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³o°ó½Ò¥Dn·|¥Î¨ìªº±Ð¬ì®Ñ¦³¤T¥»¡C²Ä¤@¥»¬ORasmusen, Eric.
2007. Games and Information: An Introduction
to Game Theory. Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd¡C³o¬O¤@¥»²`¤J²L¥Xªº®Ñ¡A«Ü¾A¦X³o°ó½Òªº»Ý¨D¡C³o¥»®Ñ¦³¤¤Ä¶¥»¡G¡mÁɧ½²z½×»P°T®§¸gÀÙ¡n¡AEric RasmusenµÛ¡A±i«Ø¤@¡B·¨®a«Û¡B§dÄR¯uĶ¡A»O¥_¥«¡A¤«n 2003[¥Á92]¡C²Ä¤G¥»¬OMcCarty,
Nolan and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. Political
Game Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press¡C³o¥»®Ñªº§@ªÌMcCarty¬OEmpirical Implications of
Theoretical Models (EITM)ªº±À¤â¡A¹ï©ó°¾¦n¡B®Ä¥Î¥H¤ÎªÀ·|¿ï¾Üµ¥Áɧ½²z½×ªº°ò¦¡A¦³«Ü¸ÔºÉªº¤¶²Ð¡A¹ê¨Ò¤]¦h¥H¬Fªv¾Ç¦³Ãö¡C²Ä¤T¥»¬OMorrow, James D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists.
Princeton, N.J.,
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n MacDonald, Paul K. 2003. ¡§Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory.¡¨ American Political Science Review 97(4): 551-565.
n Granato, Jim and Frank Scioli. 2004. ¡§Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM).¡¨ Perspectives on Politics 2(2): 313-323.
l ²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü©M«D¦X§@Áɧ½²z½×¡GÁɧ½²z½×©M²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¦³¤°»òÃö«Y¡H²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¬°¤°»ò¤Þ°_³o»ò¦h§åµû¡H¡uÁɧ½²z½×¡v¦³´XºØ¡H
n
Green, Donald P. and Ian
Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice
Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science.
n Johnson, James. 1996. ¡§How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory: Pathologies of 'Common Sense'.¡¨ Philosophy of the Social Sciences March 1996: 77-91.
n
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative
Politics.
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l Áɧ½ªº°ò¦¡G±q°¾¦n¨ì®Ä¥Î¡A±q®Ä¥Î¨ì¿ï¾Ü¡A±q§Ú¨ì²³¤H
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 1.1-1.4; ch.4.
l Áɧ½ªºµ²ºc¡Gn«ØºcÁɧ½¼Ò«¬¡A»Ýn¤°»ò±ø¥ó¡H¬°¤°»òn¥Î¨ì¥Î¼Æ¾Ç¡H©M¤é±`»y¨¥¦³¦óÃö³s¡H
n Rasmusen: introduction; 1.1.
n Morrow: ch.1.
l ¥¿³W¦¡»P®i¶}¦¡¡G¦p¦ó§âÁɧ½ªºn¥ó¾ã¦X°_¨Ó¡H¤°»ò¥s¡uµ¦²¤¡v¡H¡uµ¦²¤¡v©M¡u¦æ°Ê¡v¦³¦ó¤£¦P¡H¥¿³W¦¡»P®i¶}¦¡ªº©w¸q¬O¡HþºØ¤ñ¸û¦n¡H
n Rasmusen: 1.1-1.4.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 5.1; 7.1.
n Morrow: 73-88.
l ¯Ç³\§¡¿Å¡G½Ö¬OJohn F. Nash¡HNash equilibrium¬O¤°»ò¡H¤@©w¦s¦b¶Ü¡H¤@ÓÁɧ½¡A·|¤£·|¦³¦n´XÓNash equilibria?
n Rasmusen:1.4.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 5.2-5.4.
l ²V¦Xµ¦²¤¡G¿ï¾Ü¬YÓµ¦²¤¡A´N¥²µM¡u®Ä¥Î·¥¤j¤Æ¡v¶Ü¡H±¹ï¤£½T©w©Ê¡An¦p¦ó¿ï¾Üµ¦²¤¡H¦³¨S¦³¡u²z©Êªº½ä³Õ¡v¡H
n Rasmusen: 3.1-3.4.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 5.5.
l ¹s©MÁɧ½¡G¡u§A¿é¡A´N¬O§ÚĹ¡vªºÄvª§¡A³Ì«á¦p¦ó©w¿éĹ¡H¬Fªv¤@©w¬O³o¼Ë¶Ü¡H¡u¤j¤¤¨ú¤p¡v¡B¡u¤p¤¤¨ú¤j¡v©M¡u¯Ç³\§¡¿Å¡v¦³¤°»òÃö³s¡H
n Morrow: 89-91.
l °T®§¡G¦æ¬°ªÌ©¼¦¹ªº»{ª¾¡A¹ï©óÁɧ½¦³¦h«n¡H¤°»ò¥scommon knowledge¡H ¦p¦ó°Ï¿ëÁɧ½ªº°T®§µ²ºc¡H
n Rasmusen: ch.2.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 7.5-7.6; 8.1.
l °T®§§¹µ½ªºÁɧ½¡G©Ò¦³¤H³£ª¾¹D©¼¦¹¤@¤ÁªºÁɧ½¡A¬O¤£¬O«Ü®e©ö§ä¥X§¡¿Å¡H§¡¿Å¡A¤@©wÆ[¹î±o¨ì¶Ü¡H¦p¦ó¸ÑŪ¬Fªv¤Wªº¡u°²°Ê§@¡v¡H
n Rasmusen: 4.1-4.3.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 7.2.
n Morrow: 121-160.
l °T®§¤£§¹¥þªºÁɧ½¡G°T®§¤£©P¥þ¡A´N¨S¿ìªk§@¨M©w¤F¶Ü¡H¡uA¤£§¹¥þÁA¸ÑB¡ABÁA¸Ñ³oÂI¡AA¤]ÁA¸Ñ³oÂI¡v³oºØ§½«ç»ò¸Ñ¡H¤°»ò¬O¡u°T®§¤£¹ïºÙ¡v¡H¡u¥N²z¤H¼Ò«¬¡v¤S¬O¤°»ò¡H
n Rasmusen: ch.4; ch.6.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 150-154.
l ¨©¦¡Áɧ½¡G¡u§ÚµLªk¥þ±ÁA¸Ñ§A¡A¦ý¥i¥HÆ[¹î¨ì§Aªº§@¬°¡A¶i¦ÓÃÒ©ú§Aªº¦s¦b¡v¡A¬O¯«¾ÇÁÙ¬OÁɧ½¡HThomas Bayes¬O¤@¦ì18¥@¬ö^°êªºªª®v¡A¦ý21¥@¬ö³Ì±`´£¨ì¥L©m¦Wªº¡A¬O²Îp¾Ç®a©MÁɧ½²z½×®a¡CBayes§i¶D§Ṳ́°»ò¡H
n Rasmusen: ch.6.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: 204-214.
n Morrow: 161-187.
l «½ÆÁɧ½¡G¡u«á·|¦³´Á¡v·|¤£·|¼vÅT²{¦bªºµ¦²¤¡H¦P¼ËªºÁɧ½¡Aª±¤@¦¸©Mª±«Ü¦h¦¸¦³¤°»ò¤£¤@¼Ë¡H¤å¤Æ¡A¦³¨S¦³²z©Êªº°ò¦¡H
n Rasmusen: 5.1-5.2.
n McCarty & Meirowitz: ch.9.
n Morrow: 260-301.
²Ä¤T³¡¤À¡G¨ä¥¦ºØÃþªºÁɧ½
l ºt¤ÆÁɧ½¡G¤°»ò¥s°µ¡u¾AªÌ¥Í¦s¡v¡H°ò¦]¬ðÅÜ©MÁɧ½²z½×¦³¦óÃö³s¡H¦A°Ý¤@¦¸¡G¤å¤Æ¡A¦³¨S¦³²z©Êªº°ò¦¡H
n Rasmusen: 5.6.
l ¦X§@Áɧ½¡G¡u¨S¦³¥Ã»·ªºªB¤Í¡A¤]¨S¦³¥Ã»·ªº¼Ä¤H¡v¬O¤°»ò·N«ä¡H¬°¤F§¹¦¨¤j§Ú¡A¤@©wnÄ묹¤p§Ú¶Ü¡H¦pªG¤@¤Á¥u±qÓ¤H§Q¯q¥Xµo§Y¥i¡A¬°¤°»ò¦³³o»ò¦h¨î¤Hªº¨î«×¡H
n Morrow: 111-119.
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