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¥»½Òµ{ªº±Ð§÷¥]¬A´X¤j³¡¤À¡C¥Dnªº±Ð¬ì®Ñ¬ODavid Austen-Smith & Jeffery Banks. 2000. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference.