type-2 consumers), RPM can again implement the vertical chain’s optimal retail prices, but its welfare effects are ambiguous. Chen (1999) places bounds on welfare changes which provide, among other things, that if output increases due to RPM, then welfare is necessarily higher, but, if output decreases, the change in welfare is ambiguous.

### 4 Price Discrimination by Purchase History

Consumer price sensitivities are often revealed by past purchase decisions. For example, consumers may suffer exogenous switching costs in firms, so past customers may have more inelastic demands than new customers. Here, purchase history is useful because an otherwise homogeneous good becomes differentiated *ex post* due to exogenous switching costs. In other cases, it may be that no exogenous switching costs exist but that the products are inherently differentiated, with consumers having strong preferences for one product or the
other. It follows that a customer who reveals a preference for firm a’s product at current prices is precisely the person to whom firm b would like to offer a price reduction. In this case, purchase history operates through a different conduit of differentiation because it informs about a consumer’s exogenous brand preference. Regardless, the strategies of “paying customers to switch” (Chen (1997b)) or “consumer poaching” (Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)) can be profitable because purchase history provides a valuable variable for the basis of dynamic third-degree price discrimination. It is not surprising, therefore, that such pricing is a well-known strategy among marketers.\footnote{Kotler (1994, ch.11) refers to segmenting markets based upon purchasing history as “behavioral segmentation” (e.g., user status, loyalty status, etc.), as opposed to geographic, demographic or psychographic segmentation. Rossi and Allenby (1993) argue that firms should offer price reductions to households “that show loyalty toward other brands and yet are price sensitive” (p. 178). Rossi, McCulloch and Allenby (1996) review some of the available purchase-history data. See Shaffer and Zhang (2000) for additional references to the marketing literature.}

As the examples suggest, two approaches to modeling imperfect competition and purchase-history price discrimination have been taken in the literature. The first set of models, e.g., Nilssen (1992), Chen (1997b), Taylor (2003), et al., assumes that the goods are initially homogeneous in period 1, but after purchase the consumers are partially locked in with their sellers; exogenous switching costs must be paid to switch to different firms in future periods. The immediate result is that although prices rise over time as firms exploit the lock-in effects of switching costs, firms ultimately compete away in period 1 the long-run profits due to lock-in.\footnote{Profits are competed away because firms at date 1 are perfectly competitive without any differentiation.}

The second set of models assumes that products are horizontally differentiated in the initial period (e.g., Caminal and Matutes (1990), Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), et al.). In the simplest variant, brand preferences are constant over time. It follows that a consumer who prefers firm a’s product and reveals this preference through his purchase in period 1 will become identified as part of a’s “strong” market segment (and firm b’s “weak” market segment) in period 2. As we will see, when firms cannot commit to long-term prices, this form of unchanging product differentiation will generate prices that decrease over time, and competition intensifies in each segment.

The resulting price paths in the above settings rest on the assumption that firms cannot commit to future prices. This assumption may be inappropriate. One could easily imagine that firms commit in advance to reward loyal customers in the future with price reductions or other benefits (such as with frequent flyer programs). Such long-term commitments can be thought of as endogenous switching costs and have been studied in the context of horizontal
differentiation by Banerjee and Summers (1987), Caminal and Matutes (1990), Villas-Boas (1999) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). Two cases have been studied: preferences that change over time and preferences that are static. In the first case, most papers assume that consumer valuations are independently distributed across the periods. If preferences change from period to period and firms cannot commit to future prices, there is no value to using purchase history as it is uninformative about current elasticities. Public, long-term contracts between, say, firm $a$ and a consumer, however, can raise the joint surplus of the pair by making firm $b$ price lower in the second period to induce switching, as in the models of Caminal and Matutes (1990) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). In equilibrium, social welfare may decrease as long-term contracts induce too little switching. In the second category of price-commitment models, preferences are assumed to be fixed across periods. When preferences are unchanging across time, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) demonstrate a similar effect from long-term contracts: firm $a$ locks in some of its customer base to generate lower second-period pricing for switching, and thereby encourages consumers to buy from firm $a$ in the initial period. With long-term contracts, some inefficient switching still occurs but less than when firms cannot commit to long-term prices; hence welfare increases by allowing such contracts.

We consider both switching-cost and horizontal-differentiation models of pricing without commitment in the following two subsections. We then turn to the effects of long-term price commitments when discrimination on purchase history is allowed.

4.1 Exogenous switching costs and homogeneous goods

There are many important and subtle effects in switching-cost models. Farrell and Klemperer (2003), in this volume, provide a thorough treatment of switching costs, so we will limit our present attention to the very specific issues of price discrimination over purchase history under imperfect competition.

One of the first discussions of purchase-history discrimination in a model of switching costs appears in Nilssen (1992). Chen (1997b), building on this approach, introduces a distribution of switching costs in a two-period model, resulting in some measure of equilibrium

\[31\] In this model, however, there is no uncertainty over the size of the switching cost, and no consumer actually switches in equilibrium. The focus in Nilssen (1992) is primarily on how market outcomes are affected by the form of switching costs. Transaction costs are paid every time the consumer switches in contrast to learning costs which are only paid the first time the consumer uses a firm’s product. These costs are indistinguishable in the two-period models considered in this survey.
switching. We present a variant of Chen’s (1997b) model here.

Consider duopolists, \( j = a, b \), selling identical homogeneous goods to a unit measure of potential consumers. In period 1, both firms offer first-period prices, \( p^j_1 \). Each consumer chooses a single firm from which to purchase one unit and obtains first-period utility of \( v - p^j_1 \). Consumers who are indifferent randomize between firms. Following the first-period purchase, each consumer randomly draws an unobservable switching cost, \( \theta \), that is distributed uniformly on \([0, \bar{\theta}]\). When price discrimination is allowed, firms simultaneously offer pairs of second-period prices, \( \{p^j_{2a}, p^j_{2b}\} \), where \( p^j_{2k} \) is the second-period price offered by firm \( j \) to a consumer who purchased from firm \( k \) in period 1. A consumer who purchases from firm \( j \) in both periods obtains present value utility of

\[
v - p^j_1 + \delta(v - p^j_{2j}),
\]

and, if the consumer switches from firm \( j \) to firm \( k \) with switching cost \( \theta \), obtains

\[
v - p^j_1 + \delta(v - p^k_{2j} - \theta).
\]

Beginning with the second period, suppose that firm \( a \) acquired a fraction \( \phi^a \) of consumers in the first period. It follows that a consumer who purchased from firm \( a \) is indifferent to switching to firm \( b \) if, and only if,

\[
v - p^a_{2a} = v - p^b_{2a} - \theta.
\]

Consequently, firm \( a \)’s retained demand is

\[
\phi^a \int_{p^b_{2a} - p^a_{2a}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{1}{\theta} d\theta = \phi^a \left( 1 - \frac{p^b_{2a} - p^a_{2a}}{\bar{\theta}} \right),
\]

and firm \( b \)’s switch demand is \( \phi^a(p^b_{2a} - p^a_{2a})/\bar{\theta} \), provided that the market is covered in equilibrium. It is straightforward to calculate the other second-period demand functions and profits as a function of second-period prices. Solving for the equilibrium, second-period, price-discriminating prices, we obtain \( p^j_{2j} = c + \frac{2}{3}\bar{\theta} \) and \( p^j_{2k} = c + \frac{1}{3}\bar{\theta} \) for \( k \neq j \).^{32} Using

^{32}Remarkably, the second-period prices are independent of first-period market share, a result that Chen (1997b) generalizes to a richer model than presented here.
these prices, the associated equilibrium second-period profits are

$$\pi^j = \frac{\bar{\theta}}{3} \left( \frac{1}{3} + \phi^j \right),$$

a function solely of first-period market share. First-period competition is perfect as the firm’s goods are homogeneous. Chen (1997b) demonstrates that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for each firm to charge

$$p_1^j = c - \frac{\delta}{3} \bar{\theta},$$
generating a present value of profits, $\delta \bar{\theta} / 3$, derived from above.

In equilibrium, each firm sets its price so that the additional market share generated by a price decrease exactly equals the discounted marginal profit, $\delta \bar{\theta} / 3$, derived from above. No profit is made from acquired first-period market share, but the firms continue to earn positive long-term profits because of the ability to induce switching in the second period and the underlying heterogeneity in preferences. Indeed, a firm who acquires zero first-period market share still earns profits of $\delta \bar{\theta}$. Prices increase over time, but more so for those consumers who are locked in. In equilibrium, all consumer types with switching costs below $\frac{\bar{\theta}}{3}$ inefficiently switch firms, thereby revealing their price sensitivity and obtaining the discounted price.

Compare the price-discrimination outcome with what would emerge under uniform-pricing restrictions. In the second period, equilibrium prices will generally depend upon first-period market shares (particularly, prices depend upon whether the market share is above, below, or equal to $\frac{1}{2}$). A firm with a higher market share will charge a higher second-period price. When market shares are equal, straightforward computations reveal that second-period equilibrium prices are $p_2^j = c + \bar{\theta}, j = a, b$. The second-period market exhibits all-out-competition as prices for both segments are lower under price discrimination relative to uniform pricing, consumer surpluses are higher, and firm profits are lower. In the first period, unfortunately, the analysis is more complex because the second-period profit functions are kinked at the point where market shares are equal. This gives rise to multiple equilibria in which consumers realize that firms with larger market shares will have higher prices in the second period, and take this into account when purchasing in period 1, leading to less elastic first-period demand. One natural equilibrium to consider is when the first-period prices constitute an equilibrium in a one-shot game. Here, the equilibrium outcome is $p_1^j = c + \frac{2}{3} \bar{\theta}$, which is higher than the first-period price-discriminating price. Furthermore, the discounted sum of equilibrium profits is $\delta \bar{\theta} / 6$, which is higher than the price-discriminating level of $\delta \bar{\theta}$. Generally, Chen (1997b) demonstrates that regardless
of the selected uniform-pricing equilibrium, the discounted sum of profits under uniform pricing is always weakly greater than the profits under price discrimination. Thus, price discrimination unambiguously makes firms worse off in the switching-cost model.

Consumers, on the other hand, may or may not be better off under uniform pricing, depending on the equilibrium chosen. In the selected “one-shot” equilibrium above, consumers are unambiguously better off under price discrimination. In other equilibria derived in Chen (1997b), both firms and consumers may be worse off under price discrimination. Regardless, because uniform pricing does not induce inefficient switching, price discrimination always reduces welfare. Of course, one must be careful when interpreting the welfare results in such models of inelastic demand because there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output.

It might seem odd that firms earn positive profits in Chen (1997b) given that, ex ante, the duopolists’ goods are homogeneous and competition is perfect in the first period. Profits are earned, however, from the fact that there is a monopoly in firms inducing switching in the second period. Taylor (2003) makes this point (among others) by noting that with three firms in a two-period model, both outside firms perfectly compete over prices in the second period, leading to zero profits from switching consumers, \( p_{2k}^j = c \) for \( k \neq j \). At such prices, the inside firm will retain its consumer if and only if \( \theta \geq p_{2j}^j - c \), so it chooses its retention price to maximize \( (\bar{\theta} - (p_{2j}^j - c))(p_{2j}^j - c) \), or \( p_{2j}^j = c + \frac{1}{2}\bar{\theta} \). Comparing this second-period price spread of \( \frac{1}{2}\bar{\theta} \) to the previous duopoly spread of \( \frac{1}{3}\bar{\theta} \), increased competition (going from duopoly to oligopoly, \( n > 3 \)) leads to more inefficient switching and greater price dispersion. In a sense, this increased price dispersion is similar to the effect present in Thisse and Vives (1988) when one goes from monopoly to duopoly: increases in competition can differentially affect some market segments more than others, leading to a larger range of equilibrium prices. Here, going from two to three firms leads to increased competition among firms that induce switching, but does not influence the loyal-customer price to the same degree.

Shaffer and Zhang (2000) consider a model similar to Chen (1997b), studying the case

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\(^{33}\)Taylor (2003) considers a more general \( T \)-period model; we simplify the present discussion by focusing on the 2-period variation. Taylor also studies a more complex setting of screening on unobservable characteristics. Specifically, Taylor assumes that there are two first-order, stochastically ranked distributions of switching costs. Consumers who draw from the low-cost distribution signal their type in equilibrium by switching, and hence generate lower prices in the future. This idea is closely related to the topic of second-degree price discrimination studied in section 6 below.
in which firms’ demands are asymmetric and the effect that these asymmetries may have on
whether a firm “pays customers to switch” or instead defends loyal consumers by “paying to
stay.” It is, of course, always optimal for price-discriminating firms to offer a lower price to
its more elastic segment of consumers. Focusing on the second period of a duopoly model,
Shaffer and Zhang (2000) demonstrate that while charging a lower price to a competitor’s
customers is always optimal when demand is symmetric, with asymmetries it may be that
one firm’s more elastic consumer segment is its own customers. This latter situation arises,
for example, when firm a’s existing customer base has lower switching costs on average,
compared to firm b’s loyal consumers. In such a setting, firm a finds its loyal consumer
segment has a higher elasticity of demand than the potential switchers who consumed from
firm b in the past; firm a will charge a lower price to its loyal segment as a result. Hence,
defending one’s consumer base with “pay-to-stay” strategies can be optimal in a more
general model.

4.2 Discrimination over revealed preferences from first-period choices

Instead of assuming exogenous switching costs arising after an initial purchase from either
firm, one can suppose that consumers have exogenous preferences for brands that are present
from the start, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). To keep the analysis simple, they model
such horizontal differentiation by imagining a Hotelling-style linear market of unit length
with firms positioned at the endpoints, and by assuming that each consumer’s uniformly
distributed brand preference, θ, remains fixed for both periods of consumption. Consumers
have transportation costs of τ per unit distance, and firms produce with constant marginal
and average costs of c per unit. In such a setting, consumers reveal information about their
brand preference by their first-period choice, and firms set second-period prices accordingly.

Solving backwards from the second period, suppose that firm a captures the market
share [0, ˆθ1) and firm b captures the complement, (ˆθ1, 1] in the first period. The second-
period demand function derivations are straightforward. In the left segment (i.e., firm a’s
strong market and firm b’s weak market), the marginal consumer, ˆθ2, who is indifferent
between continuing to purchase from firm a at price p2a and switching to firm b at price of
p2b, is given by

\[ p_{2a} + \tau \hat{\theta}^2 = p_{2b} + \tau (1 - \hat{\theta}^2). \]
It follows that firm $a$’s demand from retained consumers is
\[ \hat{\theta}_a^2 = \frac{1}{2} + \left( \frac{p_{2a}^b - p_{2a}^a}{2\tau} \right), \]
and firm $b$’s demand from switching consumers is
\[ \hat{\theta}_b^2 = \hat{\theta}_1 - \hat{\theta}_a^2 = \hat{\theta}_1 - q_{2a}^a = \hat{\theta}_1 - \frac{1}{2} + \left( \frac{p_{2a}^a - p_{2a}^b}{2\tau} \right). \]

Similar derivations provide the retained demand for firm $b$ and the switching demand for firm $a$. Using these demand functions, simple computations reveal that equilibrium second-period prices are
\[ p_{2a}^a(\hat{\theta}_1) = p_{2b}^b(\hat{\theta}_1) = c + \frac{\tau}{3}(4\hat{\theta}_1 - 1). \]

When the first-period market is equally split, $p_{2a}^a = p_{2b}^b = c + \frac{\tau}{3}(1 + 2\hat{\theta}_1)$ and $p_{2a}^b = p_{2b}^a = c + \frac{\tau}{3}(1 + \frac{1}{2} \hat{\theta}_1)$.

The marginal consumer in the first period will ultimately switch in the second period, so the location $\hat{\theta}_1$ is determined by the relationship
\[ p_1^a + \tau\hat{\theta}_1 + \delta \left( p_{2a}^b(\hat{\theta}_1) + \tau(1 - \hat{\theta}_1) \right) = p_1^b + \tau(1 - \hat{\theta}_1) + \delta \left( p_{2b}^a(\hat{\theta}_1) + \tau\hat{\theta}_1 \right). \]

Simplifying, first-period demand is
\[ \hat{\theta}_1(p_1^a, p_1^b) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{3}{2\tau(3 + \delta)}(p_1^b - p_1^a). \]

Providing $\delta > 0$, first-period demands are less sensitive to prices relative to the static one-shot game because an increase in first-period market share implies higher second-period prices. Using the equilibrium prices from the second period as a function of $\hat{\theta}_1$, one can compute second-period market shares as a function of $\hat{\theta}_1$. Because $\hat{\theta}_1$ is a function of first-period prices, second-period market shares and prices are entirely determined by first-period prices: $\hat{\theta}_2^a(\hat{\theta}_1(p_1^a, p_1^b))$ and $\hat{\theta}_2^b(\hat{\theta}_1(p_1^a, p_1^b))$. With these expressions, the present value of profit for firm $a$ can be written as a function of first-period prices. Computing the equilibrium is algebraically tedious but straightforward, leading one to conclude that $p_1^a = p_1^b = c + \tau + \frac{\delta}{3}\tau$, second-period prices are $p_{2a}^a = p_{2b}^b = c + \frac{2}{3}\tau$ for loyal customers, and $p_{2a}^b = p_{2b}^a = c + \frac{1}{3}\tau$ for switchers. The first-period market is split symmetrically with $\hat{\theta}_1 = \frac{1}{2}$, and the second-period segments are split at $\hat{\theta}_2^a = \frac{1}{3}$ and $\hat{\theta}_2^b = \frac{2}{3}$.

Compare this dynamic price discrimination game with the outcome under uniform pricing. Without the ability to condition second-period prices on first-period behavior, firms
would offer the static prices in each period, \( p_1^a = p_2^a = p_1^b = p_2^b = c + \tau \); consumers would pay a total of \((1 + \delta)(c + \tau)\) for the consumption stream, and no switching would arise. The absence of equilibrium switching under uniform pricing immediately implies that social welfare is lowered by price discrimination, although the modeling assumption of inelastic demand limits the generality of this welfare conclusion.

Several additional results emerge from a simple comparison of uniform pricing and price discrimination. First, in the price discrimination game, the “loyal” consumers in the intervals \([0, \frac{1}{3}]\) and \([\frac{2}{3}, 1]\) do not switch and their present-value payment is the same as in the uniform setting: \( p_1^j + \delta p_2^j = c + \tau + \frac{2}{3} \tau + \delta (c + \frac{2}{3} \tau) = (1 + \delta)(c + \tau) \). Consumer surplus and profit for these intervals is unaffected by price discrimination. Second, the “poached” consumers in the interval \((\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3})\), however, switch from one firm to the other. By revealed preference they could choose to be loyal but strictly prefer to switch firms; hence, consumer surplus increases for consumers with only moderate brand loyalties. Because such switching decreases social welfare, it follows that profits must decrease for these segments. The present-value price paid by these consumers for two periods of consumption is only \((1 + \delta)(c + \tau) - \frac{2}{3} \tau\), and hence lower than the price paid by loyal consumers. Price discrimination does not increase the present-value payment from any consumer segment and strictly reduces it to the middle segment, just as in models of all-out-competition. Third, the price path in this model of product differentiation differs from the exogenous switching-cost models: here, prices fall over time as competition intensifies for the price-sensitive market segments.

Villas-Boas (1999) studies a related but infinite-period, overlapping-generations model in which firms can only discriminate between returning customers and non-returning customers. Among these non-returning customers, a firm cannot distinguish between new consumers and customers who purchased from the rival firm in the first half of their economic lives. Whether this is a reasonable assumption depends upon the setting. If a firm would like to offer a lower price to new customers than to rival customers, this may be plausible if masquerading as a new customer is possible. Of course, if a firm would prefer to offer the lower price to rival customers, one might imagine in some settings a consumer could provide proof of purchase of a competing product, making the assumption less realistic and the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) more appropriate. The steady-state results of Villas-Boas (1999) indicate that equilibrium prices are lower because each firm wants to attract the competitor’s previous customers. Moreover, equilibrium prices decrease
as consumers become more patient due to marginal consumers becoming more indifferent about which product to buy initially. This movement toward indifference renders consumers more price sensitive, which in turn intensifies competition and makes it difficult for firms to retain their customers. Finally, Villas-Boas (1999) demonstrates that, close to steady state, a greater previous-period market share results in a lower price to new customers and a higher price to existing customers. Thus, customer-recognition effects appear to make demand more inelastic in the previous period, as in the previously presented models and for reasons documented in the switching-cost literature.

4.3 Purchase-history pricing with long-term commitment

Unlike the previous analyses which relied on short-term price agreements, we now ask what happens if a firm can write a long-term contract, committing to a second-period price so as to guarantee returning customers terms that differ from those offered to other customers. Banerjee and Summers (1987) and Caminal and Matutes (1990) were among the first to explore the use of long-term contracts to induce loyalty and generate endogenous switching costs. Consider the setting of Caminal and Matutes (1990). As before, there are two firms and two periods of competition. The market in each period consists of a linear city of unit length, with firm \( a \) located at 0 and firm \( b \) located at 1, and consumers uniformly distributed across the interval. The difference with the previous models is that the location of each consumer is *independently distributed across periods*. Thus, a consumer’s location in period 1, \( \theta_1 \), is statistically independent of the consumer’s location in period 2, \( \theta_2 \). This independence assumption implies that there is no relevant second-period information contained in a consumer’s first-period choice. It follows that if firms cannot commit to long-term prices, there is no value from price discrimination based upon purchase history.

Suppose, however, that price commitments are possible. The timing of the market game is as follows: First, firms simultaneously choose their first-period prices, \( p^1_j \), and pre-commit (if they wish) to offer a second period price, \( p^2_j \), to customers who purchase in period 1 (i.e., period 1 customers are given an option contract for period 2.) Consumers decide from whom to purchase in period 1. At the start of the second period, each firm simultaneously chooses \( p^2_k \), \( k \neq j \), which applies to non-returning consumers and returning customers if either \( p^2_{2k} \leq p^2_j \) or if firm \( j \) did not offer a price commitment. Caminal and Matutes (1990) demonstrate that subgame perfection requires that both firms commit to
long-term prices for returning consumers. Calculating the subgame perfect equilibrium is thus straightforward, with the second-period poaching prices determined as functions of the second-period committed prices. Using these prices, second-period profits and first-period market shares can be computed, and the equilibrium prices can be derived. Absent discounting, the equilibrium prices are $p_{1}^j = c + \frac{4\tau}{3}$, $p_{2j}^j = c - \frac{\tau}{3}$ and $p_{2k}^j = c + \frac{\tau}{3}$, $k \neq j$.

Caminal and Matutes (1990) find a few noteworthy results. First, equilibrium prices decline over time. Remarkably, the second-period commitment price is below even marginal cost. The reasoning of this is subtle. Suppose, for example, that firm b’s poaching price in the second period was independent of firm a’s second-period loyalty price. Because the consumer’s second-period location is unknown at the time of long-term contracting, firm a maximizes the joint surplus of a consumer and itself by setting $p_{2j}^j = c$ and pricing efficiently in the second period. Given that firm b’s poaching price in reality does depend positively on firm a’s second-period loyalty price, firm a can obtain a first-order gain in joint surplus by reducing its price slightly below cost and thereby reducing firm b’s second-period price. This slight reduction in price incurs only a corresponding second-order loss in surplus since pricing was originally at the efficient level. Hence, a firm will commit to a follow-on price below marginal cost in the second-period as a way to increase the expected surplus going to the consumer, and hence raise the attractiveness of purchasing from the firm initially. In this sense, the price commitment is similar to the analysis of Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Aghion and Bolton (1987), in which contractual commitments are used to extract a better price from an outside party. Of course, as Caminal and Matures (1990) confirm, when both firms undertake this strategy simultaneously, profits fall relative to the no-commitment case and firms are worse off. Welfare is also lower as too little switching takes place from a social viewpoint.

What are the effects of the presence of this commitment strategy? As is by now a familiar theme, although an individual firm will benefit from committing to a declining price path for returning customers, the firms are collectively worse off with the ability to write long-term price contracts. With commitment, it is also the case that there is too much lock-in or inertia in the second-period allocations. Without commitment, social welfare would therefore be higher, as consumers would allocate themselves to firms over time to minimize transportation costs. The endogenous switching costs (created by the declining price path for returning consumers) decrease social welfare. As before, because market demand is inelastic in this model, there is an inherent bias against price discrimination, so we must
Closely related to Caminal and Matutes (1990), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) also consider an environment in which price commitments can be made through long-term contracts, using an interesting variation in which consumer preferences are fixed across periods (i.e., location $\theta$ between firms $a$ and $b$ does not change). In this setting, there are no exogenous switching costs, but long-term contracts with breach penalties can be offered which introduce endogenous switching costs in the sense of Caminal and Matutes (1990). While such contracts could be effectively used to lock consumers into a firm and prevent poaching, the firms choose to offer both long-term and spot contracts in equilibrium so as to segment the marketplace. In equilibrium, consumers with strong preferences for one firm will purchase long-term contracts, while those with weaker preferences will select short-term contracts and switch suppliers in the second period. The firm utilizes long-term contracts to generate lower poaching prices, which benefit consumers located near the center of the market. The firm can extract concessions in the first period by locking in some customers with long-term contracts, thereby generating more aggressive second-period pricing (similar in spirit to Caminal and Matutes (1990).) In addition, the long-term contracts also generate a single-crossing property that segments first-period consumers: in equilibrium, consumers located near the middle of the market are more willing to purchase short-term contracts and switch in the second period to a lower-priced rival than consumers located at the extreme.

It is worth noting that a multi-plant monopolist would accomplish a similar sorting by selling long-term contracts for $aa$, $bb$ and the switching bundles $ab$ and $ba$. The monopolist can therefore segment the market, charging higher prices to the non-switchers and lower prices to the consumers who are willing to switch. The optimal amount of monopoly switch-

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34Caminal and Matutes (1990) also consider a distinct game in which firms’ strategies allow only for commitments to discounts (or coupons) rather than to particular prices. In this setting, a similar decreasing price path emerges for continuing consumers, and profits for firms are higher than with commitment to prices. Indeed, the profits are higher than if no commitments are allowed. The difference arises because committed prices do not have an impact on second-period profits from non-returning customers; this is not the case with committed discounts. With committed discounts, firms are reluctant to cut prices to non-returning customers, so second-period competition is less intense. This finding relates to that of Banerjee and Summers (1987), who show in a homogeneous product market that commitments to discounts for returning customers can be a collusive device which raises second-period prices to the monopoly level. Because profits are higher in the discount game, we might expect firms to choose such strategies in a meta-game that offers a choice between committed discounts and committed prices. Caminal and Matutes (1990) analyze this meta-game and conclude that, unfortunately for the firms, the price-commitment game is the equilibrium outcome. The analysis of Caminal and Matutes (1990) demonstrates that price discrimination over purchase history can generate endogenous switching costs with declining price paths (loyalty rewards) and too much lock-in, assuming that demand information in the first period is independent of the second period.
ing in the second period (given a uniform distribution) can be shown to be one-half of the consumers. Here, long-term contracts serve a similar segmentation function. Interestingly, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) show that if consumers are uniformly distributed, one-fourth of the consumers will switch in the long-term contracting equilibrium with duopoly—less switching than in the case of short-term contracts alone, and still less switching than under monopoly. Hence, given price discrimination is allowed, allowing firms to use long-term contracts improves social welfare. This finding emerges because demand is unchanging across periods, in contrast to Caminal and Matutes (1990), who find that long-term price commitments lead to too much lock-in and hence reduce social welfare when preferences vary over time.

5 Intrapersonal price discrimination

Intrapersonal price discrimination has received very little attention, partly because in the context of monopoly, the models and results are economically immediate. For example, consider a consumer with a known demand curve, \( p = D(q) \), and a constant marginal (and average) cost of production equal to \( c \). Let \( q^* \) be the unique solution to \( c = D(q^*) \). A monopolist can increase profits by offering any of a host of equally optimal but distinct mechanisms: a fixed bundle of \( q^* \) units at a bundle price of \( \int_0^{q^*} D(z)dz \); a fully nonlinear tariff of \( P(q) = D(q) \); or a two-part tariff equal to \( P(q) = v(c) + cq \) where \( v(p) \equiv \max_q u(q) - pq \) is the consumer’s indirect utility of consuming at the linear price \( p \). In all examples, the monopolist is effectively price discriminating in an intrapersonal manner: Different prices are charged to the same consumer for different units because the marginal values to the consumer for those units vary according to consumption. In this sense, it is closely related to third-degree price discrimination because the different units of consumption can be thought of as distinguishable market segments. Because there is no heterogeneity within each market segment—the reservation value is \( D(q) \) in the \( q \)-th unit market—price discrimination is perfect and social welfare is maximized.

When markets are imperfectly competitive, intrapersonal price discrimination using nonlinear prices allows firms to provide more efficiently a given level of consumer surplus and cover any fixed, per-consumer costs of production. This efficiency suggests that intrapersonal price discrimination may raise social welfare when firms compete. Following Armstrong and Vickers (2001), we address this possibility and related issues of consumer
surplus and industry profit in the simplest discrete-choice setting in which there is a single market segment with homogeneous consumers.\footnote{Armstrong and Vickers (2001) also study the important settings of interpersonal third-degree price discrimination (discussed in section 3.3) and the case of unobservable heterogeneity considered in section 6.}

Suppose that there are two firms, $j = a, b$, and each is allowed to offer price schedules, $P_j(q_j)$, chosen from the set $\mathcal{P}$. Any restrictions on pricing, such as a requirement of uniform, per-unit prices, are embedded in $\mathcal{P}$. We assume that consumers make all of their purchases from a single firm. This one-stop-shopping assumption implies that a consumer evaluates his utility from each firm and chooses either the firm which generates the greatest utility or not to purchase at all. A consumer who buys from firm $j$ obtains indirect utility of

$$v_j \equiv \max_q u(q) - P_j(q).$$

Define $\pi(v)$ to be the maximal per-consumer profit that firm $j$ can make, while choosing $P_j \in \mathcal{P}$ and generating an indirect utility of $v$ for each participating consumer:

$$\pi(v) \equiv \max_{P_j \in \mathcal{P}} P_j(q) - C(q), \text{ such that } \max_q u(q) - P_j(q) = v.$$ 

Note that as fewer restrictions are placed on $\mathcal{P}$ and the set increases in size, $\pi(v)$ weakly increases. Thus, the per-consumer profit with unfettered price discrimination, $\pi^{pd}(v)$, will typically exceed the per-consumer profit when prices are restricted to be uniform across units, $\pi^u(v)$.

Following the discrete-choice literature,\footnote{Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) provide a thorough survey of the discrete-choice literature.} we can model duopoly product differentiation by assuming each consumer’s net utility from choosing firm $j$ is the consumer’s indirect utility plus an additive, firm-specific, fixed effect, $v_j + \varepsilon_j$; the outside option of no purchase is normalized to 0. For any joint distribution of the additive disturbance terms across firms, there exists a market share function, $s(v_a, v_b)$, which gives the probability that a given consumer purchases from firm $a$ as a function of the indirect utilities offered by the firms. With this notation in hand, we can model firms competing in utility space rather than prices. Firm $a$ maximizes $s(v_a, v_b)\pi(v_a)$, taking $v_b$ as given, and similarly for firm $b$. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) show with a few regularity assumptions that a symmetric equilibrium is given by each firm choosing a $v$ to maximize $\phi(v) + \log \pi(v)$, where $\phi(v)$ is
entirely determined by the structure of \( s(v_a, v_b) \).\(^{37}\)

Remarkably, one can separate the marginal effects of \( v \) on market share from its effect on per-consumer profit, providing a powerful tool to understand the impact of intrapersonal price discrimination in competitive settings. For example, to model the competition for market share, \( s(v_a, v_b) \), assume that the duopolists are situated at either end of a linear Hotelling-style market with transportation costs, \( \tau \), and uniformly distributed consumers.\(^{38}\)

Take the simplest case where per-consumer costs are \( C(q) = cq + k \). We will consider two cases: when \( k > 0 \), there is a per-consumer cost of service; and when \( k = 0 \), there are constant returns to scale in serving a consumer. We define \( \bar{v} \) to be the highest level of indirect utility that can be given to a consumer while earning nonnegative profits; formally,

\[
\pi(\bar{v}) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \pi(v) < 0 \quad \text{for all} \quad v > \bar{v}.
\]

When there is a fixed-cost per consumer, \( k > 0 \), then \( \bar{v} = v(c) - k \) when two-part tariffs are allowed, but \( \bar{v} < v(c) - k \) when prices must be uniform. Thus, when \( k > 0 \) and per-consumer fixed costs exist, it follows that greater utility is generated with price discrimination than with uniform pricing: \( \bar{v}^{pd} > \bar{v}^{u} \). Armstrong and Vickers (2001) prove that in such a setting, allowing price discrimination increases consumer surplus and welfare relative to uniform pricing. As competition intensifies (i.e., \( \tau \to 0 \)), firms attract consumers only by offering them utility close to the maximal zero-profit level. Because the relative loss in profits from a gain in indirect utility is never more than one-to-one, social surplus also increases. In a related model with free entry and firms competing equidistant on a Salop-style circular market, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) similarly demonstrate that price discrimination increases consumer surplus (which equals welfare) relative to uniform pricing. Because welfare increases under price discrimination, it follows that output must increase.

When \( k = 0 \) and there is no per-consumer fixed cost, it follows that \( \bar{v}^{pd} = \bar{v}^{u} = v(c) \), through a more subtle economic argument that requires Taylor expansions around \( \tau = 0 \). Nonetheless, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) find that as competition intensifies (i.e., \( \tau \to 0 \)), price discrimination increases welfare and profits, but this time at the expense

\(^{37}\)This is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium if the maximand is strictly concave.

\(^{38}\)Formally, this framework violates a technical assumption used in Armstrong and Vickers’s (2001) separation theorem, due to the kinked demand curve inherent in the Hotelling model. It is still true, however, that the equilibrium utility maximizes \( \phi(v) + \log \pi(v) \) if the market is covered. Here, \( \phi(v) = v/\tau \). Armstrong and Vickers (2001) also demonstrate that the Hotelling framework approximates the discrete-choice Logit framework when competition is strong.
of consumer surplus. In the free-entry analog on a circular market, they demonstrate that price discrimination again increases welfare and consumer surplus (profits are zero), relative to uniform pricing. It is more difficult to capture the economic intuition for these results, given a reliance on second-order terms and $\tau \approx 0$. Because $\pi_{pd}(\bar{v}) = \pi_u(\bar{v})$ and $\pi_{pd}'(\bar{v}) = \pi_u'(\bar{v})$, it can be shown that $\pi_{pd}''(\bar{v}) > \pi_u''(\bar{v})$. These second-order terms in the Taylor expansions drive the result. Taken together with the case for $k > 0$, the findings suggest that intrapersonal price discrimination is welfare-enhancing when competition is strong.

6 Nonlinear pricing (second-degree price discrimination)

Unlike the setting of third-degree price discrimination, indirect (second-degree) discrimination relies upon self-selection constraints, thus introducing an entirely new set of competitive issues.

In what follows we assume that firms compete via price schedules of the form $P_j(q_j)$, and consumers choose which (if any) firms to patronize and which product(s) from the offered lines they will purchase. To model imperfect competition we assume the product lines are differentiated.\(^{39}\) The theoretical literature on second-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition has largely focused on characterizing equilibrium schedules and the efficiency consequences of competition; less attention has been spent on the desirability of enforcing uniform pricing in these environments. This is due in part to the extra technical complexity of second-degree price discrimination, and, to a lesser degree, to the impracticality of requiring uniform pricing when $q$ refers to quality rather than quantity.

The variety of consumer preferences and competitive environments make it useful to distinguish a few cases. First, two possible equilibrium configurations can arise: a consumer may purchase exclusively from one firm (referred to in the contract theory literature as exclusive agency) or may purchase different products from multiple firms (referred to as exclusive agency) or may purchase different products from multiple firms (referred to as

\(^{39}\)Other papers have modeled imperfect competition and nonlinear pricing for homogeneous products by restricting firms to the choice of quantities (or market shares) as strategic variables, but we do not consider these approaches in this survey. Gal-Or (1983), De Fraja (1996), and Johnson and Myatt (2003) all consider the setting in which firms choose quantities of each quality level, and the market price schedule is set by a Walrasian auctioneer so as to sell the entire quantity of each quality. In a related spirit, Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982) consider two distinct models of imperfect competition with homogeneous goods. In the first, each firm commits to the market share it serves for each quality level; in the second model, each firm commits to the market share it serves for each consumer type.
Second, within each setting, there are several possibilities regarding the unobservable heterogeneity of consumers. The two most common forms are what we will call \textit{vertical} and \textit{horizontal} heterogeneity. In the former, the consumer’s marginal preferences for $q$ (and absolute preferences for participating) are increasing in $\theta$ for each firm; in the latter, the consumer’s marginal preferences for $q$ and absolute preferences for participating are monotonic in $\theta$, but the direction varies across firms with the result that a high-demand type for firm $j$ is a low-demand type for firm $k$ and conversely.\footnote{Formally, if preferences for firm $j$’s goods are represented by $u^j(q_j, \theta)$, then vertical heterogeneity exists when $u^j_\theta > 0$ and $u^j_\theta > 0$ for each $j$. Horizontal heterogeneity is said to exist between firms $j$ and $k$ if $u^j_\theta > 0 > u^k_\theta$ and $u^j_\theta > 0 > u^k_\theta$. Note that this notion of vertical heterogeneity should not be confused with the pure vertical differentiation preferences described in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), which require that all potential qualities are ranked in the same way by every consumer type when products are priced at cost.} Under these definitions, vertical heterogeneity implies that firms agree in their ranking of type from high demand to low demand; under horizontal heterogeneity, two firms have reversed ranking for consumer types. In this sense, the taxonomy is similar in spirit to best-response symmetry and asymmetry under third-degree price discrimination.

Ideally, a general model of competition among second-degree price-discriminating firms should incorporate two dimensions of heterogeneity, one vertical and one horizontal, to capture both a common ranking of marginal valuations for quality among consumers (holding brand preferences fixed) and a variety of brand preferences (holding quality valuations fixed). Unfortunately, multidimensional self-selection models are considerably more difficult to study, as they introduce additional economic and technical subtleties.\footnote{See Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet and Stole (2002b) for surveys of multidimensional screening models.} As a result, the economics literature has either relied upon one-dimensional models (either vertical or horizontal) for precise analytic results (e.g., Spulber (1989), Martimort (1992, 1996), Stole (1991), Stole (1995), Martimort and Stole (2003a)), numerical simulations of multidimensional models (e.g., Borenstein (1985)), or further restrictions on preferences to simplify multidimensional settings to the point of analytical tractability (e.g., Armstrong and Vickers (2001), Rochet and Stole (2002a), Martimort and Ivaldi (1994)).

Before we survey the various approaches taken in the literature, we begin with a review of monopoly second-degree price discrimination to provide a benchmark and a vehicle to introduce notation.
6.1 Monopoly second-degree price discrimination benchmark

In the simplest monopoly model, the consumer has preferences $u(q, \theta) - P(q)$ over combinations of $q$ and price, $P(q)$, where the consumer’s one-dimensional type, $\theta$, is distributed on some interval $\Theta = [\theta_0, \theta_1]$ according to the distribution and density functions, $F(\theta)$ and $f(\theta)$, respectively. We assume that the outside option of not consuming is zero and that the firm faces a per-consumer, convex cost of quality equal to $C(q)$. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978), we take $q$ to represent quality, but it could equally well represent quantities.\footnote{Maskin and Riley (1984) consider a more general model with nonlinear pricing over quantities to explore, among other things, the optimality of quantity discounts.} We also assume that the consumer’s preferences satisfy the standard single-crossing property that $u_{\theta q}(q, \theta) > 0$ and utility is increasing in type, $u_{\theta}(q, \theta) > 0$. In terms of consumer demand curves for $q$ indexed by type, $p = D(q, \theta)$, single-crossing is equivalent to assuming the demand curves are nested in $\theta$, with higher types exhibiting a greater willingness to pay for every increment of $q$.

The firm chooses the price schedule, $P(q)$, to maximize expected profits, given that consumers will select from the schedule to maximize individual utilities. Solving for the optimal price schedule is straightforward. For any $P(q)$, the firm can characterize the associated choices and consumer surpluses as a function of $\theta$:

$$q(\theta) \equiv \arg \max_q u(q, \theta) - P(q),$$

$$v(\theta) \equiv \max_q u(q, \theta) - P(q).$$

Expected profits can be written in terms of expected revenues less costs, or in terms of expected total surplus less consumer surplus:

$$\int_{\theta_0}^{\theta_1} (P(q(\theta)) - C(q(\theta)))dF(\theta) = \int_{\theta_0}^{\theta_1} (u(q(\theta), \theta) - C(q(\theta)) - v(\theta))dF(\theta).$$

The monopolist cannot arbitrarily choose $q(\theta)$ and $v(\theta)$, however, as the consumer’s ability to choose $q$ must be respected. Following standard arguments in the self-selection literature, we know that such incentive compatibility requires that $q(\theta)$ weakly increases in $\theta$, there is a one-to-one relationship between the chosen qualities, $q(\theta)$, and the consumer’s marginal surplus is $v'(\theta) = u_{\theta}(q(\theta), \theta) > 0$. There is also a requirement that the consumer wishes to
participate, \( v(\theta) \geq 0 \), which, given \( v'(\theta) > 0 \), will be satisfied if and only if \( v(\theta_0) \geq 0 \). Fortunately, for any surplus and quality functions that satisfy the two incentive-compatibility conditions, there exists a unique price schedule that implements \( q(\theta) \); hence, the firm need respect only these two properties and the participation constraint when choosing qualities and surpluses.

Integrating by parts and substituting for \( v'(\theta) \) convert the firm’s constrained-maximization program over \( \{q(\theta), v(\theta)\} \) to a simpler program over \( q(\theta) \) and \( v(\theta_0) \). In short, the firm chooses \( q(\theta) \) to maximize

\[
\int_{\theta_0}^{\theta_1} \left( u(q(\theta), \theta) - C(q(\theta)) - \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} u_\theta(q(\theta), \theta) - v(\theta_0) \right) dF(\theta),
\]

subject to \( q(\theta) \) nondecreasing and \( v(\theta_0) \geq 0 \).

Assuming that the firm finds it profitable to serve the entire distribution of consumers, it will choose \( v(\theta_0) = 0 \), a corner solution to the optimization program.\(^{43}\) The integrand of firm’s objective function is defined by

\[
\Lambda(q, \theta) \equiv u(q, \theta) - C(q) - \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} u_\theta(q, \theta).
\]

This “virtual” profit function gives the the total surplus less the consumer’s information rents for a fixed type, \( \theta \). Choosing \( q(\theta) \) to maximize \( \Lambda(q, \theta) \) pointwise over \( \theta \) will simultaneously maximize its expected value over \( \theta \). If this function is strictly quasi-concave (a reasonable assumption in most contexts), then the optimal \( q(\theta) \) is determined by \( \Lambda_q(q(\theta), \theta) = 0 \) for every \( \theta \). If \( \Lambda(q, \theta) \) is also supermodular (i.e., \( \Lambda_{q\theta}(q, \theta) \geq 0 \))—an assumption that is satisfied for a wide variety of distributions and preferences—then the resulting function \( q(\theta) \) is weakly increasing in \( \theta \).\(^{44}\) Hence, we have the firm’s optimal choice. After setting \( v(\theta_0) = 0 \) and determining \( q(\theta) \), constructing the unique price schedule is straightforward: one recovers \( v(\theta) = v(\theta_0) + \int_{\theta_0}^{\theta_1} u_\theta(q(\theta), \theta) d\theta \) and then constructs \( P(q) \) from the equation \( u(q(\theta), \theta) - P(q(\theta)) = v(\theta) \).

\(^{43}\)For sufficiently large heterogeneity, it is possible that the firm will wish to serve a proper subset of types. Here, the lowest type served, \( \theta^*_0 \), is determined by the point where the virtual profit (defined below) of the monopolist goes from positive to negative: \( \Lambda(q(\theta^*_0), \theta^*_0) = 0 \).

\(^{44}\)For example, if preferences are quadratic and \( (1 - F(\theta))/f(\theta) \) is nonincreasing in \( \theta \), then \( \Lambda(q, \theta) \) is supermodular. When \( \Lambda(q, \theta) \) is not supermodular, one must employ control-theoretic techniques to maximize, subject to the monotonicity constraint. This “ironing” procedure is explained in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 7).
Because we are primarily interested in the consumption distortions introduced by the monopolist, we are more interested in \( q(\theta) \) than \( P(q) \). To understand the distortion, consider the defining condition, \( \Lambda_q(q(\theta), \theta) = 0 \):

\[
u_q(q(\theta), \theta) - C_q(q(\theta)) = \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} u_{q\theta}(q(\theta), \theta) \geq 0.
\] (1)

In words, the marginal social benefit of increasing \( q \) (the marginal increase in the size of the pie) is set equal to the marginal loss from increased consumer surplus and reduced infra-marginal profits (a smaller slice of the pie). Alternatively, in the form \( f(\theta)(u_q - C_q) = (1 - F(\theta))u_{q\theta}, \) we see that the gain from increasing quality for some type \( \theta \) is the probability, \( f(\theta), \) of that type arising, multiplied by the increase in surplus which the marginal quality generates, \( (u_q - C_q) \). The loss arises from all higher type consumers, \( 1 - F(\theta), \) who obtain more surplus by the amount \( u_{q\theta}. \) Thus, we have the marginal-versus-inframarginal trade-off that is familiar to the classic monopolist: the marginal profit from selling to one more consumer must be set against the lowered price given to the higher-demand, inframarginal customers. In standard models of price- or quantity-setting oligopolists, competition reduces the significance of the inframarginal term and fewer distortions arise. One might conjecture that the presence of competition should have the same general effect in markets with nonlinear pricing—reducing the impact of the infra-marginal effect (and thereby reducing the distortions from market power). As we will see below, this is the case for a large class of models.

Two final remarks on monopoly price discrimination are helpful. First, the above model was one of vertical differentiation; consumers’ willingness to pay increases in their marginal valuation of quality, \( \theta, \) and the firm makes more profit per customer on the high types than on the low types. One could instead consider a model of horizontal differentiation with little difference in the character of the distortions.\(^45\) For example, suppose that consumer types are distributed over the positive real numbers, and a type represents the distance of the consumer to the monopolist firm. Here, closer consumers (low \( \theta \)’s) take on the role of valued, high-demand customers, so \( u_\theta < 0 \) and \( u_{q\theta} < 0. \) The analysis above goes through with very minor modifications. Now, all consumers but the closest to the firm will have downward-distortions in their quality allocation, and the first-order condition will be given

\(^{45}\) This point is made most effectively in Champsaur and Rochet (1989).
by
\[ u_q(q(\theta), \theta) - C_q(q(\theta)) = -\frac{F(\theta)}{\theta} u_{q\theta}(q(\theta), \theta) \geq 0. \]

Hence, there is nothing conceptually distinct about horizontal or vertical preference heterogeneity in the context of monopoly, providing the relevant single-crossing property is satisfied. This will typically not be the case for competitive settings where heterogeneity is inextricably linked to product differentiation.

Second, it is worth noting that a consumer’s relevant “type” is completely summarized by the consumer’s demand curve; therefore, we should be able to find similar conclusions looking only at a distribution of demand functions, indexed by type. Consider again the case of vertical heterogeneity, and denote \( p = D(q, \theta) \) as a type-\( \theta \) consumer’s demand curve for quality. By definition, \( D(q, \theta) \equiv u_q(q, \theta) \). The single-crossing property on preferences is equivalent to saying that the demand functions are nested over \( \theta \), with higher \( \theta \)’s representing higher demand curves. The relevant condition for profit maximization is now
\[ D(q(\theta), \theta) - C_q(q(\theta)) = 1 - F(\theta) f(\theta) D_\theta(q(\theta), \theta). \]

Rearranging, this can be written in the more familiar form
\[ \frac{P'(q(\theta)) - C_q(q(\theta))}{P'(q(\theta))} = \frac{1}{\eta(q(\theta), \theta)}, \]

where \( \eta = \frac{1 - F D_\theta}{f D} \) is the relevant elasticity of marginal demand for the \( q(\theta) \) marginal unit. In the elasticity form, the intuitive connection between nonlinear pricing and classic monopoly pricing is clear. In a large variety of competitive nonlinear pricing models, the effect of competition is to increase this elasticity and hence reduce marginal distortions. To understand how this elasticity formula changes under competition, we separately examine the settings in which a consumer makes all purchases from a single firm, or commonly purchases from multiple firms.

### 6.2 Nonlinear pricing with exclusive consumers and one-stop shopping

Suppose that in equilibrium, consumers purchase from at most one firm. For example, each consumer may desire at most one automobile, but may desire a variety of quality-improving extras (air conditioning, high performance stereo, luxury trim, etc.) which must be supplied by the same seller. In this setting of one-shop shopping, firms compete for each
consumer’s patronage. One can think of the consumer’s decision in two stages: first, the consumer assigns an indirect utility of purchasing from each firm’s price schedule, and second, the consumer visits the firm with the highest indirect utility (providing this generates nonnegative utility) and makes his purchase accordingly.

6.2.1 One-dimensional models of heterogeneity

Assume for the present that all uncertainty in the above setting is contained in a one-dimensional parameter, $\theta$, and that preferences for each firm $j$’s products are given by $u^j(q_j, \theta) - P_j(q_j), j = 1, \ldots, n$. Given the offered schedules, the indirect utility of purchasing from each firm $j$ is

$$v_j(\theta) = \max_{q_j} u^j(q_j, \theta) - P_j(q_j).$$

Calculating the indirect utilities, firm $j$ can derive the best alternative for each consumer of type $\theta$, relative to the firm’s offer:

$$v_j(\theta) \equiv \max_{k \neq j} \{0, v_1(\theta), \ldots, v_n(\theta)\}.$$

The competitive environment, from firm $j$’s point of view, is entirely contained in the description of $v_j(\theta)$. The best response of firm $j$ is the same as a monopolist which (for whatever reason) faces a consumer with utility $u(q, \theta) - P(q)$ and an outside option of $v_j(\theta)$.

This monopoly restatement of firm $i$’s problem makes clear a new difficulty: the outside option is type dependent on $\theta$. Economically, the presence of $\theta$ in the outside option means that it is no longer clear which consumer types will be marginally attracted to a firm’s rival.\footnote{A number of theoretical contributions in the incentives literature have developed the methodology of type-dependent participation constraints; see, for example, Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Clare-Rodriguez (1995) and Jullien (2000).} Fortunately, some guidance is provided as there exists a connection between the nature of the participation constraint and the form of preference heterogeneity—horizontal or vertical.\footnote{Several papers have drawn upon this distinction in one form or another; see, for example, Borenstein (1985), Katz (1987), and Stole (1995).}

- **Horizontal heterogeneity.**

  Consider a setting in which consumers are located between two firms such that closer consumers have not only lower transportation costs, but also a higher marginal utility of...
quality. For example, consumers without strong preferences over having either an Apple or Windows-Intel computer are also not willing to pay as much for faster processors or extra software packages in their preferred product line; the reverse is true for someone with strong brand preferences. This is a setting of horizontal heterogeneity. Formally, let $\theta$ represent a consumer’s distance to firm 1 (and her “closeness” to firm 2); we assume that $u_1^2(q, \theta) < 0 < u_2^2(q, \theta)$. Because greater distance lowers the marginal utility of quality, we also have $u_1^1(q, \theta) < 0 < u_2^1(q, \theta)$. Holding $q$ fixed, a consumer that is close to firm 1 and far from firm 2 obtains higher utility from firm 1 than firm 2, and has a higher marginal valuation of firm 1’s quality than firm 2’s. It follows that a low-$\theta$ (resp., high-$\theta$) consumer has a higher demand for firm 1’s (resp., firm 2’s) product line.

An early and simple model of nonlinear pricing by oligopolists in a setting of horizontal heterogeneity is developed in Spulber (1989), which we follow here. Firms are evenly spaced on a circular market of unit size, and consumers’ types are simply their locations on the market. Consider a consumer located between two firms, with the left firm located at 0 and the right one located at $\frac{1}{n}$. The consumer’s utility from the left firm at price $p$ is taken to be $u^1 = (z - \theta)q - P_1(q)$ and the utility derived from the right firm is $u^2 = (z - (\frac{1}{n} - \theta))q - P_2(q)$. Here, the base value of consumption, $z$, is known, but the consumer’s location in “brand” space is private information. There is a single-crossing property in $(q, \theta)$ for each firm: nearer consumers enjoy a higher margin from consuming $q$.

Consider firm 2’s problem. Taking $P_1(q)$ as fixed, we have $v_2(\theta) = \max\{0, v_1(\theta)\}$, where $v_1(\theta) = \max_q (z - \theta)q - P_1(q)$. Using the envelope theorem, we know that $v'_1(\theta) = -q_1(\theta) \leq 0$, so $v_2(\theta)$ is decreasing. As a result, if the marginal type, $\tilde{\theta}$, is indifferent between the two firms, then firm 1 obtains market share $[0, \tilde{\theta})$ and firm 2 obtains the share $(\tilde{\theta}, \frac{1}{n}]$. This partition implies that the determination of market share and the allocation of quality are separable problems. Price competition between the local duopolists is entirely focused on the marginal consumer. Here, each firm will trade off the gain derived from the additional market share captured by raising this marginal consumer’s utility against the cost of lowering prices to all inframarginal consumers. This classic tradeoff determines the value of $z = v_1(\tilde{\theta}) = v_2(\tilde{\theta})$. Given the equilibrium partition and utility of the marginal

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48 Spulber (1984) also considers spatial nonlinear pricing with imperfect competition, but models imperfect competition by assuming firms are local monopolists within a given market radius and that the market radius is determined by a zero-profit condition. Unlike Spulber (1989), this earlier Löschian approach to spatial competition ignores the interesting price effects of competition on the boundaries. Norman (1981) considers third-degree price discrimination with competition under a similar Löschian assumption.
consumer, \( v \), each firm will allocate \( q(\theta) \) as if they were a second-degree price-discriminating monopolist. As Spulber (1989) emphasizes, the resulting quality schedules are equivalent to those of a monopolist operating over the given market shares. Given the quality allocation is unchanged between competition and monopoly, the marginal price schedules are the same whether the market structure is an \( n \)-firm oligopoly or an \( n \)-plant monopolist. Only the level of prices will be lower under competition, leaving positive surplus to the marginal “worst-type” consumer.

A few remarks are in order. First, fixing the number of distinct product lines, \( n \), and assuming that the market is covered under monopoly and oligopoly, social welfare is unaffected by the market structure. Under competition, consumer surplus is higher and profits are lower, but the aggregate surplus is unchanged from monopoly. Second, as the number of product lines, \( n \), increases and more brands become available, the distance between brands decreases; the marginal customer then moves closer to her nearest brand, leading to a reduction in quality distortions. Of course, more product lines typically come at a social cost, which raises a third point: In a free-entry model with fixed per-plant costs of production, it is generally unclear whether additional brands will raise social welfare. We again face the familiar tradeoff between product diversity and production costs.

- **Vertical heterogeneity.**

  Suppose instead that unobservable heterogeneity is vertical rather than horizontal; i.e., every firm ranks the consumer types identically. Formally, \( u_{\phi j}(q_j, \theta) > 0 \) and \( u_{\theta j}(q_j, \theta) > 0 \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \). Given that all firms rank the consumer types equivalently and \( \theta \) does not represent differentiated tastes for brands, the source of product differentiation is not immediate. Two approaches to modeling imperfect competition emerge in such a setting. The first assumes firms have different comparative advantages for serving customer segments; e.g., Stole (1995). The second assumes that the firms are \textit{ex ante} symmetric in their productive capabilities, but in an initial stage the firms commit to a range of qualities before the choosing prices, generating endogenous comparative advantages that soften price competition; e.g. Champsaur and Rochet (1989). We consider each approach in turn.

  Consider a duopoly where firm 1 has a comparative advantage over firm 2 for an identifiable consumer segment. As a simple example, suppose that a consumer obtains \( u^1(q_1, \theta) = \theta q_1 + z - P_1(q_1) \) from firm 1 and \( u^2(q_2, \theta) = \theta q_2 - P_2(q_2) \) from firm 2, although the cost of production is \( C(q) = \frac{1}{2}q^2 \) for both firms. In equilibrium, firm 2 offers
$P_2(q) = C(q)$ and the consumer’s associated indirect utility becomes $v_1(\theta) = v_2(\theta) = \frac{1}{2} \theta^2$. Firm 1, in order to make any sales, must offer at least $\frac{1}{2} \theta^2$ to any type it wishes to serve. Straightforward techniques of optimization with type-dependent participation constraints verify that in this equilibrium, $P_1(q) = C(q) + z$, providing that the consumer who is indifferent between the two firms chooses to purchase from firm 1. In contrast to the setting of horizontal heterogeneity, the participation constraint binds for every type of consumer. One may also note that the equilibrium allocation is efficient; it is known with certainty that firm 1 extracts all the consumer’s residual surplus, $z$. Consumers nonetheless obtain considerable information rents given the strong competitive pressures from firm 2.

This model of vertical heterogeneity is perhaps too simple, because neither firm has a comparative advantage on the margin of quality, and thus the firms are perfectly competitive. Firm 1 only extracts rents on its comparative advantage, the additive component of $z$, which can be extracted without distortion given full information about $z$. A more realistic model perhaps should allow variations in the marginal comparative advantages of the firms.

Along these lines of inquiry, Stole (1995) assumes that consumers are located on a unit circle with $n$ evenly-spaced oligopolists but each consumer’s location is observable so that firms can offer delivered, nonlinear prices conditioned on location. For a consumer segment located at $x \in [0, \frac{1}{n}]$, suppose that the utility of consuming from the first firm is $u^1 = (\theta - x)q - P_1(q)$, while the utility of consuming from the second firm is $u^2 = (\theta - \left(\frac{1}{n} - x\right))q - P_2(q)$. Firms furthermore have symmetric costs of production, say $C(q) = \frac{1}{2} q^2$. A reasonable conjecture would have the consumer purchasing from the nearest firm (say, firm 1), while the more distant firm offers its product line at cost and makes no sales, $P_2(q) = C(q)$, but it becomes unclear for which types the participation constraint will bind. The closer firm now faces a competing option which generates utility, $v_1(\theta) = \frac{1}{2} \left(\theta - \left(\frac{1}{n} - x\right)\right)^2$, increasing in $\theta$.

For the moment, suppose the nearer firm offers the monopoly quality schedule, assuming that the outside option only matters for the lowest type, $\theta_0$, and that $\theta$ is distributed uniformly on $[\theta_0, \theta_1]$. Straightforward calculations yield $q_1(\theta) = 2 \theta - \theta_1 - x$. The envelope theorem implies that the slope of the consumer’s indirect utility function from firm 1 is $v_1'(\theta) = q_1(\theta)$; consequently, there must be parameter values (e.g., $\frac{1}{n} > 2x + \theta_1 - \theta_0$) such that the participation constraint binds for only the lowest type. More generally, an interior value of $\hat{\theta}$ exists such that the participation constraint binds for all $\theta < \hat{\theta}$, and is slack otherwise. When this happens, it must be the case that $q_1(\theta) = v_1'(\theta)$ over the determined interval, which in turn requires that $q_1$ is less distorted than it would be without the binding
constraint. While the calculation of this interval relies upon more general control-theoretic techniques, it helps us understand how competition affects distortions. Here, the rival firm’s offer has a stronger competitive effect, actually increasing quality for the lower-end of consumer types. When the number of firms increases, the firms become closer and the rival offer becomes more attractive, binding over a larger interval as the differentiation between firms decreases.

While these two simple examples of vertical heterogeneity may be of applied interest, they fail to adequately portray the richness of results that can arise in a setting of vertical heterogeneity when firms have different comparative advantages on the margin. For example, a comparative advantage such as different marginal costs of supplying quality leads to a reasonable conjecture that the firms would split the consumer market. However, the effects of competition are more subtle than in the simpler, horizontal-heterogeneity setting with symmetric firms. Clear empirical predictions are not at hand.

Turning to the case of endogenous comparative advantage, we follow Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and consider a two-stage-game duopoly in which firms commit to quality ranges $Q^j = [q_j, \bar{q}_j]$, $j = 1, 2$ in the first stage, and then compete in price schedules properly restricted to these intervals in the second stage. Let $\pi^j(Q^1, Q^2)$ be the equilibrium profits in the second stage given the intervals chosen in the first. Champsaur and Rochet (1989) demonstrate that for any given first-stage quality intervals, there is an equilibrium to the second-stage price game with well-defined $\pi^j(Q^1, Q^2)$, and that in the equilibrium, firms typically find it optimal to leave quality gaps: e.g., $q_1 \leq \bar{q}_1 < q_2 \leq \bar{q}_2$. In the presence of a gap, firm 1 sells to the lower interval of consumer types with a lower-quality product line while firm 2 serves the higher end with higher qualities. More remarkably, they show under a few additional conditions that when a gap in qualities exist, the profits of the firms can be decomposed into two terms:

$$\pi^1(Q^1, Q^2) = \pi^1(\{\bar{q}_1\}, \{q_2\}) + \pi^1(Q^1, [\bar{q}_1, \infty)),$$

$$\pi^2(Q^1, Q^2) = \pi^2(\{\bar{q}_1\}, \{q_2\}) + \pi^2((\infty, q_2], Q^2).$$

The first term corresponds to the payoffs in a traditional single-quality product-differentiation game. If this was the only component to payoffs, firms would choose their qualities to differentiate themselves on the margin and soften second-stage price competition; this is pure
differentiation profit. The second term is independent of the other firm’s strategy and represents the surplus extracted from consumers situated entirely in the area of local monopoly; this is pure segmentation profit along the lines of Mussa and Rosen. In many settings, the Chamberlinian incentive to differentiate products in the first term dominates the incentive to segment consumers within the served interval. For example, when preferences are as in Mussa and Rosen (1978), with \( u_j(q, \theta) = \theta q \), \( C(q) = \frac{1}{2} q^2 \) and \( \theta \) uniformly distributed, Champsaur and Rochet (1989) show that in equilibrium each firm makes a positive profit but offers a unique quality. Although nonlinear pricing is an available strategy, both firms optimally discard this option in the first stage to increase profits in the second.

6.2.2 Multi-dimensional models of heterogeneity

A shortcoming of one-dimensional models is that they are inadequate to capture both privately known brand preferences and privately known marginal values of consumption. Furthermore, the lack of compelling conclusions from the one-dimensional modeling approach (particularly the vertical setting) is partly due to the ad hoc manner of modeling product differentiation across firms. Ideally, we would derive economic implications from a model which contains both horizontal and vertical unobservables with a more general allowance for product differentiation.

Two approaches have been taken by the literature. The first relies upon simulations to uncover the basic tendencies of the price discrimination.\(^{49}\) Borenstein (1985), for example, considers a closely related model with heterogeneity over transportation costs as well as value. Using simulations in both second- and third-degree frameworks, he concludes that sorting over brand preferences rather than vertical preferences leads to a greater price differential when markets are very competitive. Borenstein and Rose (1994) develop a similar model to study the impact of competition on price dispersion and conclude from numerical results that dispersion increases for reasonable parameter values.

A second modeling approach to product differentiation uses the well-known discrete-choice approach and incorporates vertical heterogeneity along the lines of Mussa and Rosen (1978). By assuming brand preferences enter utility additively (as in the discrete-choice literature), enough additional structure on preferences arises to provide tractable solutions. In this spirit, Rochet and Stole (2002a) develop a methodology for calculating nonlinear

\(^{49}\)E.g., Borenstein (1985), Wilson (1993), among others.
price schedules when preferences take the discrete-choice form of \( u(q_j, \theta) - P_j(q_j) - \xi_j \), and \( \xi_j \) represents a brand-specific shock to the consumer when purchasing from firm \( j \). Each consumer has a multi-dimensional type given by \((\theta, \xi_1, \ldots, \xi_n)\). As before, let \( v_j(\theta) \equiv \max_q u(q_j, \theta) - P_j(q) \) represent a type-\( \theta \) consumer’s indirect utility of purchasing from firm \( j \), excluding brand-specific shocks. When considering a purchase from firm \( j \), the consumer’s outside option is given by

\[
v_j(\theta, \xi) \equiv \max_{k \neq j} \{0, v_1(\theta) - \xi_1, \ldots, v_n(\theta) - \xi_n\} + \xi_j.
\]

The competitive environment, from firm \( j \)’s point of view, is entirely contained in the description of \( v_j(\theta, \xi) \).

First, consider the monopoly case of \( n = 1 \) and suppose that \( \xi_1 \) is independently distributed from \( \theta \) according to the distribution function \( G(\xi) \) on \([0, \infty)\). A monopolist facing a class of consumers with these preferences has a two-dimensional screening problem. The program itself, however, is very easy to conceive. For any nonlinear pricing schedule, \( P_j(q) \), there is an associated indirect utility, \( v_1(\theta) = \max_q u(q, \theta) - P_1(q) \). Because a consumer will purchase if and only if \( v_1(\theta) \geq \xi_1 \), the monopolist’s market share, conditional on \( \theta \), is \( G(v_1(\theta)) \). The monopolist’s objective in terms of \( q(\theta) \) and \( v_1(\theta) \) becomes

\[
\max_{\{q,v_1\}} \mathbb{E}_\theta \left[ G(v_1(\theta)) (u(q(\theta), \theta) - C(q(\theta)) - v_1(\theta)) \right],
\]

subject to incentive compatibility conditions that \( v_1'(\theta) = u_\theta(q(\theta), \theta) \) and \( q(\theta) \) is nondecreasing. There is no participation constraint because participation is endogenous. Now \( v_1(\theta_0) \) is no longer chosen to equal the outside option of zero (a corner condition in a standard monopoly program), but is instead chosen to satisfy a first-order condition. In a classic tradeoff, a higher utility level (equivalent to shifting \( P_1(q) \) downward) reduces the profitability of all inframarginal consumers, but increases market share by raising indirect utilities.

To determine the appropriate first-order conditions of this problem, one needs to appeal to control-theoretic techniques. The resulting Euler equation is a second-order nonlinear differential equation with boundary conditions, and generally does not yield a closed-form solution. Nonetheless, Rochet and Stole (2002a) demonstrate that in the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model, with the addition of additive utility shocks, the equilibrium quality function,
$q(\theta)$, lies between the first-best solution and Mussa-Rosen solution without additive uncertainty. In this sense, the addition of random effects reduces the monopolist’s distortions. Intuitively, when additive uncertainty is present, consumer surplus raises the participation rate of consumers. On the margin, it is less profitable to extract surplus from consumers and, therefore, it is no longer as valuable to distort quality in order to extract surplus.\footnote{Interestingly, these problems can easily generate a lower interval of pooling, even with the standard restrictions of quadratic preferences and uniformly distributed $\theta$ in Mussa and Rosen (1978).}

Returning to the problem of competition, we can easily incorporate models of horizontal differentiation into this setting with vertical preferences. Several papers have taken this approach in one form or another, including Schmidt-Mohr and Villas-Boas (1999), Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002a). Along these lines, consider a duopoly with two firms on the endpoints of a Hotelling market of unit length, populated with consumers, each with unit transportation costs equal to $\tau$. Let the consumer’s location, $x$, in this interval take on the role of the additive shock. Specifically, $\xi_1 = \tau x$ and $\xi_2 = \tau (1 - x)$, where $x$ is distributed according to some distribution $G(x)$ on $[0, 1]$. As before, firm $j$ makes profit of $u(q(\theta), \theta) - C(q(\theta) - v_j(\theta))$ for each consumer of type $\theta$ who purchases. A consumer will purchase for firm 1, only if $v_1(\theta) - \tau x \geq \max\{0, v_2(\theta) - \tau (1 - x)\}$. Hence, the probability that a consumer of type $\theta$ visits the firm $j \neq k$ is

$$G_j \left( \min \left\{ \frac{v_j}{\tau}, \frac{v_j - v_k}{2\tau} \right\} \right),$$

where $G_1(x) = G(x)$ and $G_2(x) = 1 - G(x)$. The two arguments in the brackets represent the cases of local monopoly and local competition, respectively. Each duopolist, therefore, maximizes $G_j(v_j(\theta))(u(q_j(\theta), \theta) - C(q_j(\theta)) - v_j(\theta))$, subject to the requirement that $v_j'(\theta) = u_\theta(q_j(\theta), \theta)$ and $q_j(\theta)$ is nondecreasing. This action gives rise to a well-defined normal-form game in quantity and utility allocations. The monopoly methodology of Rochet and Stole (2002a) can be directly applied to solve for each firm’s best-response function, which in turn can be used to determine the equilibrium price schedules. Generally, closed-form equilibrium solutions are not available, and we must resort to numerical routines to determine solutions. The form of the solution is similar to those of monopoly when the market is not fully covered: the duopoly allocations of quality lie between the case of monopoly and the first best, with lower marginal prices of quality than the monopolist in Mussa and Rosen (1978). As firms become less differentiated ($\tau$ decreases), the duopoly solution converges to the
full-information, first-best allocation.

Two final remarks are in order. First, this discrete-choice approach to competition with a single dimension of vertical uncertainty is quite flexible. It can easily be extended to oligopolies with general distributions of \( \xi \). In such an \( n \)-firm oligopoly, firm \( i \)'s market share is represented by \( G_j(v_1, \ldots, v_n) \equiv \text{Prob}[u_j - \xi_j \geq \max_{k \neq j} u_k - \xi_k] \), and the analysis proceeds as before. It can also easily be adapted to explore questions about price-cost margins and add-on pricing, as discussed in section 6.3, below.

Second, and more fundamental, a precise solution for these games can be determined in one instance, as independently noted by Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002).\(^{51}\) Suppose that the firms are symmetric and that the market is entirely covered in equilibrium. Define the following inverse hazard rate which captures firm \( j \)'s ability to profit from its random brand effects:

\[
H_j(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \equiv \frac{\partial}{\partial v_j} G_j(u_1, \ldots, u_n).
\]

If this function is homogeneous of degree zero in indirect utilities for each firm (i.e., \( \frac{d}{dv} H_j(v, \ldots, v) = 0 \) for each \( j \)), then nonlinear, cost-plus-fixed-fee prices, \( P_j(q) = C(q) + F_j \), form a Nash equilibrium. Such homogeneity naturally arises when the fixed-effects distributions are symmetric. For example, in our Hotelling duopoly above, \( H_j(v, v) = \tau \) and the equilibrium prices are \( P(q) = C(q) + \tau \). The similarity with the uniform-pricing, single-product Hotelling game is remarkable. Duopolists earn profits over their locational advantage, but because they have no competitive advantage in supplying quality, they do not gain from distorting quality. This result of cost-plus-fixed-fee pricing, however, depends critically upon firm symmetry in providing utility and upon market coverage. Changes in either of these assumptions will open up the possibility that firms distort qualities in their battle for market share.

### 6.3 Applications: Add-on pricing and the nature of price-cost margins

At least a few interesting applications use a similar, multidimensional discrete-choice framework to explore specific price discrimination questions.

\(^{51}\)Verboven (1999) finds a related pricing result: given exogenous quality levels and cost symmetries between duopolists, pricing is at cost plus a uniform markup.
Verboven (1999) uses this framework to make predictions about absolute and relative price-cost margins, and how these margins move with respect to quality. He first notes that, according to the received theory of monopoly nonlinear pricing, the monopolist’s absolute price-cost margins, \( P(q) - C(q) \), increase with quality, but the percentage price-cost margins, \( (P(q) - C(q))/P(q) \), fall with \( q \). This finding is certainly true for the Mussa-Rosen (1978) setting in section 6.1, and it is also true for a monopolist choosing two qualities and selling to two types of consumers, \( \theta \in \{ \bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta} \} \). However, this theoretical prediction seems at odds with reality. Specifically, Verboven (1999) presents evidence from the European automobiles that leads one to reject the simple monopolistic model of second-degree price discrimination and conclude that the percentage price-cost margins rise with quality for this market.

In response, Verboven (1999) makes two changes to the basic monopoly model to create an alternative theory that better fits the data. First, he assumes that consumers have both a vertical heterogeneity component, \( \theta \), and a horizontal fixed effect for each product line. Second, he assumes that high-quality prices are unobservable by consumers.

The first modification requires distributional assumptions. Rather than following Verboven (1999), we use a simpler set of distributional assumptions to the same effect. We assume that \( \theta \) takes on only two equally likely types, \( \theta \in \{ \bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta} \} \) with \( \bar{\theta} > \theta \), and that the fixed-effects shocks derive from a Hotelling model of differentiation; i.e., the firms are positioned on the endpoints of a Hotelling market of length 1, consumers are uniformly distributed and must expend transportation costs of \( \tau \) per unit-distance traveled. Suppose also assume that the firms can sell only two exogenously given qualities, \( q_2 > q_1 \), at costs of \( c_2 \geq c_1 \), respectively. We can immediately apply the result of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) that if the market is covered and consumers observe the full price schedules, then equilibrium prices are cost-plus-fixed-fee. It follows that equilibrium prices under duopoly with fully advertised price schedules are \( p_2 = c_2 + \tau \) and \( p_1 = c_1 + \tau \). Absolute price-cost margins are constant but, as in monopoly, percentage price-cost margins fall with quality.

To this duopoly model, Verboven (1999) adds a second modification, similar to Lal and

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Note that this result for the two-type case relies upon the monopolist optimally choosing qualities with smooth, convex cost function. For arbitrary qualities, it is no longer necessarily true. In Verboven (1999), the underlying type distribution for \( \theta \) is continuous and only two exogenous qualities are offered. Here, the result of decreasing relative price-cost margins again emerges.

These different assumptions do not change Verboven’s main theoretical conclusions and allow us to more closely compare Verboven (1999) to recent work by Ellison (2003).
Matutes (1994). He assumes that consumers can only costlessly observe the price of the base-quality goods, $p_1$, and not the price of the higher-quality product; that is, the prices of the “add-ons” are unobservable. At a small additional search cost, a consumer can visit a firm and discover the price of the high-quality product. However, following a reasoning in Diamond (1971), consumers correctly anticipate the high-quality product prices and have no reason to search beyond one firm in equilibrium. As a result, the individual firms behave as monopolists on the high-quality item, setting a price that makes the high-type consumer indifferent between consuming the high- and low-quality products: $p_2 = p_1 + \bar{\theta}\Delta q$. The low-quality price now serves a new role: it provides a credible signal about the unobserved high-quality price. Each firm, taking the equilibrium prices of its rival as given, $\{p_2^*, p_1^*\}$, chooses its low-quality price to maximize (after substitution of $p_2 = p_1 + \bar{\theta}\Delta q$ and $p_2^* = p_1^* + \bar{\theta}\Delta q$)

$$
(p_1 - c_1) \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{p_1^* - p_1}{2\tau} \right) + (p_1 + \bar{\theta}\Delta q - c_2) \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{p_1^* - p_1}{2\tau} \right).
$$

Solving for the optimal price (and imposing symmetry), we have $p_1^* = \bar{c} + \tau - \frac{\bar{\theta}}{2}\Delta q$ and $p_2^* = \bar{c} + \tau + \frac{\bar{\theta}}{2}\Delta q$, where $\bar{c} \equiv (c_1 + c_2)/2$ and $\Delta c \equiv c_2 - c_1$.

Two interesting results follow when there is incomplete information about add-on prices. First, relative price-cost margins increase with quality if and only if competition is sufficiently strong, $\tau < \tau^* = (\bar{\theta}\Delta q - \Delta c)\bar{c}/\Delta c$. This result is in sharp contrast to the monopoly and fully-advertised duopoly pricing games. Second, although Verboven (1999) does not stress this result, the presence of incomplete information about add-on prices does not raise industry profits: average prices are unchanged. Indeed, for any fixed price differential, $p_2 - p_1$, the first-order condition for profit maximization entirely pins down the average price; the average price equals the average cost plus $\tau$. The ability to act as a monopolist on the high-quality item gets competed away on the low-type consumers; the result is similar to Lal and Matutes’ (1994) for loss-leader pricing.

It is perhaps surprising that the presence of incomplete information about high-quality prices does not increase profits, especially given that the reasoning in Diamond (1971) suggests unobservable pricing generates monopoly power in other contexts. In order to study the strategic effects of unobservable add-on pricing, Ellison (2003) uses a similar model to the one presented above but with the key difference of heterogeneity, $\gamma$, over the marginal utility of income: $u(q, \theta) = q - \gamma p - \tau x$, where $x$ is the distance traveled to the firm. Defining $\theta = 1/\gamma$ and multiplying through by $\theta$, these preferences can be normalized
to \( u(q, \theta) = \theta q - p - \theta \tau x \). While this formulation has the same marginal rate of substitution between money and quality as Verboven’s (1999) setting, a consumer with higher marginal utility of income (and therefore a lower marginal willingness to pay for quality) now also is less sensitive to distance. This vertical heterogeneity parameter captures price sensitivities with respect to a competitor’s price and to a firm’s own price.

To see why this matters, we can introduce two distinct terms, \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_2 \), to capture the sensitivities of each market. The first-order condition requires

\[
\left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\tau_1} (p_1 - c_1) \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2\tau_2} (p_2 - c_2) \right) = 0.
\]

Given that incentive compatibility requires a positive price differential, \( p_2 - p_1 = \bar{\theta} \Delta q > 0 \), the marginal effect of a price change will be positive in market 1 and negative in market 2. In Verboven’s (1999) setting, \( \tau_1 = \tau_2 = \tau \), and so there is no heterogeneity over brand sensitivities. The effect on profits from a marginal reduction in \( p_1 \) is equal to the effect of a marginal increase of \( p_2 \). It is optimal that the average price is unchanged and that the individual prices are equally distorted from \( \bar{c} + \tau \). In contrast, after normalizing utility, Ellison’s (2003) setting has \( \tau_1 = \theta \tau \) and \( \tau_2 = \bar{\theta} \tau > \tau_1 \). Now, the effect on profit from a small reduction in \( p_1 \) is greater than from an equal increase in \( p_2 \). Hence, the base price is distorted less downward than the high-quality price is distorted upward. The net result is that the average price (and profit) increase from unobservable add-on prices in Ellison (2003). While the profit neutrality result in Verboven (1999) is quite interesting, given the plausibility of the preferences in Ellison (2003) it should be applied cautiously.

### 6.4 Nonlinear pricing with consumers in common

In the previous section, the models were cast with the discrete-choice, one-stop-shopping assumption that assigns each consumer to at most one firm in equilibrium. The only conduit for competitive effects was through the outside option; once a consumer chose to purchase from a firm, the offers of other firms became irrelevant. This assumption generated a natural separability in the equilibrium analysis. In some settings, however, one-stop-shopping is an inappropriate assumption. As an extreme example, one could imagine two firms selling complementary goods such as a monopoly vendor of software and a monopoly vendor of computer hardware. In a less extreme example, two firms may sell differentiated products that are substitutes, but it is efficient for the customer to consume some output from each
seller. In both cases, the consumer is likely to purchase from both firms in equilibrium (i.e., a setting of common agency), and the nonlinear price schedule offered by one firm will typically introduce a competitive externality on the other at every margin.

### 6.4.1 One-dimensional models

Most common agency models consider competition between two principals (e.g., price-discriminating duopolists) for a common agent’s activities (e.g., consumer’s purchases) when there is one dimension of uncertainty over the agent’s preferences. In equilibrium, the consumer purchases goods from both firms, which introduces a new difficulty: one firm’s offer can negatively impact the incentive-compatibility of the other’s.

The most interesting and tractable setting for such one-dimensional models are when (i) both firms care about the same dimension of preference uncertainty, and (ii) consumption of one firm’s good affects the marginal utility of consuming the other firm’s good. An example of the first condition arises when the relevant information is the consumer’s marginal utility of income (e.g., high marginal utilities of income may imply high price elasticities of demand for all goods). An example of the second condition arises when the goods are either substitutes (i.e., \( u_{q_1 q_2}(q_1, q_2, \theta) < 0 \)) or complements (i.e., \( u_{q_1 q_2}(q_1, q_2, \theta) < 0 \)). If there is no interaction in the consumer’s utility function, then the firms are effectively monopolists over their products and competition is not economically meaningful.

In the game, each firm \( j \) simultaneously offers the consumer a nonlinear price schedule, \( P_j(q_j) \), for the purchase of good \( q_j \). The consumer decides how much (if any) he wishes

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55 For completeness, one needs to distinguish between intrinsic and delegated common agency games. This distinction was first noted by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) in the context of common agency and moral hazard. When the common agency game is intrinsic, the agent is assumed to be unable to accept only one of the two principals’ offers. This is an appropriate assumption, for example, in regulatory settings where the regulated firm can either submit to all governmental regulatory bodies, or exit the industry. When common agency is delegated, the agent has the additional options of contracting with just one or the other principal. When firms cannot monitor a consumer’s purchases with a rival, the delegated common agency game is more appropriate. As noted by Martimort and Stole (2003a), however, the distinction has no impact on the equilibrium allocations of \( q_j(\theta) \) chosen by participating consumers at each firm. The distinction does matter if one is interested in consumer surplus (which is higher under delegated agency) or market participation when coverage is incomplete (delegated agency games typically generate more market coverage than intrinsic agency games). Of course, when the goods are perfect complements on the extensive margin, such as arguably in the example of monopoly computer software and hardware firms, the games are strategically equivalent since a consumer would never choose to purchase from only one firm.
to buy of the two goods, and then makes his purchases simultaneously. Importantly, firms
cannot condition their price schedule on the consumer’s choices from the rival. Suppose
that the consumer’s utility is represented as
\[ u(q_1, q_2, \theta) - P_1(q_1) - P_2(q_2), \]
which satisfies a one-dimensional single-crossing property in each \((q_j, \theta)\) pair and is increas-
ing in \(\theta\).

Appealing to previous arguments, if \(q_2\) was fixed, firm 1 would construct a nonlinear
pricing schedule to induce consumers of type \(\theta\) to select \(q_1(\theta)\), satisfying the relationship:
\[ u_{q_1}(q_1(\theta), q_2, \theta) - C'_{q_1}(q_1(\theta)) = \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} u_{q_1\theta}(q_1(\theta), q_2, \theta). \] (2)

Generally, when \(u_{q_1q_2} \neq 0\), however, the choice of \(q_2\) will depend upon the offer of \(P_1(q)\).

We proceed, as before, by converting the problem into one similar to monopoly. To this
end, take firm 2’s pricing schedule as fixed, \(P_2(\cdot)\) and define the consumer’s best-response
function and indirect utility, given \((q_1, \theta)\):
\[ \hat{q}_2(q_1, \theta) = \arg \max_{q_2} u(q_1, q_2, \theta) - P_2(q_2). \]
\[ v_1(q_1, \theta) = \max_{q_2} u(q_1, q_2, \theta) - P_2(q_2). \]

The indirect utility function, \(v_1(q, \theta)\), is continuous and increasing in both arguments. It
is straightforward to check that if the goods are complements, then \(v_1(q, \theta)\) satisfies the
single-crossing property.\(^{56}\) If the goods are substitutes, then single-crossing is endogenous
and must be checked in equilibrium. For a wide variety of preferences, this concern is
not a problem so we cautiously proceed by setting it aside. The end result is that firm 1’s
optimization problem is identical to that of a monopolist facing a consumer with preferences
\(v_1(q, \theta)\).\(^{57}\) Competitive effects are embedded in this indirect utility function, much as they
are embedded in the outside option \(v_j(\theta)\) when there is one-stop shopping.

Suppose for the sake of argument that \(\hat{q}_2\) is continuous and differentiable and \(v_1(q, \theta)\) sat-

\(^{56}\)Formally, complementarity and single-crossing implies that \(u(q_1, q_2, \theta) - P_1(q_1) - P_2(q_2)\) is supermodular
in \((q_1, q_2, \theta)\). Hence, the maximized function is also supermodular.

\(^{57}\)A few technical issues regarding the associated virtual surplus function—namely strict quasi-concavity
and supermodularity—must also be addressed; see Martimort and Stole (2003a), for details.
satisfies the single-crossing property. Then using the monopoly methodology, firm 1’s optimal price-discriminating solution is to choose \( q_1(\theta) \) to satisfy

\[
\hat{U}_{q_1}(q_1(\theta), \theta) - C_q(q_1(\theta)) = \frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \frac{\partial^2 v_1}{\partial q_1 \partial \theta}(q_1(\theta), \theta).
\]

Using the equilibrium condition that \( q_2(\theta) = \hat{q}_2(q_1(\theta), \theta) \) and applying the envelope theorem to replace the derivatives of \( v_1 \) with derivatives of \( \hat{q}_2 \), we obtain:

\[
u_{q_1}(q_1(\theta), q_2(\theta), \theta) - C_q(q_1(\theta)) =
\frac{1 - F(\theta)}{f(\theta)} \left( u_{q_1, \theta}(q_1(\theta), q_2(\theta), \theta) + u_{q_1, q_2}(q_1(\theta), q_2(\theta), \theta) \frac{\partial \hat{q}_2(q_1(\theta), \theta)}{\partial \theta} \right).
\]

Comparing this result to the analogous monopoly equation, (1), we see that the presence of a duopolist introduces a second strategic term.

To understand this new effect, suppose for the moment that the duopolists’ goods are substitutes: \( u_{q_1 q_2} < 0 \). Because \( \hat{q}_2 \) is increasing in \( \theta \), the second term is negative and reduces the standard distortion. Hence, when the products are substitutes in the consumer’s preferences, distortions are reduced by competition. Alternatively, if the goods were complements, the distortions would be amplified. Intuitively, selling an extra margin of output to a lower type requires that the firm reduce the marginal price of output for all consumers (including higher types), and in so doing, reduce inframarginal profit. The reduction in inframarginal profit, however, is offset by the fact that a marginal increase in \( q_1 \) causes the consumer to lower \( q_2 \) marginally, which lowers the information-rent term \( u_{\theta} \).

In a broader sense, the result shares the same spirit as pricing equilibria in differentiated pricing games with single-product duopolists. If the goods are imperfect substitutes, we know the presence of competition reduces consumption distortions, while if the goods are complements, distortions increase. Indeed, this intuition goes back at least as far as Cournot (1838). The present argument suggests that this single-price intuition is robust to the introduction of more complicated nonlinear pricing and multi-product firms.

### 6.4.2 Multi-dimensional models

One can easily think of examples in which the two-dimensional preference uncertainty is more appropriate because each firm wants to segment on a different dimension of consumer tastes. In these settings, the interaction of marginal utilities of consumption may introduce
an economically important common agency setting worthy of study. Unfortunately, these models share similar technical difficulties with multi-dimensional screening models, and so have received little attention. One exception is the paper by Ivaldi and Martimort (1994).\footnote{A related competitive setting in which aggregation usefully converts a multi-dimensional problem into a single dimension can be found in Biais, et al. (2000).} The authors construct a model which allows simple aggregation after a change of variables, and then they empirically fit the model to data. A simplified variation of Ivaldi and Martimort’s (1994) model makes this clear.

Suppose that there are two competing firms, \( i = 1, 2 \), each producing one good and offering nonlinear pricing schedules \( P_i(q_i) \) to the population of consumers. A consumer has two-dimensional private information, \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\), and preferences for consumption of the two goods and money given by

\[
 u = \theta_1 q_1 + \theta_2 q_2 - \frac{1}{2} q_1^2 - \frac{1}{2} q_2^2 + \lambda q_1 q_2 - P_1 - P_2,
\]

with \( |\lambda| < 1 \). For the moment, suppose firms are restricted to offering quadratic price schedules. Taking the price schedule of firm 2 as given, \( P_2(q_2) = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 q_2 + \gamma_2 q_2^2 \), it follows that the type \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) consumer’s first-order condition for choice of \( q_2 \) is given by

\[
 \theta_2 - q_2 + \lambda q_1 = \beta_2 + \gamma_2 q_2.
\]

Solving for \( q_2 \) and substituting in the first-order condition for the choice of \( q_1 \), yields

\[
 \theta_1 - q_1 + \frac{\lambda}{1 + \gamma_2} (\theta_2 - \beta_2 + \lambda q_1) = P'_1(q_1).
\]

We can define \( z_1 \equiv \theta_1 + \frac{\lambda \theta_2}{1 + \gamma_2} \), and use it as a one-dimensional sufficient statistic for consumer heterogeneity from the perspective of firm 1. The two-dimensional problem has thus been simplified and standard methods can be employed. Providing that \( z_1 \) is distributed according to Beta distribution with parameter \( \lambda \), Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) show that firm 1’s optimal contract is indeed quadratic.\footnote{While this condition places rather strong restrictions on the equilibrium distribution of \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\), one could utilize the simple aggregation approach for more general distributions, providing one was content to restrict strategy spaces to quadratic price schedules.} The equilibrium price schedules satisfy an important comparative static property: an increase in \( \lambda \) (tantamount to making the goods closer substitutes) causes the duopolists to reduce price margins, suggesting that our intu-
tion from the differentiated Bertrand model are robust to multi-dimensional types and to larger strategy spaces which include nonlinear price schedules.

7 Bundling

It is well known that a multiproduct monopolist can increase its profit by engaging in some form of mixed bundling, even when demands for the component products are independently distributed. The intuition of bundling is straightforward. A monopolist selling two distinct goods, for example, can offer them for sale individually and as a bundle, with the bundle price being less than the individual prices. This ability effectively segments the market into three groups: those with moderately high valuations for both goods who buy the bundle, those with high valuations for one good and low valuations for the other who buy at the individual prices, and those who do not purchase. One can think of this pricing strategy as a form of nonlinear pricing with quantity discounts. The first unit is for sale at the individual price, and the second unit is for sale at a reduced price equal to the difference between the bundle price and the individual price. In this sense, there is a closeness with the methodology of nonlinear pricing. Moreover, if consumer reservation values are independently distributed across goods, as the number of goods increases the law of large numbers provides a homogenizing effect with little consumer heterogeneity. Bundling with a large number of goods allows the monopolist to extract relatively all of the consumer surplus, as shown by Armstrong (1999). When marginal costs are zero, there is no social loss from selling a bundle as valuations will exceed marginal costs on every component. Hence, for information goods, which have very low marginal costs, this homogenizing effect of bundling is especially attractive.

When bundling is introduced with imperfect competition, its surplus extraction gains must be weighed together with its competitive effects. Bundling may intensify or soften competition, depending on the nature of consumer preferences over the available products. In this regard, the effects of imperfect competition and bundling are not far removed from those under third-degree price discrimination. A second line of theoretical results emerges,

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60 McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989) demonstrate this result; see also Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984), Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999).

61 Formally, optimal pricing in these environments quickly becomes intractable because sorting occurs over a multidimensional space. See Armstrong and Rochet (1999) and Rochet and Stole (2001b) for a survey of the multidimensional screening literature and the results on bundling by a monopolist.

62 Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000) emphasize this point.
however, that is unique to potentially competitive settings: bundling may foreclose entry. In both lines of inquiry, it matters whether firms can precommit to a bundling strategy before prices are set. We treat each scenario in turn: first, we examine strategic commitments to bundle, both to foreclose entry and to accommodate entry; then, we turn to settings in which commitments to bundle do not exist.

7.1 Strategic commitments to bundle

7.1.1 Bundling for strategic foreclosure and entry deterrence

One of the first in-depth studies of the value of a commitment to bundling (or “tying”) is found in Whinston (1990).\footnote{Carlton and Waldman (2002) develop and extend the ideas in Whinston (1990) to understand how bundling complementary products can be used to preserve and create monopoly positions in a dynamic setting.} Whinston addresses whether a monopolist in market 1 can increase profits by committing to bundle its market-1, monopoly good with a product from a second market in which the firm faces greater competition. The classical response to this question has been that if the second market exhibits perfect competition and marginal cost pricing, such bundling cannot be valuable to the monopolist. Moreover, profits are reduced if there are some bundle-purchasing consumers whose value of good 2 is lower than the marginal cost of production.

Whinston’s model departs from the classical argument by assuming that competition in market 2 is imperfect. Briefly, Whinston (1990) provides a model of strategic foreclosure in which the monopolist’s commitment to bundle products from the two markets lowers the profits of any duopolist who may enter market 2. Thus, for a range of entry costs, the duopolist will remain out of the market if and only if the monopolist in market 1 makes such a commitment. The applicability of this argument, however, is closely connected with the nature of demand in the monopolist’s captive market.

To make the argument most clear, a useful assumption is that the demand for the monopolist’s good in market 1 is \textit{homogeneous} across consumers (i.e., rectangular demand): a unit measure of consumers value the good at exactly $v_1$. Thus, in absence of bundling, a monopolist chooses $p_1 = v_1$ and profits are $\pi_1 = v_1 - c_1$, where $c_i$ is the unit cost of production in market $i$. In market 2, $K_2$ represents the cost of entry for a potential duopolist. If the duopolist enters, demand is $q_2^b(p_2^a, p_2^b)$ for the market-1 monopolist and...
\( q_2^b(p_2^a, p_2^b) \) for the entering duopolist. There is also a unit measure of potential consumers in market 2.

A commitment to sell only a pure bundle will make the monopolist more aggressive in market 2, the reason being that under bundling, each additional market share has an added value equal to the margin \((v_1 - c_1)\) created in market 1. Since the value of market share increases, the monopolist prices more aggressively, which in turn lowers the profits of firm \(b\), and so deters entry for a range of \(K_2\). Of course, such a commitment carries a corresponding cost. Having succeeded in foreclosing entry, the monopolist is now left to maximize profits over the two markets using only a pure bundle. Nonetheless, strategic foreclosure through a commitment to bundle is theoretically plausible.

### 7.1.2 Committing to bundles for accommodation

Whinston (1990) extends the basic model to allow heterogeneous preferences in market 1, and shows in an example how bundling may alternatively increase prices in market 2. This effect is due to two reasons: First, if good 1 is undesirable to market-2 consumers such that the margins are negative (i.e., \(v_1 < c_1\) for market 2 consumers), then the previous intuition reverses itself. Reducing segment 2 market share increases profits for the tied monopolist. A second, more interesting reason is that bundling may introduce product differentiation and soften competition in market 2. For instance, one can imagine intense competition on market 2 without bundling (because of homogeneity of the firms market-2 goods). Now bundling may generate a form of vertical differentiation with the bundled product representing a higher “quality” product with additional features. With such vertical differentiation, pricing in market 2 may be less intense. In this way, committed bundling may be an ideal accommodation strategy. The higher the levels of dispersion in market 1 reservation values and the lower the differentiation of goods in market 2, the more likely this strategy will raise incumbent profits.

Other authors have found similar accommodating effects from commitments to sell a pure bundle. Carbajo, et al. (1990) construct a model in which goods are homogeneous in market 2, but values for the goods in market 1 and 2 are perfectly correlated. Pure bundling segments the market into high-valuation consumers purchasing the bundle and low valuation consumers purchasing the single product from firm \(b\). If the cost of production in market 2 is not too much greater than in market 1 and demand is linear, then firm \(a\) will
commit to bundling, prices will rise in market 2 and consumer surplus will decrease. Chen (1997a) presents a similar model in which duopolists who can produce in both markets play a first-stage game over whether to sell good 1 or a pure bundle of goods 1 and 2; as before, market 2 is a perfectly competitive market. The pure-strategy equilibrium exhibits differentiation with one firm choosing good 1 and the other offering the pure bundle. Again, bundling serves to soften competition by introducing product differentiation. Importantly, the product differentiation role of bundling in both models arises because firms commit to sell only the pure bundle; mixed bundling would undermine product differentiation.

Bundling does not always soften competition, however, particularly when it is mixed (i.e., both individual and bundled prices are jointly offered). For example, Matutes and Regibeau (1992) show that firms would be better off if they could commit to not provide bundle discounts, but, because a Prisoner’s Dilemma results, bundling is chosen by each firm, and aggressive price competition follows. Reisinger (2003) revisits this result with a different demand model that allows more general correlations of brand-effects across products. He demonstrates that whether mixed bundling softens or intensifies competition depends importantly on the size and direction of these correlations. As in Reisinger (2003), suppose that duopolists each sell two goods, a and b. The market for each good consists of a uniform distribution of consumers along a circle on which the duopolists are located on opposite sides. When a consumer’s distance to firm j in market a is positively correlated with his distance to firm j in market b, the bundles are well differentiated between the firms, and mixed bundling raises industry profits by extracting more consumer surplus. When a consumer’s distances in the two markets are negatively correlated, however, demands for the bundle are very similar across consumers and across firms, product differentiation between bundles is small, and competition intensifies. Profits can fall under bundling although it remains individually rational for both firms to commit bundled discounts. Regardless of the correlation, bundling reduces social welfare when markets are covered, as it can only cause consumers to inefficiently purchase the wrong good.

7.2 Bundling without commitment

When bundling is available, practicing such price discrimination is usually ex post optimal for a firm. Sometimes an incumbent firm’s desire to bundle will significantly reduce the attractiveness of entry, thereby discouraging new products. Whinston (1990) considers
settings with a heterogeneous captive market, showing the possibility that bundling will be ex-post profitable with or without entry, so a commitment to bundling is unnecessary. In this setting, bundling may sufficiently reduce the profitability of market 2 for the potential duopolist and deter entry. No strategic commitments need to be made.

The papers of Nalebuff (2003) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) further establish that bundling may be optimal and reduce entrant profits without commitment. Nalebuff (2003) emphasizes that the practice of pure bundling by an incumbent greatly reduces the potential entrant’s profitability when entry can only occur in one of the markets. The intuition for this pure bundling effect can be seen in a simple stylized example. Suppose that an incumbent sells two goods, for which consumers have uniformly and independently distributed valuations on [0,1], and the entrant can only enter market 2. If the incumbent sells each good at $p = \frac{1}{2}$ (i.e., at the optimal individual prices absent entry), an entrant can undercut the price of $\frac{1}{2}$ in market 2 and capture the entire market, earning a profit of $\frac{1}{4}$. If, instead, the incumbent sells only a pure bundle at the price of $\bar{p} = 1$ (i.e., the sum of the previous individual prices), then an entrant undercutting with the same price of $\frac{1}{2}$ will sell to only half as many customers as before. Sales are only made to those consumers whose valuations are above $\frac{1}{2}$ in market 2 and below $\frac{1}{2}$ in market 1. In effect, the entrant must compete for consumers on market 1 as well. More generally, one can show that pure bundling is more profitable than individual pricing for an incumbent firm, and that pure bundling greatly reduces the profits of entrants who can enter only on one component market (Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) and Nalebuff (2003)). In many regards, bundling generates a subtle source of economies of scope. Hence, the common practice of bundling by a dominant firm with multiple products can discourage entry and reduce competition on a smaller scale.

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64 Matutes and Regibeau (1988, 1989, 1992) consider closely related questions of product design—whether a firm would like its system components to be compatible with other firms’ systems or instead would prefer incompatibility, requiring the consumer to purchase the entire system from the firm rather than a subset of components to mix and match. See Nalebuff (2000) for a discussion of the differences and similarities of these papers with those papers that examine the use of strategic bundling.

65 Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) also show, in the context of information goods, that when competing for upstream content, larger downstream bundlers can out bid smaller ones.
8 Demand uncertainty and price rigidities

The pricing strategies studied in the preceding sections are well-known forms of price discrimination. In the present section, we consider a setting which is less directly related to price discrimination. Specifically, we now consider market demand uncertainty with ex post price rigidities. In such a setting, firms would like to set distinct prices conditional on the aggregate demand state, but they are unable either because prices are rigid immediately after the uncertainty is realized or because the demand state is unobservable.\(^{66}\) In a world of contingent pricing, the outcome looks similar to third-degree price discrimination, where each firm sets a different price in each market segment, but where now each market corresponds to a different aggregate demand state. Without contingent pricing, firms can only indirectly price discriminate across states of aggregate demand. Formally, the outcomes generated look similar to second-degree price discrimination across consumers, but here it is instead discrimination across the market demand states.

To be precise, consider a setting in which considerable aggregate demand uncertainty exists, but firms must make pricing decisions before the demand uncertainty is resolved. This approach is taken in Prescott (1975), Eden (1990) and Dana (1998, 1999a, 1999b). Each firm \(i = 1, \ldots, n\) is allowed to offer a distribution of prices and quantities, \(q_i(p)\), where \(q_i(p)\) gives the number of units available from firm \(i\) at price \(p\). We denote the cumulative supply function (i.e., the total amount of output supplied at a price equal to or less than \(p\)) as \(Q_i(p)\).

Let \(q(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(p)\) and \(Q(p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(p)\). Note that the output-distribution strategy \(q_i(p)\) is not a nonlinear price schedule in the sense of section 6. In fact, \(Q_i(p)\) represents something closer to a supply function as it gives the total number of units supplied by firm \(i\) at prices no greater than \(p\). Even so, \(Q_i(p)\) is not a supply function in the neoclassical sense either, because each firm sells its output at a variety of prices along the curve \(Q_i(p)\), and typically some form of rationing occurs as too many customers line up to purchase the lowest price items.

The firms anticipate the effects of demand uncertainty and offer a distribution of output at different prices. If demand is unusually low, a small measure of consumers shows up and

\(^{66}\)The latter assumption will only work in the simplest of models in which a firm learns of a higher demand state only after purchasing has taken place at the lower prices. For example, suppose all consumers have identical unit demands and reservation prices, but in the high demand state there are 100 customers while in the low demand state there are only 50. The firm’s posterior on the state is then unchanged until 51 customers have purchased. At this point, it is not possible to change the price on the first 50 units sold, although the shadow cost of capacity is now known to be much higher.
purchases the cheapest priced units; if demand is unusually large, many consumers show up (first buying up the cheap items, then the ones more dear) eventually driving the price of each firm’s goods upward.\footnote{Alternatively, one could model demand uncertainty in a setting in which each customer selects a firm knowing that stockouts occur with some probability and the customer has no recourse to visit another firm. In these settings, firms can compete on availability through their reputation and pricing strategies. See, for example, the papers by Carlton (1978), Deneckere and Peck (1995) and Dana (2001b), in which firms compete in both price and availability. Because these settings are further removed from the methodology of price discrimination, we do not discuss them here.} The greater the positive demand shock, the larger the average selling price will be. In this manner, inflexible prices indirectly behave with some flexibility, discriminating across demand states.

The market for airline tickets is a good example of this phenomenon. In their revenue management programs, airlines try to accomplish several objectives—properly price the shadow costs of seats and planes, effectively segment the market using a host of price discrimination devices (e.g., Saturday night stay-over restrictions, etc.), and quickly respond to changes in aggregate demand. This latter objective is accomplished by offering a collection of buckets of seats at different prices. Thus, if a convention in Chicago increases demand for airline tickets on a given weekend from New York to Chicago, the low-priced restricted-fare economy buckets quickly run dry, forcing consumers to purchase otherwise identical seats at higher prices.

Two related, but distinct sets of work should also be mentioned and distinguished before proceeding. The first concerns the optimal flexible price mechanism for responding to demand uncertainty. For example, an electrical utility may be capacity constrained in periods of high demand, but it can sell priority contracts to end users to allocate efficiently the scarce output in such periods. Wilson (1993, ch. 10-11) provides a detailed survey of this literature. To my knowledge, no work has been done which examines the effect of competition on such priority mechanisms, although the results from the previous section would be applicable to this form of self-selection contracting. The second related, but less-explored set of models analyzes supply-function games and equilibria. In these games, firms submit neoclassical supply functions and a single price clears the market in each demand state.\footnote{The most influential paper on such supply-function equilibria is by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) (see also their earlier paper, Klemperer and Meyer (1986)). The fundamental difference between supply-function games and the output-distribution games which are the focus of the present section, is that in the former, a Walrasian auctioneer determines the unique market clearing price, while in the latter, a set of prices is available and rationing exists at all but the highest chosen price. Although in both settings average price increases with demand, in a supply-function equilibrium there is no price variation within any aggregate} Methodologically, supply-function games share some similarities with the work...
discussed here, but the absence of price dispersion within a given aggregate demand state creates less of an affinity with second-degree price discrimination. To provide more focus, we leave this interesting literature aside.

In the demand uncertainty setting with ex-post price rigidities, multiple prices are offered in any given aggregate demand state. Therefore, we need a rule for allocating goods before proceeding. Three different assumptions of rationing have been considered in this literature: proportional, efficient and inefficient. Proportional rationing requires that all consumers willing to buy at a given price are equally likely to obtain the limited quantities of the good. We assume that our consumers have unit demands, which is tantamount to assuming that consumers arrive in random order and purchase at the lowest available price. Efficient rationing assumes that the highest value customers show up first. “Efficient” rationing is so named because it guarantees that there is never an ex post misallocation of goods among consumers. (The term is a slight misnomer, as we will see, in that the efficient rationing rule does not guarantee that the allocation is ex post efficient between consumers and firms; that is, in most demand states some capacity will be unsold, although the marginal consumer values the output above marginal cost.) Finally, inefficient rationing assumes that those with the lowest valuation for consumption arrive first (perhaps because they have lower valuations of time relative to money, and so can afford to stand in line). Most of the research in this field focuses on proportional rationing, some assumes efficient rationing, and only a few papers consider inefficient rationing. For the purposes of this chapter, we focus largely on proportional and efficient rationing.

We begin with the monopoly setting to illustrate how a distribution of outputs at various prices can improve upon uniform pricing. We then explore the perfectly competitive setting to understand the effect of competition and zero profits on equilibrium pricing, as in Prescott (1975). Following Dana (1999a), we encapsulate all of these models in one general model of oligopoly, with monopoly and perfect competition as extremes. We are then able to examine specific questions with respect to price dispersion and price discrimination, and advanced-purchase discounts.

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69 Because efficient rationing is equivalent to generating the residual demand curve with a parallel shift inward, it is often called parallel rationing.
8.1 Monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty and price rigidities

Consider a setting in which there are two states of aggregate demand: \( D_s(q), s = 1, 2 \), where \( D_2(q) \geq D_1(q) \). Within each demand state, consumers have unit demands but possibly differ in their reservation prices. There is a constant marginal cost of production, \( c \), and a cost of capacity, \( k \geq 0 \). The marginal cost, \( c \), is only expended if production takes place and capacity exists; \( k \) must be spent for each unit of capacity, regardless of production. We assume that \( D_1(0) > c + k \), so that the highest demanding customers value the object in the low demand state above the marginal production and capacity costs.

As a thought experiment, suppose that there is only one consumer, but the consumer has two possible types, \( \theta = \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \), where the \( \theta_i \) type consumer has demand \( D_i(q) \). Because \( D_2(q) \geq D_1(q) \), a single-crossing property is satisfied in the utility function which rationalizes these demands. A second-degree price discriminating monopolist could offer a menu with two different price-quantity pairs and generally do better than pricing uniformly across types. Because it will prove helpful to think of output in incremental amounts, we alter our notation slightly from section 6 and let \( q_1 \) be the output designed for the low-demand customer and \( Q_2 = q_1 + q_2 \) be the output designed for the high-demand customer; the high-demand customer buys the base quantity, \( q_1 \), plus the increment \( q_2 \). For a given set of outputs, \( q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \), a monopolist segmenting the market would price them to extract all the surplus of the low-demand type, while leaving just enough surplus to the high-demand type to make him indifferent between consuming \( Q_2 \) and \( q_1 \). In Figure 2, \( q_1 \) is the output AD, while \( q_2 \) is the interval DG (and hence, \( Q_2 \) is the interval AG). At these quantities, the price discriminating monopolist charges the low-demand customer the trapezoid, ABCD, and charges the high-demand customer this amount plus the additional trapezoid DEFG. Importantly, the area in BCEH is an information rent left to the high-demand customer to maintain incentive compatibility.

Now, suppose that the heterogeneity is driven by aggregate demand uncertainty with a continuum of unit-demand consumers, and for simplicity, suppose for the moment that rationing is efficient. Our monopolist would like to implement the exact same pricing as before for the given outputs, \( q_1 \) and \( Q_2 \). Extracting all the consumers’ surplus, however, is not possible, since that would require prices to decrease as consumers purchase; instead, the first-arriving customers (the high-value ones) will choose the lowest-offered prices, not the highest. As such, it is not possible to price along the demand curve in the low-demand
state; only nondecreasing price schedules can be implemented. In the low-demand state, the best our monopolist can do while selling $q_1$, therefore, is to offer a single price, $p_1$ and forego the triangle, $p_1BC$. Similarly, in the high-demand state, the best the monopolist can do is offer a second set of output, $q_2$, at a higher price, $p_2 = D_2(q_1 + q_2)$; the monopolist cannot obtain the triangle $p_2EF$. Hence, the only difference between the fictitious second-degree price discrimination setting with a single “consumer” representing the marketplace and our true setting with a continuum of consumers and aggregate demand uncertainty is the latter exhibits an inability to practice intra-state price discrimination among the consumers. A similar outcome would be obtained if we considered second-degree price discrimination with the restriction that the monopolist price to each consumer-type using a piecewise-linear, convex price schedule.

So far, we have considered pricing by taking the outputs as exogenous. In the general program, the monopolist chooses the distribution, $\{(p_1, q_1), (p_2, q_2)\}$. In our two-state

Figure 2:
example, the monopolist solves:

$$\max_{q_1, q_2} (D_1(q_1) - c)q_1 + f_2(D_2(q_1 + q_2) - c)q_2 - k(q_1 + q_2),$$

subject to $p_1 = D_1(q_1) \leq p_2 = D_2(q_1 + q_2)$, where $f_s$ is the probability of state $s$. The first-order conditions (ignoring the monotonicity constraint) are

$$D_1(q_1) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1(q_1)}\right) = c + k - f_2 D_2'(q_1 + q_2)q_2,$$
$$D_2(q_1 + q_2) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\varepsilon_2(q_1)}\right) = c + \frac{k}{f_2}.$$

Note that in the high-demand state, $s = 2$, the marginal cost of capacity is $\frac{k}{f_2}$; i.e., $\frac{k}{f_2}$, multiplied by the probability of the high-demand state, equals the cost of producing a unit of capacity. Interestingly, the price in the high-demand state is set at the state-contingent optimal monopoly price, while the price in the low-demand state is biased upward from the optimal price (and hence output is distorted downward, relative to a state-contingent monopolist). Hence, the outcome is reminiscent of second-degree price discrimination, where the monopolist distorts quality downward for the low-type consumer. Also note that if $k$ is sufficiently large, the requirement that $p_2 \geq p_1$ is satisfied in the relaxed program; otherwise, no price dispersion arises.

For instance, consider the case of multiplicative demand uncertainty explored in Dana (1999a) where the demand function is characterized by $q = X_s(p) = sX(p)$; the economic consequence is that the elasticity of demand is not affected by demand shocks, holding price fixed. When $X(p) = 4 - p$, $s_1 = 1$, $s_2 = 2$, $c = 1$, $k = 1$, and both states are equally likely, the ideal state-contingent prices are $p_1^* = 3$ and $p_2^* = \frac{7}{2}$. However, when prices cannot directly depend upon the demand state and rationing is efficient, then $p_1 = \frac{46}{15}$ and $p_2 = \frac{56}{15}$.

Now consider proportional rationing under monopoly, as in Dana (2001a). Some consumers can purchase at the low demand price of $p_1$ in the high demand state, resulting in a residual demand of $X(p_2)(1 - \frac{q_1}{X_2(p_1)})$ at $p_2$. An additional economic effect arises which further removes the setting from second-degree price discrimination across states. It is now possible that the low-demand customers obtain some of the low-priced goods, thereby increasing the residual demand in the high-demand state. As a result, the monopolist can
do better with proportional rationing than with efficient rationing.\textsuperscript{70} The monopolist’s program is to maximize

$$\max_{(p_1,p_2)} (p_1 - c - k)X_1(p_1) + f_2 \left( \frac{p_2 - c - k}{f_2} \right) X_2(p_2) \left( 1 - \frac{X_1(p_1)}{X_2(p_1)} \right),$$

subject to $p_2 \geq p_1$. Here, we switch the maximization program to prices in order to rotate the high-state demand curve inward under proportional rationing; the switch is notionally less cumbersome. Quantities at each resulting price are determined recursively: $q_1 = X_1(p_1)$ and $q_2 = X_2(p_2)(1 - \frac{q_1}{X_2(p_1)})$. Returning to our previous numerical example with multiplicative demand uncertainty, when $k = 0$, the optimal prices under proportional rationing are $p_1 = 3$ and $p_2 = \frac{7}{2}$, the same as under state-contingent pricing.\textsuperscript{71} The result that monopoly profits are higher under proportional rationing compared to efficient rationing is general. With proportional rationing, some low-demand consumers purchase the low-priced items in the high-demand state, raising the average price to high-demand customers. In effect, proportional rationing allows some indirect intrastate price discrimination.

\subsection*{8.2 Perfect competition with demand uncertainty and price rigidities}

Now consider the polar extreme of no market power—perfect competition—where there are no costs of entry and technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Assume there are $S$ demand states, $s = 1, \ldots, S$, ordered by increasing demand, with probability $f(s)$ and cumulative distribution $F(s)$. For any equilibrium distribution of output and prices, if all output offered at price $p$ is purchased in state $s$, then this output is also purchased in higher states, $s' > s$.

In a free-entry, perfectly competitive equilibrium, no firm can make positive expected profit for any output sold with positive probability. As Prescott (1975), Eden (1990), and Dana (1998, 1999a) have shown, this no-profit condition completely determines equilibrium prices. Given an equilibrium distribution of output, suppose that the units offered at $p$ sell in states $s = s', \ldots, S$; it follows that the probability these units sell is equal to $1 - F(s' - 1)$.

\textsuperscript{70}Better still, the monopolist extracts even more of the intrastate rents in the case of inefficient rationing. With one state, for example, the monopolist will extract all consumer surplus with inefficient rationing by posting one unit for each price on the demand curve.

\textsuperscript{71}For more general demand systems Dana demonstrates that the resulting prices will satisfy the monotonicity constraint if and only if the state-contingent monopoly price is increasing in the state of demand. This equivalence arises because of multiplicative uncertainty, however, and more generally the prices differ.
The zero-profit condition in this case is that \((p - c)[1 - F(s')] = k\). Hence, we can index the price by state and obtain

\[
p(s) = c + \frac{k}{1 - F(s - 1)},
\]

where \(p(1) = c + k\). Competitive prices equal the marginal cost of production plus the marginal expected cost of capacity. To return briefly to our two-state, multiplicative-uncertainty monopoly example, the spot prices are necessarily \(p_1 = c + k = 2\) and \(p_2 = c + \frac{k}{1 - F(s_1)} = c + \frac{k}{f_2} = 3\). Two remarks are worth making. First, note that these prices are more dispersed than monopoly prices. Second, except in the lowest demand state, price exceeds marginal cost. Because prices are inflexible ex post, this means that some firms will have unsold capacity priced above marginal cost, and consumption will be inefficiently low. Hence, regardless of the rationing rule, price inflexibility implies that consumption will be inefficiently low in almost all states.

So far, we have said nothing about the rationing rule under perfect competition; the zero-profit condition is enough to determine the spot prices across states: \(\{p(1), \ldots, p(S)\}\). A competitive equilibrium also requires that the output supplied at each price level is such that the residual demand is zero across all states. With efficient rationing, the residual demand at a price \(p(s)\), given cumulative output purchased at lower prices, \(Q(p(s - 1))\), is \(X_s(p(s)) - Q(p(s - 1))\). Hence, equilibrium requires that

\[
q(p(s)) = \max\{X_s(p(s)) - Q(p(s - 1)), 0\},
\]

with \(q(p(1)) = X_1(c + k)\). Alternatively, in a world of proportional rationing, residual demand at \(p(s)\) is

\[
RD_s(p(s)) = X_s(p(s)) \left(1 - \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \frac{q(j)}{X_j(p(j))}\right).
\]

Equilibrium requires this to be zero in each state, which provides a recursive relationship determining the quantities offered at each spot price.

Regardless of rationing rule, prices in a perfectly competitive market with demand uncertainty and ex post price rigidities vary by the state of aggregate demand in the same fashion and firms make zero profits. Prices are at effective marginal cost, where effective marginal cost includes the expected cost of adding capacity for a given state in addition to
the familiar marginal cost of production. Of course, while capacity is priced efficiently, the market allocation is not Pareto efficient because ex post rationing may generate misallocations across consumers.

8.3 Oligopoly with demand uncertainty and price rigidities

Dana (1999a) constructs a more general model of oligopoly with symmetric firms in environments of multiplicative demand uncertainty and proportional rationing which includes perfect competition and monopoly as special cases. When uncertainty is multiplicative and rationing is proportional, the residual demand function for a given firm $i$ can be calculated given the output distributions offered by the remaining firms, $q_{-i}(p)$. The symmetric equilibrium can be calculated using this residual demand function and shown to generate the monopoly setting when $n = 1$ and to converge to the perfectly competitive setting as $n \to \infty$. Remarkably, Dana (1999a) shows that the support of prices shrinks as $n$ increases, as suggested in our two-state example. The result is consistent with Borenstein and Rose’s (1994) finding of increased price dispersion by airlines as competition increases. Hence, the price dispersion in airline pricing may not be attributable to standard second- or third-degree price discrimination arguments, but instead represents an optimal response to aggregate demand uncertainty with price rigidities.

8.4 Sequential screening: advanced purchases and refunds

So far, we have put aside individual consumer heterogeneity and focused instead on the aggregate market demand. This focus is relevant if the firm has no ability to screen among the consumers comprising aggregate demand. While it is true that high-value consumers will pay a higher expected price when rationing is proportional, one might imagine firms employing a more direct approach to extract consumer surplus.

The approach considered here is one of sequential screening. The idea is that before demand is realized, consumers may have ex ante information about their own demands. For example, a business traveler may not know whether a business trip will be required in the following month, but if it is required, her valuation is very high; correspondingly, a leisure traveler may have very certain demands for a vacation during the next month, but the valuation of the airline ticket is not as high. At an early point in time, the airline may

\footnote{When demand is linear, variance also decreases.}
offer to sell its tickets with various restrictions. Later, when demand information arrives, consumption decisions can be adjusted accordingly. For example, in an effort to sort the two types of consumers, cheap tickets may be offered without refunds, while expensive tickets will be fully refundable.

Formally, the idea of sequential screening was developed in Baron and Besanko (1984) in the context of regulation. More recently, Miravete (1996) and Courty and Li (2001) explore these sequential sorting mechanisms for a second-degree price discriminating monopolist. Courty and Li (2001), for instance, show that if consumers initially know the distribution from which their reservation value will be drawn, then such sequential mechanisms are useful sorting devices when the distributions can be ordered by either first-order or second-order/mean-preserving stochastic dominance. As a simple intuition, consider the offer of tickets with and without refunds. If a consumer has either a low expected final value or a very certain final value, the option value of a refund is also low; as such, refund provisions can be priced higher in order to price discriminate against high-valuation consumers.

To take an overly simple numerical example without capacity costs, suppose there are two types of consumers. Type 1 consumers have certain demands with a reservation value of consumption of \( \theta_1 > c \), while type 2 consumers have variable demands, with \( \theta_2 = \bar{\theta} \) with probability \( \alpha \), and \( \theta_2 = 0 \) with probability \( 1 - \alpha \). Further assume that \( \text{E}[\theta_2] = \alpha \bar{\theta} = \theta_1 = \text{E}[\theta_1] \), so consumer 2's distribution is a mean-preserving spread of consumer 1's. Letting \( c > 0 \) and \( k = 0 \), the optimal pricing scheme is to set \( p_1 = \theta_1 \) as an advanced-purchase discount (with no refund), while \( p_2 = \bar{\theta} > p_1 \) is the price after the demand realization. These prices succeed in extracting all of the consumer surplus with no productive distortions. In more general settings, advanced-purchase discount (APD) mechanisms are not optimal within a larger class of sequential mechanisms, and marginal distortions are introduced. Courty and Li's (2001) results over a more general class of mechanisms (absent capacity costs and aggregate demand uncertainty, however) show that a monopolist will wish to distort the second-period adjustment of a consumer's allocation for all but the highest-ordered consumer type. In this sense, their results are very similar to those of the canonical second-degree nonlinear-pricing monopolist.

Less is currently known about how such sequential screening mechanisms operate in imperfectly competitive environments. Dana (1998), however, explores the effect of APDs in the perfectly competitive setting of Prescott (1975) with two distinct types of consumers. For simplicity, suppose there is an ex ante type of consumer, say type 1, who knows that their
valuation will always equal \( \theta_1 > c + k \). Given that the spot price under perfect competition increases in the demand state and exceeds \( c + k \) in all but the lowest demand state, this type will strictly prefer to buy an APD at a price of \( p_{apd} = c + k \). Hence, perfect competition results in the offering of APDs. Will the other type of consumer also purchase the APD? The answer demonstrated by Dana (1998) under some additional preference restrictions is, “No.” Specifically, suppose that the type 2 consumer values the good at \( \bar{\theta}_2 \) with probability \( \alpha_s \) in state \( s \), and otherwise values it as \( \theta_2 = 0 \). To further simplify the analysis, assume that \( \bar{\theta}_2 > c + k/f_S \) so that all type 2 consumers with a positive demand realization will buy in every state. This assumption implies that the expected utility of participating in the spot market when it consists of type 2 consumers is

\[
E_s \left[ \alpha_s \sum_{j=1}^{S} (\alpha_j - \alpha_{j-1})(\bar{\theta}_2 - p(j)) \right] = \alpha(\bar{\theta}_2 - c) - k,
\]

where \( \alpha \) is the average value of \( \alpha_s \): \( \alpha \equiv \sum_{s=1}^{S} \alpha_s f_s \). Because the same type 2 customer will only receive expected utility of \( E[\theta_2] - c - k = \alpha \bar{\theta}_2 - c - k \) under an APD arrangement, sorting is an equilibrium. The APD sorting equilibrium also arises in cases of efficient rationing, although the type 1 consumers are indifferent between purchasing the APD and entering the spot market in this simple example.

What is most interesting about sorting with APDs under perfect competition is that in equilibrium, profits are zero across states and consumer types. Because the outcome looks similar to the monopoly second-degree price discriminating example above, one is wrongly tempted to conclude from the presence of APDs and market segmentation that firms enjoy market power. This conclusion is mistaken, however. The observed price discrimination arises because after capacity costs have been sunk, firms have limited, short-run market power. With freedom to adjust capacity, long-run profits cannot arise.

Without advanced purchases, two distortions emerge in general models with proportional rationing. Misallocation can occur across buyers because goods are consumed by low-value consumers when high-valued consumers are rationed, and underutilization can also occur because some supply is left unpurchased despite consumers who value it above marginal cost. Again, note that efficient rationing only eliminates the first concern; underutilization arises with either rationing rule. A further misallocation occurs with the addition of APDs, as low-value buyers consume in high demand states even though they would have been
rationed with some probability absent APD. This consumption requires the addition of costly capacity to serve the high-demand customers. Because the expected cost of the capacity exceeds the value of the consumption by the low-value types, welfare is even lower. This result would be reversed if type 2 customers had certain demands at $\theta_2 = \bar{\theta}$, while type 1 consumers (with lower expected valuations), had greater uncertainty over consumption. Here, as Dana (1998) has noted, APDs would allow type 2 consumers to crowd out type 1 consumers’ consumption, as is efficient.

Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993) consider APDs in a related framework of aggregate demand uncertainty. In their setting of airline pricing, the demand uncertainty is over which of two flight times will have the peak demand, and correspondingly, which of the two will have low demand; demand for the two flights is thus negatively correlated. Gale and Holmes show how APDs can usefully allocate customers to flights when a spot market for flights is not available. Consumers know ex ante the utility difference between their ideal flight time and their second-choice. Consumers with weak preferences (small differences) buy in advance while those with strong preferences buy on the day of the flight at a higher price, providing the ticket is available. In this setting, a monopolist airline will trade off the lost revenue from lowering the cost of the APD ticket, against the increased probability that a person buying on the day of travel will be able to fly on the peak flight, thereby earning the firm more revenues on the high-preference market. Gale and Holmes (1992) also consider a model of duopoly, but in the specialized setting in which each firm exogenously supplies only one of two flights. In these models, the firm(s) set a single day-of-flight price in advance rather than a distribution of prices and outputs.

9 Summary

While the extremes of perfect competition and monopoly are invaluable tools for understanding the economic world around us, most economic activity takes place in the realm in between these poles. One need not search very far within this sphere of imperfect competition to find numerous examples of the discriminatory pricing strategies described in this chapter. Given the significance of these practices, an understanding of the interaction of price discrimination and competition—and how this interaction affects profits, consumer surplus, market structure and welfare—is an integral topic in industrial organization. This chapter documents many theories where (under imperfect competition) price discrimination
increases welfare, providing that markets are not foreclosed. That said, even this finding is not without exceptions and counterexamples. It is, at times, frustrating that imperfect competition introduces additional effects into our classic price-discrimination theories that make truly robust theoretical predictions a rarity. In many circumstances the theories cannot provide definitive answers without additional empirical evidence. Conclusions regarding profit and welfare typically depend upon the form of consumer heterogeneity, the goods for sale and the available instruments of price discrimination. Nonetheless, in the end the theories are informative by making these dependencies clear.

The theoretical research to date also makes clear that there is little reason to expect that the predictions of monopoly price discrimination theory will survive empirical tests using data from imperfectly competitive markets. The most interesting empirical question is that which comes after data rejects the monopoly discrimination theory: “What is the best alternative theory of price discrimination under imperfect competition?” Here, interesting combinations of theoretical and empirical work lays before us.
References


