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6.20.26.ETHNIC CULTURE STUDIES: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE AMONG TAIWANESE AUSTRONESIAN PEOPLES

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Key Words: Austronesian, Taiwan, Autonomous Conservation, Participatory Elevation, Cultural Revival.

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Summary

This article examines contemporary socio-cultural developments among Taiwan's indigenous Austronesian peoples, who constitute approximately 2.2% of the national population, or 504,531 out of 23,119,722 in 2009. Produced as they are in a multiethnic and multicultural social milieu, studies of ethnic cultures must be contextualized in the grand wave of global social change from the colonialism of past centuries to contemporary globalization. This article proceeds from previously published research findings to review major policy changes over the past quarter century (1983-2008) and their consequential developments—both the positive improvements in general well-being and the persistence of ingrained problems among these marginal groups. Employing both qualitative and quantitative research methods, this study's multidisciplinary research team canvassed the entire island during 2006 and 2007. Major findings indicate that the increasing tempo of globalization has resulted in two contradictory trends among Taiwanese Austronesians. On the one hand, the rise of national consciousness has engendered renewed interest in their cultures and supported efforts to preserve and restore selected indigenous customs and practices, such as ritual healings, age-grade systems and annual harvest festivals. The opposite trend is a continuous outflow of the indigenes from traditional tribal communities to urban centers for employment, education, or health care; those numbers had reached close to half of the entire indigenous population by the timeframe under consideration here. Their increasing urbanization also contributes to mixed marriages and the loss of indigenous languages and practices. This paper points to some of the issues related to these developments, such as the syncretic merger of the old and new, and the persistent problems indigenous communities face in daily life. The case of Taiwanese Austronesians illustrates the impacts global historical and politico-economic processes are having on indigenous peoples around the world.

1. Research Goal and Methods

In 1983, the lead Taiwanese institute for ethnic studies, the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, under the guidance of academician Yih-yuan Li, published a major treatise on contemporary Taiwanese indigenous peoples entitled *Research and Assessment of Hill Aboriginal Administration Policies*. This book identifies major problems Taiwan's indigenous peoples face and the possibilities of alleviating them through administrative means. Unexpectedly yet importantly, this publication sparked indigenous social movements that gained tremendous momentum in subsequent decades. A quarter of a century had passed since this landmark research was published, and it became imperative that another broad-based assessment be conducted to evaluate current conditions in these communities. The questions we planned to pursue as we organized this project were: What major policy changes had been implemented by the national government to improve the lives of the indigenes? To what extent had the indigenous peoples changed over this past quarter century in terms of their general well-being? Had the grassroots movements launched by indigenous elites in the late 1980s and early 1990s produced tangible results and narrowed the gaps between their

communities and mainstream society? What features still hindered the improvement of their general well-being? A team of fifteen researchers representing diverse academic institutions and disciplines was organized by Shu-min Huang, the first author of the article and primary investigator of , as an Academia Sinica Thematic Research Project. The team investigated the following topical areas: changes in national policy towards the indigenes, population movement and changing socio-economic status, labor and employment conditions, indigenous traditional land rights, general social welfare and health, promotion of cultural enterprises, language policy and preservation, education, and political development.

To collect essential data, the research team employed a multitude of research methods: archival data collection from government offices and libraries, current census data, site visits to indigenous communities, in-depth interviews with officials in charge of indigenous affairs, focus group discussions with experts and non-experts on pressing issues, and finally, survey questionnaires. In the last case, standardized questionnaires were developed to elicit quantitative data that would supplement general impressions gained through qualitatively obtained data. Following a rigid stratified sampling procedure, the research team covered all fourteen officially registered tribes with 2,057 valid samples: 1,178 from traditional indigenous communities and 879 from metropolitan areas. The research period covered two years, 2006 and 2007. Research outcomes, written in Chinese by individual researchers based on their chosen topics, were published in a single volume titled *Government Policy and Social Development among Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples* in 2010 by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan. The current article highlights the major findings of this project.

2. Profiles of Taiwanese Austronesians

Linguistically, Taiwanese indigenous peoples belong to the Austronesian language family, in close association with the Malayo-Polynesian and Oceanic languages that cover major islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. One school of thought, championed by Australian archaeologist Peter Bellwood, even argues that Taiwan must be the original home of all Austronesian peoples due to the extremely high complexity of the indigenous languages on the island (Bellwood 2005). To differentiate Taiwanese indigenous peoples from the majority Han Chinese, we use terms such as Taiwanese Austronesians, indigenous Austronesians, Taiwanese indigenous peoples, or simply indigenes interchangeable in this article.

i. Historical Contexts

Historically, despite its close proximity to Han Chinese empires, Taiwan and its indigenous peoples made little impression on China's imperial historiography. It was not until the early 17th century, during European colonial expansion in Southeast Asia, that the Dutch and the Spaniards began to explore the island's southern and northern ends, respectively, and established tiny fortified

trading posts and harbors to guard their commercial interests. Rivalry between the Europeans lasted for two decades and quickly ended when the Dutch successfully drove out the Spaniards from northern Taiwan. Chinese sovereignty was extended to Taiwan in the mid-17th century during the dynastic change when defeated Ming loyalists, under the leadership of Koxinga, in turn drove out the Dutch and established Chinese settler communities on the island. Even though the European colonial occupation of Taiwan had been short—a mere 50 years—it was the first encounter Taiwanese indigenes had with Christianity.

The Ming loyalists in Taiwan eventually succumbed to the consolidating Qing dynasty (circa 1644-1911), which had established formal sovereignty on the island by the late 17th century. For the next two centuries, this newly acquired territory attracted hordes of immigrants from China's overcrowded Southeast Coast, from Fujian and Guangdong provinces where land-hungry farmers had been spilling out across greater Southeast Asia in search of arable land.

Early Chinese records produced by travelers and government officials in the late 17th and 18th centuries depicted Taiwanese Austronesians as primitive and fearsome: practicing slash-and-burn agriculture (growing chiefly millet and hill rice as staples) with simple farm implements, hunting the widely abundant deer for their skins and meat, and raiding and killing each other and outsiders for their heads as war trophies. With a low level of technological sophistication and lacking written languages, the indigenes were considered barbaric and loathsome; they were to be converted to the Chinese way of life if possible. The ensuing encounters between Han settlers and the indigenous peoples had not been pleasant. Armed with more advanced weaponry and organizational capabilities, the Chinese settlers either subjugated the indigenes and turned them into dependent servants or tenants, or forced them to retreat farther into high mountains unsuitable for agricultural use—at least from the Han Chinese point of view.

Imperial Chinese policy towards Taiwanese indigenous minorities, like its treatment of other ethnic groups in the borderlands of the mainland, was an ambivalent one: a mixture biases colored by a belief in sino-centric cultural superiority on the one hand, and benevolent paternalism on the other. Whenever an ethnic minority was assimilated into the supposedly superior Confucian moral world, they were treated as genuine court subjects and protected by law. Thus, the degree to which indigenes complied with Confucian culture became a key benchmark to demarcate the various ethnic minorities. There were the “Cooked Barbarians” who had taken on some of the basic features of Chineseness, such as Han languages, costumes, sedentary agriculture, proper mannerisms and social decorum, and so on. From the court's point of view, the Cooked Barbarians could be further cultivated through education, so they would eventually be “civilized” and could enjoy the benefits of Chinese civilization (Harrell 2001). The so-called “Plains Aborigines” in Taiwan, a conglomerate of more than ten ethnic groups who live at lower elevations throughout the island and who had long experience of Han Chinese culture, belong to this category.

The term “Cooked Barbarians” was long considered derogatory in Taiwanese history and had been shunned for its implication of barbarian ancestry. This negative connotation, however, changed in the late 20th century when indigenous social movements awoke long-dormant nationalistic aspirations and ethnic pride (Brown 2004). One particular group, the Kavalan in Eastern Taiwan, for instance, reclaimed its non-Han Chinese ancestry and was recognized by the government in 2002 as the eleventh indigenous group in Taiwan. Other Plains Aboriginal groups that have organized to reclaim their Austronesian ancestry and gain official recognition, however, have been stonewalled in recent years by the Council of Indigenous Peoples, due to the complexities of sorting out ethnicity and the politics involved.

Taiwan’s “Raw Barbarians” were properly subjects of pacification from the imperial court’s point of view. Since they were “uncivilized,” they had to be fenced off so they would not encroach upon citizens of the celestial empire on the frontier. When marauding Raw Barbarians attacked early Han Chinese settlers or their communities, the government had to respond in kind, sending in troops or constables to arrest the culprits and defend the territory. The Chinese court’s policy toward the Raw Barbarians, however, was more paternalistic than strictly punitive. Administrators at various level of local government knew too well that Han immigrants were not always victims in those conflicts: they could easily outwit the less sophisticated indigenous peoples and used various forms of chicanery to steal their land. To prevent such encounters and their subsequent conflicts and bloodshed, the imperial court ordered erected earthen walls called “bull’s backs,” to separate the settlers and the Raw Barbarians from late 17th century towards late 19th century. The dual purpose of the bull backs was to prevent the barbarians from attacking the settlers, and also to prevent the settlers from entering the tribes’ territories. But due to the continuously increasing population pressure along Taiwan’s western coastal plains, those earthen walls were continuously being pushed back towards the high mountains. This went on up to the tenure of the last imperial governor of Taiwan, Liu Ming-chuan, who launched ambitious modernization plans in 1885 to promote cash crop production such as tea- and camphor-planting in the hills. During the second half of the 19th century Christian missions, chiefly English and Canadian Presbyterians, also began to take an interest in Taiwan and established churches and hospitals on the island. Their initial targets were the local Han Chinese, but their efforts later expanded to the aboriginal areas. In addition to introducing Christian gospels and modern medicine to the indigenes, the missionaries also used a romanization system to translate the bible into Austronesian languages, thus creating a vehicle to record those languages. The establishment of the Tainan Theological College and Seminary in 1876 was a major development since the Seminary would train large numbers of indigenous pastors who became instrumental in their communities’ subsequent development.

Governor Liu Ming-chuan’s modernization project was quickly terminated once the Chinese court ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, the year China was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese colonial government in Taiwan generally followed the imperial Chinese policy by dividing the aboriginal populations into two broad categories of the Raw and the Cooked Barbarians,

minus the Confucian concerns of a universalistic humanity. In addition, the Japanese administration brought modern science and an explicit scientific racism. Among the first wave of the Japanese occupation army that landed in Taiwan in 1895 were also linguists and anthropologists who began to explore the island's indigenous populations. Based on those "scientific" explorations, the Raw Barbarians among Taiwan's indigenous Austronesians were first identified and classified as belonging to nine different tribes or ethnic groups. In addition to this nomenclature change, the colonial government also conducted surveys of the Central Mountain Range (henceforth CMR) that crisscrosses the entire island from north to south. Once the cartography of the CMR was determined, the colonial government declared that all unoccupied forestland belonged to the government, and the indigenous tribes were to be confined to their current residential territories.

To placate and pacify the seemingly unruly Raw Barbarians, the Japanese administration adopted several measures. [The lowland indigenes were taught to grow paddy rice to replace their slash-and-burn agriculture. Those living in the high mountains with limited outside contacts were forced to resettle. Between 1903 and 1941, an estimate 7,318 families with 43,112 people, or about half of the entire indigenous Austronesian population, were forcibly relocated to new settlements below 1,500 meters above sea level (Li 1997). To ensure the success of this policy, the colonial government also constructed police stations in the high hills to monitor indigenous communities. Once the indigenes were registered by the police, they were not allowed to move freely as they had before when practicing slash-and-burn agriculture. Firearms used for hunting were registered or confiscated to prevent possible revolts. These heavy-handed approaches inevitably raised resentment among those ruled.

The Wushe Incident is regarded as one of the most dramatic examples of indigenous revolt against Japanese rule in the CMR regions. In October 27, 1930, some 300 warriors from six Sediq communities, under the leadership of Mona Rudao, attacked the Wushe police station, post office, and school, and killed 134 Japanese, including women and infants. To suppress this audacious rebellion, the colonial government immediately sent in troops numbering 1,194 soldiers and 1,306 police to attack Sediq territories. In addition, the government enlisted the assistance of neighboring Truku groups who harbored historical animosity toward the Sediq. When the Sediq warriors offered stiff resistance, the colonial government even sent in aircraft to drop bombs carrying vesicant gasses. Ultimately modern weaponry won the day, and with 364 Sediq killed and 225 committing suicide, the rebellion was over one month later.

With end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, at the end of World War Two, the heavy-handed policies imposed on Taiwan's indigenous Austronesians moderated somewhat. Instead of calling them Raw and Cooked Barbarians, the Chinese Nationalist government abolished the latter category and registered these indigenes as ordinary citizens. The Raw Barbarians, in the manner of the imperial court's paternalistic tradition, were divided into two categories: the Mountain Compatriots of the Hills (*shandi shanbao*) and the Mountain Compatriots of the Lowlands (*pingdi shanbao*). We

will use Hill Compatriots and Lowland Compatriots to differentiate these two groups below. The Lowland Compatriots are concentrated in relatively isolated east coast areas, and the Hill Compatriots reside in the mountainous areas of Central Mountain Range. As compatriots, both categories were recognized as citizens of Republic of China (namely Taiwan) with full legal rights and obligations. Furthermore, to alleviate their generally poor living conditions, the Nationalist government established various policies that gave the indigenes preferential treatment, such as awarding bonus points to those who took college entrance exams and reserving quotas for them in tuition-free teachers' normal schools or nursing schools. Preferential treatment for Taiwanese indigenes was also seen in the number of their elected representatives at the national, provincial, and local level. Despite all this, these classificatory terms for indigenes remained derogatory and "fictive." For instance, the term "Mountain Compatriots of the Lowlands" is clearly an oxymoron. We will address the name changes in the next section.

While the Lowland Compatriots often lived in mixed communities with Han people and had become increasingly indistinguishable from their neighbors, the Hill Compatriots in CMR reservations, until 1987—the year when Martial Law was lifted in Taiwan—were off limits to ordinary Han people. Non-indigenes who wanted to enter the hill reservations had to apply for permission from local police before entry. This restriction, like the bulls' back of the Qing dynasty, served two purposes. The first was to prevent illegal or clandestine activities in the hills. The second was to prevent the encroachment of the Han people who often tricked the indigenes into selling their land. Since the lifting of the Martial Law in 1987, restricted access to the hill regions has been relaxed and formal entry applications to reservations have become more or less *pro-forma*. However, the government still closely monitors land transactions involving parties on both sides of the ethnic divide to prevent land seizures by Han people and to prevent environmental deterioration from over-development of Taiwan's Central Mountain Range.

ii. Contemporary Distribution

In 1983 when Professor Li Yih-yuan published the first major treatise on contemporary Taiwanese Austronesians, the entire indigenous population was barely over 310,000, or about 1.7% of Taiwan's entire population of 18,790,538, according to the household registration records of the Ministry of Interior. With a rate of population growth that is slightly higher than Taiwanese society as a whole, the number of indigenous peoples increased to 408,030, or about 1.8% of the island-wide population (22,276,672) in 2000, and 504,531, or about 2.2% of the island's total (23,119,772) in 2009. The steady increase of the indigenous population over this past quarter century, however, was not solely the result of natural growth. In the early 1990s, grassroots indigenous social movements began to attract general public interest, and the government changed its policy and granted assimilated indigenes and persons of mixed blood the freedom to decide their own ethnic affiliations and to change their registration at the Household Registration Office. There has been no official tally, however, as to exactly how many people changed their classification this


way.

Among the fourteen officially recognized indigenous tribes in 2010, the largest is the Ami, who mainly reside in the eastern coastal lowlands; Amis number 185,000, or about 38.5% of all indigenous people. They are followed by the Paiwan of southern Taiwan, with 89,000 people or 18.5%. In northern Taiwan, the Atayal tribe has 81,000 people or 16.7% of the total. The fourth largest group is the Bunun, who occupy the center of the CMR; this tribe's population of 52,000 is about 10.5%. The remaining ten groups are generally small in size: [Truku, 26,100 (5.4%); Puyuma, 12,000 (2.5%); Rukai, 12,000 (2.5%); Tsou, 6,800 (1.4%); Sediq, 6,800 (1.4%); Saisiyat, 6,000 (1.2%); Yami (or Dao), 3,800 (0.8%); Kavalan, 1,230 (0.3%); Thao, 698 (0.15%); Sakizaya, 478 (0.1%).

The healthy population growth among the indigenes over the last quarter century does not reveal another major trend that has fundamentally changed indigenous society: their dramatic geographic movement from traditional tribal communities to metropolitan areas where they can find non-agricultural work. According to Taiwan's official household registration records, in 1983, only about 6% of all indigenes lived outside of their traditional territories in urban areas, but by 2009, the proportion of metropolitan indigenes had shot up to 39%. If we include short-term sojourners and youth who attend school in metropolitan areas but retain their home household registration, the actual number of indigenes now living in Taiwan's cities must be close to half the entire population. The biggest out-migration has been seen among the Lowland Compatriots from the Hualian-Taidong Corridor.

When examining just where out-migrating indigenes were headed, we found that their movement follow specific patterns (see Map 1 below). Map 1 marks out in green the traditional indigenous areas and the blue dots indicate clusters of settlements, with each dot representing 10 people. The green shaded area includes the Central Mountain Range and the eastern coastal areas, with heavy concentrations of indigenous populations along Hualian-Taidong Corridor, and Northern and Southern parts of CMR. Outside the green area, three regions are marked by a concentration of blue dots—from north to south, the Taipei-Taoyuan Metropolitan Area, the Taichung Metropolitan Area, and the Kaohsiung Metropolitan Area. These three are Taiwan's major industrial hubs where most of the traditional labor-intensive industries are located. It is in these industrial zones that the indigenes find semi-skilled work in assembly line production, construction, truck driving, and other service jobs.

Map 1: Distribution of Taiwanese Indigenes



3. Major Policy Changes

How can we account for the robust population growth among Taiwanese Austronesians over the past quarter century? Why have they moved from tribal territories to urban centers? Have these movements improved their general well-being or alleviated problems they encounter as marginal groups in Taiwanese society? What factors have contributed to their new confidence in indigenous cultural heritage and ethnic identity? To answer these questions, we must first review the major policy changes that resulted from grassroots social movements in recent decades. In the late 1980s, several college-educated indigenous elites began to question and challenge the social conditions faced by Taiwanese Austronesians; those included: general poverty on the indigenous reservations, social stigma associated with ethnic identity, deprivation of the right to carry out traditional practices (especially hunting and logging) in National Forests, and the gradual disappearance of indigenous languages and culture. The appeals of these leaders struck a chord with a Taiwanese society that was experiencing unprecedented economic growth and prosperity, and was ready to bestow charity and assistance to whatever social causes could justify their legitimacy. To some extent indigenous social protests might have also stirred hidden guilty feelings among Taiwan's Han elites who had selectively ignored or forgotten the cruelties and injustices their forbears had inflicted on the indigenes over the past four centuries. In addition, Taiwan was in the process of undertaking a broader indigenization movement as part of reconstructing its self-identity vis-à-vis China. As a consequence, the indigenous movement gained wide sympathy and support in the early 1990s.

The first concrete result of this social movement was the Name Rectification enacted in 1994, with a constitutional amendment that abolished derogatory terms such as barbarians, aborigines, hill tribes, Mountain Compatriots, and so on for the original settlers of the island. Instead, the English term “indigene” was translated into Chinese and used to represent all Taiwanese Austronesians. Along with the name rectification effort, a 1995 Presidential decree allowed indigenous people to change their personal names from the adopted Han Chinese names logged in the official Household Registration back to indigenous names—spelled with Chinese pronunciations. In 1996 the Council of Indigenous Affairs, a ministry-level office in charge of all matters related to Taiwanese Austronesians, was established under the Executive Yuan.

The initial achievements of the 1990s became complicated later on as democratization and ethnic differentiation continuously deepened and created friction among various groups. In 2000, Taiwan experienced its first political power transition when the pro-independent Democratic Progressive Party (henceforth DPP) defeated the ruling Nationalist Party in the presidential election. To garner favor among the Taiwanese Austronesians, the DPP government accelerated efforts to work out political autonomy for the indigenous tribes. In 2002 the Council of Indigenous Affairs was renamed the Council of Indigenous Peoples to underscore its goal of establishing eventual political autonomy and self-determination among the tribes. A year before the name change, in 2001, the College of Indigenous Studies was established at National Dong Hua University in Hualian as a training institution for future indigenous officials.

Several other measures were enacted by the government in the early 2000s to prepare the Austronesians for eventual political autonomy, though not outright independence. The first was the push to recognize “Indigenous Traditional Land Rights,” which began in 2002. Indigenous tribes were encouraged to reconstruct their migration routes and former settlements through the collection of oral histories, as the basis for reclaiming their homeland territories. Scholarly communities, including the geography department of National Taiwan University, were commissioned by the government to assist the hill communities, using Geographic Information System (GIS) to reconstruct traditional territories. However, since the pre-modern indigenous Austronesians had practiced slash-and-burn agriculture, which entailed constant movement in search of new land, overlapping claims by various groups in the CMR soon emerged. Seeing potential conflicts in the pursuit of such claims, the land right reconstruction project was quietly abandoned.

Another landmark development was the establishment of the Indigenous Television Station in 2003. Ideally, this government-sponsored station should have unified the diverse indigenous groups. But due to the complexity of Austronesian languages (i.e., linguists have identified at least 24 mutually unintelligible languages among the indigenes), which languages to use in broadcasts became a contentious issue, especially among the four largest groups—the Amis, Paiwan, Atayal, and Bunun.

In 2005 the Council of Indigenous Peoples published “The Basic Laws of Indigenous Peoples,” which clearly spelled out the eventual goal of establishing parallel “nationhood” institutions among indigenous communities in legislation, judiciary, education, and so on and so forth. The Basic Laws were approved by the Legislative Yuan in 2007 and have become part of Taiwan’s legal system.

All these policy changes certainly have had a direct impact on the indigenous peoples as regards their self-esteem, aspirations, and their relationship vis-à-vis mainstream society. Public recognition of the Taiwanese Austronesians as a special category of citizens has allowed them to bargain with the national government for special privileges. For instance, in 2004, the Truku group of the Sediq branch, formerly considered part of the Atayal people, demanded recognition as a newly independent group in exchange for all its votes in the upcoming presidential election. The DPP government rushed through the legislation to formally establish the Truku group as the twelfth ethnic group in Taiwan. This enraged the Sediq branch, which considered itself a higher order collective than the Truku and as such should have received such recognition first. This conflict further rekindled historical animosity between the two groups, and the Truku people were accused of assisting the Japanese punish the Sediq during the 1930 Wushe Incident. To pacify the Sediq group, the DDP government in early 2008 recognized it as the [fourteenth indigenous group in Taiwan.


4. Major Findings: Continuities and Changes among Taiwanese Indigenous Peoples

With their newly gained acceptance and respectability, Taiwanese Austronesians began to move *en masse* to urban centers in the 1990s in search of opportunities such as gainful employment, better education, and/or better healthcare. Their tangible progress in education and income can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 below. For instance in Table 1, only 40.27% of Austronesian high school graduates entered colleges in 2001, but that increased to 68.3% in 2006, an almost 30% gain. Impressive as these figures are, their significance quickly diminishes when compared with the national average. Austronesians appeared to have improved significantly from 2001 to 2003, when they not only narrowed the higher education learning gap with the mainstream society, but also outperformed the latter by close to 5 percentage points. This achievement, however, rapidly eroded over the next three years when Austronesian college entrance rates lagged behind, and the gap nearly returned to previous levels.

Table 1: Comparison of College Entrance among High School Graduates

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Austronesians	40.27	59.57	67.11	57.88	60	68.3
Nationwide	61.36	65.63	62.33	76.49	74.16	83.37
Difference	-21.09	-6.06	+4.78	-18.61	-14.16	-15.07

(Source: Chou 2010: 281)



Similarly, in terms of increases in average annual household income, we find comparable fluctuations. Table 2 shows that the average household incomes for the Austronesians was NT\$209,440 (about US\$6,981, based on a US\$1 to NT\$30 exchange rate) in 1985, but grew robustly to NT\$463,980 (US\$15,466) in 2006, more than doubling in 22 years. Superficially, the Austronesians have made significant progress between 1985 and 2006 when their average annual household income increased by 4.6% per year. The real problem is, during this same period the national average increased even faster, by 11.04% per annum: while in 1985 the income gap between an Austronesian household and the national average was a mere NT\$111,055 (US\$3,702), by 2006 it had increased to NT\$600,173 (US\$20,006).

Table 2: Changing Income Gap Per Household Per Annum

	A. Austronesian	B. Nationwide	C. Difference	D. % of A:B
1985	NT\$209,440	NT\$320,495	NT\$111,055	65.3
2006	NT\$463,980	NT\$1,064,153	NT\$600,173	43.6
% increase Per Annum	4.6	11.04		

(Source: Chang, Lin and Liu 2010: 90)

Nowhere is the stagnation in general well-being more clearly seen than in the life expectancy of Taiwanese Austronesians. Due to various structural factors, such as the lack of adequate healthcare facilities in hill communities, higher mortality rates among indigenes due to the prevalence of chronic diseases (e.g., liver diseases) or accidental death, Taiwanese Austronesian life expectancy has remained below the national average, as the following statistics collected by researchers at the National Health Research Institute show.

Table 3: Comparison of Life Expectancy between Indigenous Males and Females with Taiwanese Society

	Aus.Males	National	Difference	Aus.Females	National	Difference
1971-1973*	57.9	66.4	8.5	63.1	71.1	8.0
1984-1986*	58.0	70.1	12.1	68.2	74.6	6.4

1992-1994*	58.1	71.6	13.5	69.3	77.0	7.7
1998-2000*	59.2	72.7	13.5	70.0	78.4	8.4
2001-2009**	64.5	74.9	10.6	73.4	81.1	7.7

(Source,* Wen et al, 2004:323;**Ministry of Interior, 2011)

Table 3 clearly shows that from 1971 to 2009, both Taiwanese males and females experienced expanded life spans, with increases of 8.5 years for males and 10 years for females. Both the Austronesian males and females also experienced increases in their life expectancy (6.6 years for males and 10.3 for females). Despite such improvements, it is alarming to notice the increasing gap between Austronesians males and mainstream society, from 8.5 years in 1971-73 to 10.6 years in 2001-2009. In brief, the above three tables indicate an important point: while Taiwanese Austronesians have made incremental progress in several aspects of their lives in recent decades, mainstream society has moved even faster. As a consequence, the general wellbeing gap between indigenes and the majority remains huge, and in some areas it is expanding.

Another emerging trend among Austronesians is the striking bifurcation between those who moved to urban centers and those who remained in their traditional communities. Since indigenous communities typically occupy relatively isolated regions with limited arable land and sparse natural resources, opportunities for employment that provides a stable income are limited. With increasingly younger and better-educated indigenes moving from their traditional communities to Taiwan's industrial zones and metropolitan areas, significant gaps are emerging between these two groups in terms of income and other social indicators. When we disaggregated the cumulative data by separating them according to their place of residence this divergence begin to show. In Table 4 below, the income gap between Austronesians and the national average in monthly income is obvious. But indigenes who live in urban areas are much closer to the national average than their fellows in traditional communities.

Table 4: Comparison of Workers' Monthly Income Distributions among Rural Indigenes, Urban Indigenes, and the National Average, 2007

	NT\$10,000 -20,000	NT\$20,000 -40,000	NT\$40,000 -60,000	NT\$60,000 -80,000	Above NT\$80,000	Total
Rural Indigenes	47.6%	38.5%	10.9%	2.3%	0.7%	100%
Urban Indigenes	22.5%	52.5%	19.5%	4.4%	1.1%	100%
National Average	23.3%	46.4%	18.0%	5.4%	6.9%	100%

(Source: Chang, Lin and Liu, 2010: 89)

Rural indigenes are concentrated in the lower income brackets of NT\$10,000 to 40,000 (totaling

86.1%), with only 13.9% earning at the above-NT\$40,000 levels. In contrast, urban indigenes have a lower ratio in the below NT\$40,000 (75%, or 11% below the homebound indigenes, but 5.3% higher than the national average of 69.7%), and a higher (above NT\$40,000) income level (25%), approaching the national average of 30.3%. It is worth mentioning here, however, that the higher living costs in cities are not considered and hence growth in income alone may not be indicative of improved well-being.

Similarly, when comparing average household incomes among the various groups of Austronesians on the basis of their residential areas between 2002 and 2006,[those who left traditional communities to locate close to metropolitan areas, such as non-indigenous townships and Taipei city, experienced significantly higher income than the hill township residents, as the following table shows.

Table 5: Comparison of Taiwanese Indigenes' Household Incomes Based on Residence

	Income in 2002	Income in 2006	Growth Rate (%)
Hill Townships	NT\$422,880	NT\$453,622	7.30
Lowland Townships	NT\$389,520	NT\$385,105	-1.10
Non-indigenous Townships	NT\$548,352	NT\$614,935	12.00
Kaohsiung City	NT\$578,796	NT\$600,623	3.80
Taipei City	NT\$571,116	NT\$769,932	34.80

(Source: Cheng and Li 2010: 210)

Differences in income based on residential regions also have other, health-related implications. Public health officials and health-related researchers have long noticed unique mortality patterns when comparing various categories of the indigenes and mainstream society. It appears that among the Austronesians who migrated to cities or lowland communities, owing perhaps to easier access to medical facilities or changing life styles, they show a mortality pattern that is closer to the national average than their hill fellows. Table 6 compares the seven major causes of death among them.

Table 6: Comparison of Major Causes of Death among Austronesian Groups Based on Residence and the National Average, 1999 (Number of deaths per 100,000)

	Hill Indigenes	Lowland Indigenes	Urban Indigenes	National Average
Accidents	184.0	137.3	93.6	58.9
Malignant Tumors	173.4	123.1	141.6	135.3
Liver Diseases	143.8	67.4	65.8	23.5
Stroke	120.7	77.4	87.0	57.4
Heart Diseases	90.5	78.9	93.7	51.3
Diabetes	56.8	39.7	32.1	41.0
Tuberculosis	53.7	30.5	13.7	6.9

(Source: Wu, et al 2001: 8)

Table 6 points to three issues that we can further elaborate on. First, health conditions among the Austronesians, as can be seen from six of the seven major death causes, appear to improve from the hill communities to the lowland communities, and they are further ameliorated in urban environments. The only exception is the category of malignant tumors, a disease closely associated with modern-style living, where there is no significant difference among all categories of people. The second issue that deserves our attention is the exceedingly high ratios of deaths caused by accidents and liver disease among the hill indigenes. Both causes are likely symptomatic of high alcohol consumption, which has become epidemic in many isolated indigenous communities. In pre-modern times, alcohol was made from millet, in limited supply, and was used mainly for ceremonial occasions, such as wedding, funerals, harvests, and so on. The availability of commercially produced liquor with a seemingly unlimited supply has completely changed alcohol consumption patterns in hill communities. With their increased involvement in the cash-based economy, Taiwanese indigenes have fallen into alcoholism at an alarming rate in recent decades. The third issue is the persistence of tuberculosis, which should have been brought under control with the improved public health regimens of recent decades. We suggest that as rural Taiwanese Austronesians maintain a traditional style of living, they seem to remain vulnerable to infectious diseases at a time when their urban counterparts have also begun to experience new endemics associated with metropolitan lifestyles, such as the high ratio of malignant tumors. This double jeopardy has inflicted a high mortality rate on the indigenes, especially those living in the hills.

In general, the indigenous Austronesians who migrate out of their traditional territories have earned higher incomes, received a better education, and enjoyed longer life than fellows in their hometowns. Assimilation into mainstream society through migration also affects how Taiwanese Austronesians perceive themselves in terms of residence, work, and inter-ethnic marriage. The results of our survey on these issues are quite revealing. Table 7 below shows that among the 2,057 samples, 1,809 respondents answered the question as to whether they are willing to work side by side with majority Han people. While 83.02% of those living in traditional indigenous communities responded positively, more than 94% of the urban indigenes gave positive answers. Similarly when asked if they are willing to have Han people as neighbors, only 76.06% of rural indigenes answered positively, while 94.43% of urban indigenes responded positively. Moreover, the question “Have conflicts between indigenes and the Han majority have been very serious in recent years?” seemed to draw generally negative responses from both categories.

Table 7: Changing Indigenous Perceptions towards Han People based on Residence, 2007

	Total Samples	Rural Indigenes	%	Urban Indigenes	%
Total Samples	2,057	1,178	57.27	879	42.73
Willing to work with Han People	1,809	978	83.02	830	94.43

Willing to have Han Neighbors	1726	896	76.06	830	94.43
Conflicts between Ind. and Han Serious	105	46	3.90	41	4.66

(Source: Huang and Chang project questionnaires, 2007)

Table 8: Comparison of Attitudes toward Marrying Han People

	Strong Opposed	Mild Opposed	Mild Support	Strong Support	Total #
Urban Ind.	45 (4.51%)	155 (15.55%)	625 (62.69%)	172 (17.25%)	997 (100%)
Rural Ind.	117 (11.11%)	311 (29.53%)	563 (53.47%)	62 (5.84%)	1,053 (100%)
Total	162 (7.90%)	466 (22.73%)	1,188(57.95%)	234 (11.41%)	2,050 (100%)

(Source: Huang and Chang project questionnaires, 2007)

We also asked about attitudes toward inter-ethnic marriages. Among the 2,050 respondents who answered this question, we find again bifurcation between urban indigenes and their rural fellows as Table 8 shows. When we add the “strongly opposed” with “mildly opposed” into a single category, and the “mildly supported” with “strongly supported,” the divergence emerges sharply: among the rural indigenes, up to 40.64% of our respondents expressed disapproval of marrying Han people, more than twice that of urban indigenes’ 20.06%. The near opposite is true regarding support for cross-ethnic marriages: 79.94% of the responding urban indigenes favor such unions, while rural indigenes indicated a much lower 59.31%, a one-fifth difference. [The difference could just be a reflection of unavailability. For urban indigenes, the opportunities to find suitable indigenous marital partners are likely quite limited.

All in all, developments among the indigenous Austronesians in Taiwan over the past quarter century have several salient features probably not much different from those among other ethnic minority groups in other parts of the world (e.g., see Frideres and Gadacz 2008). Two major parallels should be noted. First, although indigenous minorities have made incremental improvements in major socio-economic indicators, such as higher incomes, better education, and improving general well-being, they nevertheless have suffered from relative deprivation when compared with mainstream society, whose pace of change and improvement has been even faster. The expanding chasm between the two inflicts negative psychological blows upon the indigenes, especially those who stay behind in traditional communities and have been consistently denied the benefits of socio-economic development. Under these circumstances, alcohol has become the readily available escape for the relatively deprived, and the epidemic of rural alcoholism is not an unexpected development.

The second feature is again the bifurcation of the indigenous society. About half of the indigenes have moved out of their traditional communities and their migration have, in general,

changed their perceptions of themselves and the larger society. As dispersed individuals or households in Taiwan's metropolitan areas, they and their children will have fewer and fewer opportunities to practice their traditional language, customs, and social gatherings. In other words, they are becoming more similar to Han people, at least superficially, in lifestyle and aspirations, than to their rural fellows. This ostensibly voluntary and unconscious assimilation process, while providing tangible benefits to Austronesians as citizens of Taiwan, will nevertheless weaken their distinct ethnic heritage as their unique languages, customs, aspirations, and cultural memories gradually fade away, to be replaced by those of mainstream Han people or globalizing trends.

This disintegration of traditional culture has alarmed many elites in rural communities, and they have begun to launch various projects to regain their cultural heritage and ethnic pride. Many individuals and organizations primarily associated with Presbyterian churches in hill communities made the initial efforts to preserve or revive traditional Austronesian culture. For instance, Pastor Pai Kwang Sheng, a Bunun indigene who graduated from Tainan Theological College and Seminary, returned to serve his home village in Yanping township of Taidong County in 1984. In addition to regular Sunday services, in 1992 he also established a kindergarten for pre-school children—the first known educational facility with explicit goals of teaching children their traditional Bunun language and cultural knowledge. Seeing the success of the kindergarten, Pastor Pai began to build a resort-like facility modeled after a traditional Bunun village on the 10 hectares of land he inherited from his father. The Bunun Leisure Farm, intended to serve tourists who wished to experience indigenous life, in 1995 was renamed Bunun Culture and Education Foundation. It soon began to receive donations from various charity organizations. Today, this resort attracts steady streams of visitors who may spend from a few hours to a few days there, tasting traditional Bunun cuisine, sampling Bunun culture, learning Bunun craftsmanship, watching Bunun youth perform traditional songs and dances, and, before departure, purchasing Bunun souvenirs from the gift shops. In addition to Pastor Pai and his wife, this operation has regularly employed ninety full-time and forty part-time workers—a significant contribution to the local economy.

A similar endeavor was developed by the Smangus community of the Atayal group in northern Taiwan. Smangus is a small village of twenty-eight households and some 150 individuals. Situated 1,500 meters above sea level, it is one of the highest-elevation indigenous communities, with only limited transportation accessibility. Smangus used to be called “Dark Tribe” because the village lacked electricity. It was not until 1979 that it finally got access to the electricity power supply. In 1991 Smangus youth report finding huge primary forest with giant thousand year old trees. The discovery immediately suggested the potential for eco-tourism and employment opportunities. In order to prevent destructive competition among themselves and to prevent Han people from seizing their commercial opportunity, Smangus residents quietly began a long consultation process to find the best solution for themselves. It was through the efforts of a village elder, Presbyterian Pastor Icyeh, who invoked the Atayal tradition of *Tnunan* (joint ownership) that all the villagers were ultimately persuaded to pool their land and resources together to form a corporation, called the

Association for the Development of Atayal Smangus na Kalan in 2001. Modeling itself after Kibbutz in Israel, the Smangus organization follows a shared system of work and profit. All villagers take part in work in the village restaurant and boarding facilities. Smangus young people also receive training to become tour guides or cultural instructors for visitors. The triple purposes of tribal cohesion, cultural preservation, and youth employment have accomplished in this endeavor.

Furthermore, unexpected natural disasters have turned into opportunities for cultural revival. On August 8, 2009, Typhoon Moraka struck southern and eastern Taiwan dumping over 3,000 mm of rainfall and creating tremendous damage in many hill communities. In response to this calamity, Presbyterian Pastor Dai Ming-xiong called a pan-indigenous meeting in Taimali, Taidong on August 16. This meeting marked the initial formation of what would become the Culture and Education Foundation for Indigenous Tribal Reconstructions, and participants began to deliberate not only on short-term post-disaster reconstruction, but also on long-term cultural preservation and revival. Pastor Dai set out two long-term goals. The first was to recover indigenous people's traditional wisdom. The second one was to reestablish traditional ways of living more compatible with nature and the environment. Besides channeling external resources to disaster areas into community reconstruction, this foundation also launched two projects in early 2010 as part of its long-term cultural revival plan. The first project, called "Millet Farm Restoration Project," contracts with indigenous farmers to begin growing millet again. Since millet played a central role in pre-modern indigenous life—the many festivals associated with different stages of its cultivation, as well as the production of indigenous cuisine and wine—the restoration of millet farming carries important symbolic meanings. Furthermore, cultivating traditional crops signals a formal departure from the mainstream society's market-oriented, chemical-dependent agriculture. Over 40 hectares of farmland in Taidong were been commissioned to grow millet in 2010.

The second project, called "Taidong Association of Creative Down Wood Culture Enterprise," has requested the government's permission to use post-typhoon down wood—damaged tree pieces claimed by the government since most of them come from CMR's national forests—to produce indigenous art works. The foundation plans to establish a protocol for collecting the down wood; the dual purpose of the project is to preserve indigenous arts by training a new generation of artists and to provide modest incomes for indigenes remain in traditional homeland areas. Whether this is the desired end of the current indigenous development or whether it will succeed is something that we will pick up in the conclusion.

5. Conclusion: Dilemmas of Indigenous Development

Taiwanese Austronesians have gone through a dramatic transformation over this past quarter century (circa 1983-2010). Some of its most salient features include: a healthy population growth rate that steadily increases their proportion in Taiwan's demographic structure, an incremental improvement in income and education (but still lagging behind mainstream society), a massive

outflow of indigenes from traditional homelands to urban areas, a regained self-confidence that enables them to confront mainstream society over perceived discriminations and real injustice they have suffered. They have assumed a new type of self-identity that puts them on a par with other citizens in Taiwan in commonplace social interactions.

This seemingly favorable condition, however, is overshadowed by the emergence of the dual social chasms we described above. The widening gap between indigenous society and mainstream society continues to grow, and the bifurcation of indigenes—almost an even split—between those who move out of the traditional territories and those who remain behind has even more dire consequences. While the indigenes as a whole are slowly improving in their general well-being, the larger society is moving even faster. Hence narrowing the ethnic divide remains an ever-challenging task. In the urban/rural divide, it seems most of the tangible gains and improvements were achieved in relation to migration to cities. Experiences and skills acquired in cities have led to the stratification of Taiwanese indigenous society, which in turn seems to have propelled the willing and skilled migrants into mainstream society. Although indigenous immigrants in cities may try to sustain some of their cultural practices, the macro environment is far from ideal as regards passing their cultural heritage on to the next generation. So their new level of social acceptance comes at a price: their offspring may be at risk of losing their native tongue or traditional customs. If the trend toward urban migration and assimilation continues, Taiwan's unique Austronesian cultures may cease to be a salient part of its rich ethnic mosaic in the next generation or two.

Taiwanese indigenes in traditional communities, especially those who hold little social capital, face a different type of social degeneration. With limited natural resources and employment opportunities, inadequate educational facilities and health care, these communities have few opportunities for social advancement and career development. With this destitution and marginalization, we find a high prevalence of alcoholism, domestic violence, accidental death, suicide, liver disease, and so on. Still, while the general conditions in indigenous homelands may be below expectations, communities there have remained a source of cultural revival. In this less-than-idyllic rural environment we find the transmission of Austronesian languages, ritual ceremonies, folktales, ethical guidance, ecological knowledge, craftsmanship, moral tenets, and family heirlooms from one generation to the next. It is also in this far-from-perfect environment that we find new aspirations for self-determination and political autonomy, as well as strategies to achieve cultural preservation and regain ethnic dignity. The recent efforts to reclaim indigenous tribal names, separate group identities, and carry out cultural revival projects have mostly taken place in traditional rural communities.

Hence the perennial question to every ethnic group and scholar researching this topic: What is the ideal development trajectory for Taiwanese Austronesian minorities? Indigenous Taiwanese elites seem to have identified two distinct paths: “autonomous conservation” and “participatory elevation.” The first option, autonomous conservation, implies the graduate disassociation between

indigenous groups and mainstream society—physically, geographically, culturally, and politically—through the establishment of autonomous tribes or nations with quasi-national institutions, such as educational, judiciary, legislative, and representative bodies. The benefits of having parallel institutions are many. For example, it would ensure that the indigenes' unique ethnic languages or cultural heritage will be fully protected by some formal state apparatus. Embedding tribal languages in officially sanctioned legislation and education will certainly assure their continuity and preservation. In addition, this approach will grant indigenes an autonomous administrative apparatus by which to promote their own interests. That is, they may be able to make better bargains with mainstream society through state-to-state negotiations.

Even though this approach is attractive to many indigenous elites, it does present practical difficulties that render it almost impossible to realize. How to identify the precise number of tribes or nationalities among Taiwanese Austronesians? The increase of officially recognized groups from nine in 1999 to fourteen in 2008 clearly indicates that tribal identification or classification is more often a political expediency used to manipulate marginal groups or negotiate with indigenous elites; it has had little to do with indigenes' subjective identities. The second problem of the autonomous conservation approach comes from the tension between a pan-indigenous identity versus individual or parochial identities; how can this be mitigated for the purpose of future institution building? For instance, how many different education systems based in the different written languages should be prepared for the various nations? The number of Taiwanese Austronesian languages, according to linguists, has been wavering between twenty-four and forty. But if each Austronesians group can declare its own political distinctness and autonomy, we may well end up with over 700 nations, namely, the number of indigenous communities on the island. A third problem when we consider autonomous conservation is how to handle different indigenous communities living side-by-side in the same area, or for that matter, the close to half of the indigenous population who live and work in Taiwan's urban centers? Should they be given the right to choose between being counted general citizens of Taiwan or immigrants from the newly established hill nations? With their limited resource base and employment opportunities, just how these new entities survive will be the real challenge the advocates of autonomy must face.

An opposite approach to autonomous conservation is participatory elevation. This approach starts with the assumption that Taiwanese Austronesians make up a small group whose legally protected citizens' rights and benefits have long been ignored or trampled on by mainstream society. Like any other marginalized minority group elsewhere in the world, Taiwanese Austronesians must take an active hand in changing the status quo. Through public awareness campaigns and legislative motions, indigenous elites have been demanding the establishment or expansion of various types of affirmative action programs that will advance their interests as ethnic minorities. In areas such as education, employment, healthcare, and old-age support, the government can and should establish specific policies that lend additional support to the disadvantaged indigenes. To counter the likelihood of losing their culture and language, Taiwan's multicultural education system could be

expanded to include Austronesian topics, such as language, art, and history, in the teaching curricula. Similarly, certain Austronesian cultural symbols, such as the geometric snake motif in wood carving among Paiwan or Bunun people in southern Taiwan or the millet harvest festivals among the Puyuma and Amis in eastern Taiwan, all can be promoted to represent a part of national culture. Through participatory elevation, Austronesians may make themselves into active citizens, if a small population, within the multicultural state of Taiwan.

This approach has appealed to many Taiwanese indigenes, especially those living in urban centers, but there are also implicit difficulties that may render it impractical. First, there is the very small size of groups such as the Sakizaya (population 478), the Thao (698), and the Kavalan (1,226). Through sheer attrition, these groups may lose their languages within the next generation or two. The same problem also confronts indigenes who live dispersed in urban centers. Since there are few opportunities for interaction with their fellows, they may not be able to maintain their native language in daily communication. A worse scenario is that native language instruction at school may degenerate into a kind of tokenism without real effect. The second difficulty with participatory elevation is that continuous recourse to preferential treatment or affirmative action to promote the interests of the Austronesians is unsustainable. Modern citizenship is based on equal rights and social justice. To remedy historical injustice such as the discrimination or persecution inflicted upon ethnic minorities, mainstream society may adopt short-term measures to correct the status quo, but with a clearly defined time table. No preferential treatment can be permanent or formally institutionalized, lest it violates the basic principle of social justice. Where to draw the line between assisting the historically deprived minority and infringing upon the other citizens' rights to social justice is a question that few politicians or statesmen care to confront.

According to our survey, the grassroots opinion on these two approaches shows a fifty-fifty split. More important, many indigenes in rural communities expressed indifference to these issues and cared mostly about how their lives might be improved financially. We are thus back to square one: there is no smooth and painless development trajectory for Taiwanese Austronesians. The bottom-line question that we face here is more fundamental and philosophical than political: there is simply no minority policy or indigenous policy that can be regarded as good or even acceptable. The existence of any minority or indigenous policy in a society means that there are structural differences among different categories of people living together. Such divisions inevitably entail prejudices, stereotypes, stigmatization, and discrimination—at both individual and group levels. How to eliminate these social scourges is a challenge that neither ancient sage or contemporary spiritual leader has been able to accomplish. Without a clear sign to guide their future development, Taiwanese Austronesians can only muddle along and try to make their way into the future.

Glossary

Academia Sinica the most prestigious research institution in China established in 1928 and

	moved to Taiwan in 1949
Amis	the largest ethnic group among Taiwanese indigenes. Mostly living in Taiwan's Eastern coastal regions
Atayal	the third largest ethnic group among Taiwanese indigenes. Occupied the northern part of the Central Mountain Range
Austronesian	a linguistic stock that includes most of the indigenous peoples in Oceanic islands, except Melanesia and Australia
Bunun	the fourth largest ethnic group among Taiwanese indigenes. Living in the middle girdles of the Central Mountain Range
Cooked Barbarians	a derogatory term used by Han Chinese to address partially sinicized ethnic minorities
Kavalan	Formerly called Plains Aborigines. Recognized by the government as a separated ethnic group in 2002
Malayo-Polynesian	pertaining to the language groups living in today's Malaysia and Pacific islands
Mona Rudao	the leader of the Sediq warriors in Wushe Incident occurred in 1930. Killed by Japanese military during the campaign
Paiwan	the second largest ethnic group among Taiwanese indigenes, living mainly in southern part of the Central Mountain Range
Puyuma	a small indigenous group in southeast Taiwan. Known for its matrilineal descent
Raw Barbarians	a derogatory term used by Han Chinese to address non-sinicized ethnic minorities
Rukai	a small ethnic group in southeastern Taiwan. Shared many cultural features with the neighboring Paiwan people
Saisiyat	an ethnic group in northwest Taiwan
Sakizaya	a small ethnic group recognized by the government as a separate group in 2006
Sediq	originally considered a branch of the Atayal people this group was recognized by the government as a separate ethnic group in 2008
Thao	living around the famous Sun-Moon Lake, this group recognized by the government as a separate ethnic group in 2000
Tsou	an ethnic group who lives in central part of the Central Mountain Range
Truku	living close to the famous Truky Gorge, this group was recognized by the government as a separate ethnic group in 2004
Wushe Incident	a open revolt against Japanese colonial rule by the Sediq people that occurred in 1930
Yami (or Tao)	a small indigenous group living on the Orchid Island, offshore in southeastern Taiwan

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