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¨C­Ó®É¥N¡A¸gÅç¬Fªv¾Ç³£¦³¨ä¡uÅã¾Ç¡v¡C¦b­pºâ¯à¤O§Ö³t¶i®iªº¤µ¤Ñ¡A¯à°÷³B²zÃe¤j¸ê®Æªºbig data²Î­p¡A¤w¸g¶}©l¦û¾Ú­«­nªº¬Fªv¾Ç´Á¥Z¡C¦ýbig dataÁÙ¬O­n³B²z¦]ªG±À½×¡A©Ò¥H¹êÅçªk¤]¬O¥t¤@ºØÅã¾Ç¡C¬Û¸û©ó¦¹¡A¥H¡u²z©Ê¤H¡v¬°°ò¥»¤½³]ªº²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¼Ò«¬¡A«o±j½Õ²¼ä¡C³o¬O§_¥Nªí²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¤w¸g³vº¥³à¥¢¨ä¼vÅT¤O¡H

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1.        Monroe, Burt L., Jennifer Pan, Margaret E. Roberts, Maya Sen, and Betsy Sinclair. 2015. "No! Formal Theory, Causal Inference, and Big Data Are Not Contradictory Trends in Political Science." PS, Political Science & Politics 48 (1):71-74.

2.        Howson, Colin and Peter Urbach. 1993. Scientific Reasoning : the Bayesian Approach. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, Ch. 1, Ch. 7.

3.        Johnson, James. 2006. ¡§Consequences of Positivism.¡¨ Comparative Political Studies 39(2): 224-252.

l   EITM¬O¤°»ò¡H¡u²z½×­n±µ¨üÀËÃÒ¡v¡A¤£¬O±`ÃѶܡH

1.     Granato, Jim and Frank Scioli. 2004. ¡§Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM).¡¨ Perspectives on Politics 2(2): 313-323.

2.     Granato, Jim, Melody Lo, and M. C. Sunny Wong. 2010. "A Framework for Unifying Formal and Empirical Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 54(3): 783-797

3.     King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Ch. 1.

 

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1.     Austen-Smith & Banks. 2000. 1.1~1.4.

2.     Ordeshook. 1986, Ch. 1.

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1.        Dickson, Eric S. 2006. ¡§Rational Choice Epistemology and Belief Formation in Mass Politics.¡¨ Journal of Theoretical Politics 18(4): 454-497.

2.        Landa, Dimitri. 2006. " Debating Conceptions of Rational Choice." Journal of Theoretical Politics 18(4): 379-83.

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1.     Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press, Ch. 3.

2.     Cox, Gary W. 1999. ¡§The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory: A Reply to Green and Shapiro.¡¨ Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(2): 147-169.

3.     Johnson, James. 1996. ¡§How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory: Pathologies of 'Common Sense'.¡¨ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 26(1): 77-91.

4.     ªLÄ~¤å¡A2005¡A¡qµê°²ÅQÅv¡G¥xÆW¬Fªv¾Ç¬ã¨s¤¤ªº²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¡r¡A¡m¬Fªv¬ì¾Ç½×ÂO¡n²Ä25´Á¡A­¶67-104¡C

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1.     Arrow, Kenneth J. 1952. Social Choice and Individual Values. 1st ed. New York, Wiley.

2.     Austen-Smith & Banks. 2000. 2.1.

3.     Ordeshook. 1986. 56-65.

l  ¦b¤°»ò±¡ªp¤U¡A¥i±N°¾¦nªÅ¶¡¤Æ

1.     Austen-Smith & Banks. 2000. 4.3.

2.     Hinich, Melvin J. & Michael C. Munger. 1997. Analytical Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 139-188.

l   ³Ó¶°(winset)»P§½§Z(yolk)

1.     Austen-Smith & Banks. 2000. 4.2.

2.     Miller, Nicholas R., Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1989. ¡§The Geometry of Majority Rule.¡¨ Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(4): 379-406.

 

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1.     Shepsle, Kenneth A. . 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." American Journal of Political Science 23 (1): 27-59.

2.     Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2006. "Rational Choice Institutionalism." In The Oxford handbook of political institutions, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder and B. A. Rockman. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

l   ijµ{¾ÞÁa

1.     Riker, William H. 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Ch.1, 3.

2.     ³¯´°·½¡B§d¨q¥ú¡A2006¡A¡q²z©Ê¿ï¾Ü¡B¥Á¥D¨î«×»P¡u¾Þ±±¹C»¡¡v¡GWilliam H. Riker ·s¬Fªv¸gÀپǪº¦^ÅU»Pµû­z¡r¡A¡m¬Fªv¬ì¾Ç½×ÂO¡n²Ä26´Á¡A­¶171-218¡C

l   ´«²¼Áp·ù

1.     Finke, Daniel , and Andreas Fleig. 2013. "The Merits of Adding Complexity: Non-separable Preferences in Spatial Models of European Union Politics." Journal of Theoretical Politics 25 (4): 546-75.

2.     Lacy, Dean and Emerson Niou. 2000. ¡§Nonseparable Preference and the Elections in Double-Member Districts.¡¨ Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(1): 89-110.

l   ±ÂÅv¡G¥D¹²Ãö«Yªº°fÂà¡H

1.     Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. The Logic of Delegation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Ch. 2.

2.     Carey, John M. 2007. "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." American Journal of Political Science 51 (1):92-107.

 

 

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¥»½Òµ{ªº±Ð§÷¥]¬A´X¤j³¡¤À¡C¥D­nªº±Ð¬ì®Ñ¬ODavid Austen-Smith & Jeffery Banks. 2000. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor, Michigan University Press. ³o¬O·¥¤Ö¼Æ¬°¤F¹êÃÒ¬Fªv²z½×©Ò¼gªº®Ñ¡A§¹¥þ¨Ï¥Î§Î¦¡²z½×ªº»y¨¥¡A¹ïªì¾ÇªÌ¦Ó¨¥¡A¾\Ū°_¨Ó¥i¯à¦³ÂI§xÃø¡A¦ýÀ³¸Ó¬O¸g¨å¤§§@¡C§@ªÌ¤§¤@ªºJeffery Banks­^¦~¦­³u¡A³o¥»®Ñ¥i¿×¨ä¶Ç¥@¤§§@¡C¥t¤@¥»®Ñ¬OÁ´_¥Í©Ò¼gªº¡m¹êÃÒ¬Fªv²z½×¡n(2013, ¤­«n¥Xª©ªÀ)¡A¥i¥H·f°tAusten-Smith©MBanksªº®Ñ¨Ó¬Ý¡C¥t¤@¥»®Ñ¡A¹ï¬ÛÃö²z½×¦³¥þ­±©Êªº¤Þ¤¶¡A´N¬OPeter C. Ordeshook. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press¡C³o¥»®Ñ¤w¸g¦³¤T¤Q¦~ªº¾ú¥v¡A¦ý²[»\¤F¹êÃÒ¬Fªv²z½×ªº¥D­nijÃD¡A¨Ã¥H¬Fªv¨tªº¬ã¨s¥Í¬°¥D­nŪªÌ¡C¦¹¥~¡A°t¦X¨C­Ó¥DÃD³£¦³¨ä¥¦¾\Ū¤åÄm(¸Ô¡u¤W½Ò¶i«×¡v)¡C¦¹¥~¡ARikerªºThe Art of Political Manipulation¬O¤@¥»¬Û·í¦³½ì¡A¦ýµo¤H²`¬Ùªº®Ñ¡C¾Ç¦n¦¹¤@½Òµ{ªº­n³Z¦b©ó¤£Â_ªº«ä¦Ò»Pºt½m¡A¦Ó¤£¦b©ó¼Æ¾Çµ{«×ªº°ª§C¡C§ó­«­nªº¬O¡A¹êÃÒ¬Fªv²z½×¥²¶·¦^¨ì¬Fªvªº¥@¬É¸Ì±µ¨üÀËÃÒ¡C

 

 

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