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General Readings: |
1 |
Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, Andras Sajo, and Susanne Baer, Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and
Materials, Thomson West (2003).
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2 |
Vicki G. Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, Foundation Press (2006). |
3 |
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Richard Pildes,The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the
Political Process, Foundation Press (2007) |
4 |
R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Rockman, The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions,
Oxford Unversity Press (2006) |
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Weekly Schedule and Assignments: |
1.憲政主義基礎理論(Theoretical Foundation of Constitutio) |
(1)憲政主義的古典討論(Classic Discussion on Constitutionalism) |
(A)古典希臘哲學(Ancient Greek Philosophy) |
Plato, Republic, Hackett Publishing, pp. 186-240 (1992).
Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, Cambridge University Press, pp. 61-91 (1996). |
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(B)啟蒙時期歐洲思想家(European Thinkers after Enlightenment) |
John Locke, Two Treatise of Government, Cambridge University Press, pp. 331-374 (2004).
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pp. 112-127, 139-172 (1990).
Alexis de Tocqueville, “Drafting of the Constitution,” Tocqueville on America after 1840,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 381-404 (2009). |
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(C)美國建國時期思想(American Founding Period) |
James Madison, The Federalist [No. 10, 47-51,] pp. 42-49; 249-272, Liberty Fund.
Brutus, “To the Citizens of the State of New York” [I & II,] The Anti-Federalist,
pp. 108-122, University of Chicago Press. |
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(2)英國習慣法傳統:戴西之法治主義(Diceyan Model) |
(A)A. V. Dicey“The True Nature of Constitutional Law,” Introduction to the Study of The Law
of the Constitution, pp. cxxv-cxlviii (24 pages), Liberty Fund. |
(B)T. R. S. Allan, “Introduction,” (especially, “British Constitutionalism”),
Constitutional Justice, pp. 1-29, Oxford University Press. |
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(3)權力分立傳統(Separationof Powers) |
(A)M. J. C. Vile,Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Liberty Fund. |
(a)Chapter 1: “The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and Institutional Theory,” pp. 1-22
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(b)Chapter 6: “The Doctrine in America,” pp. 131-192 |
(c)Chapter 11:“Political Theory, Constitutionalism, and the Behavioral Approach,”
pp. 323-345. |
(d)Chapter 12: “A Model of a Theory of Constitutionalism,” pp. 346-384. |
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(B)Alexander M. Bickel, Chapter 1, 2, The Least Dangerous Branch, pp. 16-23, 34-72. |
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(4)德國二戰前後憲政思想概觀(Pre-/Post-German Constitutional Theories) |
(A)Carl Schmitt Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer, Duke University Press. |
(a)“The Rechtsstaat Concept of Law,”pp. 181-196; |
(b)“The Basic Raghts,” pp. 197-219; |
(c)“Seperation(So-called Division) of Powers,” pp. 220-234, |
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(B)Hans Kelsen, “Legal Formalism and the Pure Theory of Law,” pp. 76-83, in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis,
University of California Press. |
(C)Hermann Helle“The Essence and Structure of the State,” pp. 265-279, in Weimar. |
(D)Ernst Forsthoff, “The Total State,” pp. 320-323, in Weimar. |
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2.科際整合觀點下的憲政主義(Constitutionalism in Social Science>) |
(1)憲法的經濟分析(Economic Approaches to the Constitution) |
(A)F. A. Hayek, “Planning and the Rule of Law,” The Road to Serfdom, pp. 112-123,
University of Chicago Press.
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(B)Joseph A. Schumpeter,Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 250-283, Harper Perennial.
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(C)James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus ofConsentpp. 30-80, Liberty Fund. |
(D)Robert D. Cooter,The Strategic Constitution, pp. 127-148; 171-209, Princeton University
Press. |
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(2)制度學派(Institutional Approaches to the Constitution) |
(A)Peter M. Shane, “Analyzing Constitutions,” inThe Oxford Handbook of Political
Institutions, pp. 191-216
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(B)Karen Orren & Stephen Skowronek,The Search for American Political Development,
pp. 1-32, 78-119, Cambridge University Press.
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(C)Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacypp. 28-81, 285-296,
Princeton University Press. |
(D)Charles Tilly“Where Do Rights Come From?” in Theda Skocpol (ed.), Democracy,
Revolution, and History, pp. 55-72, Cornell University Press.
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(E)Jack Knight, “Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation,” in Constitutional Culture and
Democratic Rule, pp. 361-391, Cambridge University Press. |
(F)Barry Weingast and Douglass C. North "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England,"
Journal of Economic History. (December 1989) 49: 803-32.
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3.比較憲法的國際視野(The Horizon of Comparative Constitutions) |
(1)新興民主國家的憲法改造(Constitutional ngineering in New Democracies) |
[二戰後德國/Post-WWII Germany]
Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany, pp. 61-94, Cambridge University Press.
[法國第五共和/France]
Cindy Skach, Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic,
pp. 71-117, Princeton University Press.
[中歐及東歐/Central and Eastern Europe]
Herman Schwartz, “Hungary,” The Struggle for Constitutional Justice, pp. 75-108,University of Chicago.
[俄羅斯/Russia]
Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia, pp.54-92, 285-303, 19-53.
[南非/South Africa]
Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy, pp. 69-159, Cambridge University Press.
[拉丁美洲/Latin America]
Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies, pp. 1-52, Stanford University Press.
[東亞/East Asia]
Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies, pp. 65-105, Cambridge University Press. |
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(2)行政與立法關係(Legislative-Executive Relation) |
Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations,” pp. 344-365, in The
Oxford Hand Book of Political Institutions.
Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it make a difference?” in The Failure of
Presidential Democracy, pp. 3-87.
Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System,”
in Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin American, pp. 394-439, Cambridge University Press. |
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(3)社會經濟權利(Socio-Economic Rights) |
Mark Tushnet, Weak Court, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law, pp. 18-42, 196-264, Princeton UniversityPress.
Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks, “Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the Triangular Shape of
Social and Economic Rights,” in Varun Gauri and Daniel M. Brinks (eds.), Courting Social Justice, pp. 1-37,
Cambridge University Press. |
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(4)政治「司法化」(Judicialization) |
Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristorcracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism,
Harvard University Press, pp. 31-99, 211-223. |
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(5)緊急狀態下的憲法(Constitution in Crisis) |
David Dyzenhaus, “Legality in a Time of Emergency,” in The Constitution of
Law, pp. 17-65, Cambridge University Press. |
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